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ABSTRACT 
Despite globalization, major differences in access and affordability of pharmaceuticals remain 
across the countries of the world. This dissertation aims at quantifying the differences in the 
price of pharmaceuticals amongst countries, identifying the factors responsible for these 
differences, and examining the policy consequences.  
Paper 1 compares prices in a large set of middle-income countries to some high- and low-
income countries. It finds that prices of pharmaceuticals are inconsistently related to income, 
with many middle-income countries paying more than some high-income countries and some 
paying less than countries that are far poorer. Paper 2 confirms the belief that drug prices in 
United States are generally higher than in 20 other high-income countries, but shows that 
prices became more similar over the period 1999-2008. Using the values and the range of 
three price indices (Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher) calculated with multilaterally- and 
bilaterally-matched samples provides a nuanced understanding of these price differences and 
their evolution. Paper 3 combines price data from middle- and high-income countries to 
ascertain the social, economic and demographic factors that determine differences in 
pharmaceutical prices. It finds that prices in middle- and high-income countries are affected 
differently by competition and globalization and that the greater effect of demographic 
factors on prices in middle-income countries can give them an inherent disadvantage in early 
price negotiation.  Paper 4 also examines possible determinants of price but in this case 
focusses on health system characteristics in OECD countries only. The study finds that whilst 
the overall health system type does not bear any significant relationship with price, 
governance structures do have a moderately strong relationship with the price and availability 
of pharmaceuticals. Based on these results, the Conclusion discusses the issue of horizontal 
and vertical equity in pricing across countries and highlights important policy themes 
emerging from this work overall. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Challenges in accessing medicines outside of the rich, industrial world are well-known, albeit 
not well understood. A critical question is whether the prices at which pharmaceuticals are 
offered are beyond the means of the populations in question. Arguments for pricing 
pharmaceuticals according to affordability amongst countries (cross-country differential 
pricing) and even locally (within-country differential pricing) are multiple and well justified on 
both normative and economic grounds (see Underlying Theory section for a discussion of the 
latter). However, there is little evidence that differential pricing is the dominant pricing 
strategy employed by pharmaceutical companies. This dissertation is an exploration into the 
degree to which differential pricing is taking place, ways of measuring price differences in the 
fairest possible manner given the immense diversity in products across countries, and what 
other factors might be playing into the level of price offered to different country markets. The 
final piece of the work explores the variation that exists in price and scope of availability even 
across the group of wealthiest countries and how this might be accounted for by the type of 
health system or underlying structures—governance, finance, or provision.          
Paper 1 of this dissertation examines relative pharmaceutical prices in middle-income 
countries – the income group about which we know the least. The comparison is made 
through the construction of price indices, here Paasche and Laspeyres price indices. 
According to the World Bank, 70% of today’s global population reside in middle-income 
countries (World Bank 2008) and the wealth of many of these countries is expected to rise 
very rapidly in the years to come. The E7 countries – Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Russia and Turkey – are expected to see real GDP triple from 2004 levels, their wealth relative 
to that of the G7 rising from 19.7% to 43.4% (PWC 2007).  With economic growth, demand 
for pharmaceuticals is expected to increase significantly, especially amongst middle-income 
countries. Price Waterhouse Coopers expects that by 2020 E7 pharmaceutical sales alone will 
account for 19% of global sales in a $1.3 trillion global pharmaceuticals market (PWC 2007). 
According to IMS Health, 7 emerging markets—Brazil, India, Turkey, Mexico, Russia, South 
Korea, and China will soon even eclipse the once-dominant sales drivers, the United States, 
Europe and Japan (Hill 2009).  
Although we know they are growing rapidly, relatively little is actually known about the 
pharmaceutical markets in middle-income countries, namely about price levels offered given 
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that they are not completely industrialized, have some remaining areas of extreme poverty, and 
are overall socially and demographically quite different from the group of high-income 
countries that are the traditional marketplace for high-volume sales of pharmaceuticals. To 
help fill in some of these important gaps in understanding, we constructed price indices to 
explore the relative price of pharmaceuticals in a number of middle-income markets and 
compared them to prices in both high- and low-income markets. The classification of 
countries by World Bank income category was included in order to most appropriately align 
with the real price negotiation process that takes place between pharmaceutical companies and 
countries (as well as both international and civil society organizations involved in health) when 
badly needed medicines fail to reach populations in need (for example with ARVs for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS income category generally works as the tier at which prices are set). .    
Our findings suggest that in fact national income category (income categories were employed 
in order to reflect the actual decision-making process undertaken by pharmaceutical 
companies whenever they undertake highly publicized global price tiering or “compassionate” 
pricing schemes to increase access to badly needed medicines -- e.g. ARVs, malaria, and TB 
drugs) is not consistently related to prices in the countries examined. Indeed the study finds 
that despite the generally accepted view that it would be statically and dynamically efficient as 
well as ethical to price pharmaceuticals according to relative income, that does not appear to 
occur consistently. The study finds a wide variability in pharmaceutical prices, with prices in 
some middle-income countries being similar to those in rich developed countries - for 
example Mexico compared to the United States or Morocco compared to France - regardless 
of the index and of the consumption volumes used, whilst in others they are low in 
comparison to the prices seen in low-income countries. Indeed for some middle-income 
countries the prices seem low even compared to much poorer countries, for example Egypt 
and India compared to western Africa.   
Whilst our study conclusions were clear, the study does have some obvious limitations. The 
samples used to create these price indices include only a portion of medicines that are 
available on the respective country markets. Though we tried to maximise like-for-like price 
comparisons, we gave priority to the overall representativeness of the market.  This means 
that whilst the respective country samples will match with the United States, for example, in 
molecule-indication (the identifying label), they may differ in their prescription status, level of 
competition, age, manufacturer, formulation, or other features. These characteristics should be 
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controlled for in an ideal analysis of price determinants. This was part of the rationale for 
exploring price determinants in Paper 3. 
Our findings require care in interpretation given the sensitivity of relative prices to how they 
are measured. Indeed the use of different indices and different samples of pharmaceuticals 
lead to different relative prices. In this study all Laspeyres index values (which are weighted by 
base country consumption patterns) exceeded their Paasche index counterpart (which are 
weighted by the consumption patterns of the comparator country, or “own-weighted”), 
indicating that the correlation between relative price and volume changes was negative, as for 
most normal goods, that is goods whose physical consumption falls when their prices rise. In 
most countries pharmaceutical prices are regulated by government so this negative correlation 
could come from the regulation itself. Whilst this relationship is expected, the interplay 
between indices and the samples on which they were based did not feel sufficiently clear after 
the publishing of Paper 1 (published as ‘The level of income appears to have no consistent 
bearing on pharmaceutical prices across countries’ CM Morel, AJ McGuire, E Mossialos, 
Health Affairs, 30, no.8  2011 :1545-1552.). This was part of the rationale for exploring the 
relationship between indices in Paper 2. 
In order to see how results differed by country sample, by base country, by unit of physical 
measurement, by type of index used, by matched sample, and by the effects of discounting, 
several additional analyses to those in Paper 1 were undertaken (see Appendix 1). For the 
most part the additional 30 analyses did not alter the main findings of Paper 1. Generally, 
when matching molecule-indications across all middle-income countries -- rather than 
bilaterally with the US—results did not change significantly. Except for the case of Mexico, all 
middle-income countries had prices less than half of US prices throughout the study period. 
Irrespective of the angle of comparison prices in middle-income countries were consistently 
below UK prices when using UK as the base country (although much closer to UK prices 
than US prices), with the exceptions of Mexico and Philippines. When looking exclusively at 
prices calculated using UK-specific consumption patterns, a number of middle-income 
countries had prices higher than UK prices in several years. These included South Africa, 
Tunisia, Brazil, Indonesia, and even western Africa in some years. Broadly speaking, 
pharmaceuticals that are important to the UK market had prices similar to several lesser 
(relative to the UK) developed countries. When focussing on middle-income country prices 
relative to France (another ex-colonial power) findings were similar, with a few more middle-
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income countries, such as Poland and Morocco, having prices above French prices over 
several years when basing prices on French consumption patterns. Regarding the comparison 
of middle- to low-income countries overall the additional findings reinforce those presented in 
Paper 1, suggesting that many middle-income countries have prices below those attained in 
low-income countries. Beyond Egypt and India which were mentioned in the published 
version of Paper 1, results here suggest that Algeria and Tunisia were consistently far below 
those in western Africa over several years of the study, irrespective of the consumption 
patterns or sample used. 
Paper 2 focusses on relative drug prices in high-income countries, quantifying and trying to 
understand the differences in pharmaceutical prices across high-income countries and how 
these differences evolved over a ten year-period, 1999 through 2008.  As in previous studies, 
this is achieved by using price indices despite the fundamental difficulties in using such 
indices.  As is well known, no single price index can provide a “true” quantification of relative 
prices when customers (or patients) in different countries exhibit different preferences. The 
use of price indices is particularly fraught in the case of pharmaceuticals, which come in 
presentations, dosages and compositions that vary from country to country. In addition drug 
prices are controlled in some way in most countries, and often not fully paid by the consumer 
as a result of private or national health insurance programs.  
In view of these difficulties, this study takes a pragmatic approach and makes simultaneous 
use of several indices that respond differently to consumption patterns and to the variations in 
the prices of individual products.  This approach has the double benefit of circumventing the 
inherent impossibility to define a true price index for pharmaceuticals and of providing useful 
information not only from the numerical values of the various indices and their evolution over 
time, but also from their differences.  
This study analyses IMS data from 20 comparator countries from 1999 through 20081 relative 
to the US.  The comparator countries are all high-income countries as defined by the World 
Bank: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.  The analysis is made for two 
                                                 
1 Data was available for years 1999 through the 3rd quarter of 2008, hence just under one full decade. 
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baskets of pharmaceuticals for each country: 1) a multilaterally-matched sample of about 150 
“global” drugs that were available in all comparator countries and the United States in any 
given year, and 2) a much larger bilaterally-matched sample of drugs available in each 
individual country and the United States in each year (between 750 and 2600 drugs) that is 
more representative of the whole market in each country.   
The analysis is conducted by calculating for each comparator country and for each year six 
separate indices, namely the Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher indices calculated separately for the 
multilaterally- and bilaterally-matched samples: LB, LM, PM, PB, FM and FB.  As a result of the 
inverse relationship between usage and price, the Laspeyres indices (which uses weights from 
the base country --the US in most of our study) are always larger than the Paasche indices 
(which use weights from the comparator country) and this effect is magnified when the 
sample size is larger such that LB > LM > PM > PB.  This expected result was indeed verified 
for all years for all countries considered.  
With very few exceptions the indices show that pharmaceutical prices in the comparator 
countries were lower than in the US for the period of the study. They also indicate a decrease 
in those differences with time for most countries with indices increasing from 1999 to 2008.  
Most notable exceptions were indices calculated for Saudi Arabia, which decreased over time, 
and for the United Kingdom, which remained nearly constant.  
For several countries, Finland, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and the Netherlands, the 
total range of the mean bilateral index values was relatively narrow with a difference LB - PB < 
0.25. In that situation, the bilateral Fisher index, FB, which is the geometric mean of LB and PB, 
provides a reasonable and practically useful single number approximation of relative prices of 
a large fraction of pharmaceuticals in two countries. On this basis, it can be said that, on 
average over the ten years of the study, the manufacturer-level prices of pharmaceuticals in 
these countries were between 40% and 50% of US prices.  Based on small differences 
between mean multilateral indices (LM ≈ PM), representative relative price of commonly used 
“global” pharmaceuticals (which constituted on average 33% of the various markets) 
compared to the US could be obtained by using the corresponding Fisher index, FM, in more 
than half the comparator countries.  
In a number of cases, the data showed unusual contrasts between the values of Laspeyres and 
Paasche indices based on the same sample, or between the same index based on multilaterally- 
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or bilaterally-matched samples, or in the relative evolution of these four indices over time.  
Such contrasts served as flags indicating unusual features of the pharmaceutical market in 
individual countries during the period of the study. In several instances, a detailed examination 
of the indices led to a likely explanation in terms of differences or changes in pricing or 
consumption patterns between the comparator country and the US. In all such cases a detailed 
examination of the individual data sets would help to positively ascertain the underlying 
causes.  
Appendix 2 describes the samples used in Paper 2 and shows the results of the sensitivity 
analysis described in the paper.  
Paper 3 looks at the combined middle- and high-income dataset in order to examine potential 
determinants of prices globally. After proving the quality, safety and efficacy requirements 
through pre-clinical and clinical trials, new pharmaceutical products undergo regulatory 
scrutiny by the regional authority (e.g. European Medicines Agency) and/or national agency 
(e.g. Food and Drug Administration, national authorities) in order to receive marketing 
authorization. Pricing and reimbursement negotiations then take place to determine price 
(except where there is truly free pricing) and reimbursement status. So whilst list prices are in 
theory set solely by the manufacturer or distributing company, they are really a result of 
potentially many other, including local, considerations. This study explores what some of these 
might be. 
The paper focusses on the contribution of country-specific economic, social, and 
demographic characteristics, in addition to drug-specific properties such as quality and levels 
of competition in the market. The study utilizes data from 33 middle- and high-income 
countries over a 10-year period, and, as such, it is much larger than previous studies of 
medicine price determinants and is the first to consider the potential relationship of country 
social and demographic characteristics to pharmaceutical prices.  
The study finds the price of drugs in all countries to be strongly negatively associated with the 
time since their global launch and positively associated with national income per capita 
(although this latter effect was less strong in middle- than in high-income countries).  Prices 
offered to middle-income countries are particularly dependent on several socio-demographic 
variables rather than purely economic ones. In middle-income countries, the percentage of old 
people was the strongest determinant of drug prices, most probably reflecting a rapid increase 
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in demand.  The length of time since launch of a drug in a country was strongly positively 
related with its price, likely a result of product recognition and associated marketing strategy 
and ensuing purchaser behaviour. Overall, results suggest that prices offered to purchasers in 
middle- and high-income countries are affected differently by globalization and competition 
and that social and demographic differences in middle-income countries give them a notably 
different negotiation predisposition (less leverage) that may deserve attention in global 
discussions surrounding fairer pricing and improving access to medicines. A description of 
each of the 13 samples used in Paper 3 can be found in Appendix 3. 
Bringing in a new, yet related angle, Paper 4 explores possible relationships between the price 
of pharmaceuticals and health system type, using the best methods approach explored in 
previous sections (namely in Paper 2). The study finds no quantitatively detectable relationship 
between overall health system type and pharmaceutical prices or market take-up in OECD 
countries. However, it does find a moderately strong relationship between regulation and both 
price and availability of pharmaceuticals in the national market. State dominance in 
governance if found to lead to slightly lower prices but also to a slightly more limited range of 
therapeutics available.  These more subtle findings should be considered with caution due to 
the limited sample size.  However, the overall greater importance of regulatory dominance 
than dominance of financing and provision may have implications for pharmaceutical as well 
as wider health policy.  For example, privatization of provision (an effective transition from an 
National Health Service to a National Health Insurance system) in the name of budget 
constraints or achieving greater efficiencies does not necessarily translate to attaining more 
competitive prices in the pharmaceutical market.   
Findings also suggest that allowing the devolvement of financing to sick funds (similar to what 
one would see in a transition from a non-profit National Health Service to an Etatist Social 
Health system) does not necessarily translate to a loss of ability to contain prices. Such a 
transition would have little effect on pharmaceutical prices. Decentralization of regulation, 
finance, and provision (e.g. in a transition from an National Health Service or an Etatist Social 
Healht Insurance system to a Social Health Insurance system) would however limit the ability 
to contain prices--interestingly not due to any loss of monopsonistic (sole payor) leverage 
(there would be no change in financing dominance from ESHI to SHI)—where one would 
likely assume the greatest influence would stem from in a free market--but rather from the 
transition away from state governance. Interestingly a closer relationship was also detected 
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between the availability of pharmaceuticals and regulation than between availability and either 
financing or provision. Again the governance role appears to be a more important 
determinant of the number of therapeutics available than who finances them or who 
prescribes them.  Here state dominance in governance leads to slightly more limited range of 
therapeutics available. Appendix 4 provides background material supporting Paper 4. 
In the name of comprehensiveness Appendix 5 aggregates price data across all countries 
(including all income levels) using optimal methods. Although the aggregation of data from 
such different parts of the world limits the size of the sample that can be analysed (down to 
approximately 100 for the multilaterally-match sample) and is arguably less fair given the 
inherent differences in the market (see Paper 3), there was value to be gained in such an 
exercise, namely as a type of sensitivity analysis for the overall work. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
Paper 1: ‘The level of income appears to have no consistent bearing on pharmaceutical prices 
across countries’ CM Morel, AJ McGuire, EA Mossialos (2011) Health Affairs, 30, no.8: 1545-
1552. 
Paper 2:  ‘Comparison of pharmaceutical prices amongst high-income countries using 
multiple indices’ CM Morel (submitted for publication) 
Paper 3:  ‘Global pharmaceutical prices and country development: How do economic, social, 
and demographic factors affect prices and how do middle- and high-income countries 
compare?’ CM Morel (submitted for publication) 
Paper 4:   Pharmaceutical markets across OECD countries: How do the markets differ and 
what role do health system structures have in determining such differences? CM Morel (to be 
submitted for publication) 
Appendix 1: Includes technical material not included in the paper, full results (a limited 
number of results could be published in the paper itself), additional study limitations, and 
additional results examining how results differed by country sample, by base country, by unit 
of physical measurement, by type of index used, by matched sample, and by the effects of 
discounting. 
Appendix 2: Includes the description of samples used in each of the analyses and results of 
the sensitivity analysis testing for changes in base country and discounting.  It also rebases 
prices to help examine evolution over time. 
Appendix 3: Includes summary statistics for the variables of each of the models 1-13 
described in Paper 3. 
Appendix 4: Includes background material supporting Paper 4. It provides a picture of the 
relative size of the individual country markets by molecule presentation (also a decent proxy 
for variability) and the degree to which the samples used in calculating the indices were 
representative of the individual country markets. 
Appendix 5: Includes additional price indices constructed for all countries together using 
optimal methods, using the US as the reference case. Also calculates global indices using other 
countries—including from other income classes--as the reference case.  
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METHODS SUMMARY 
All papers are based on the same IMS dataset of ex-manufacturer prices from the decade 1999 
through 20082.  
Paper 1 constructs Paasche and Laspeyres price indices to explore price variation across a set 
of 14 middle-income countries, 3 high-income countries and an aggregate low-income country 
zone (made up of 10 countries in western Africa). 
Paper 2 constructs Paasche, Laspeyres, and Fisher price indices to explore price relatives in 20 
high-income countries compared to the United States.  
Paper 3 examines the determinants of prices across 33 middle- and high income countries, 
looking at the association with country development indicators in addition to characteristics of 
the pharmaceuticals themselves.  
Paper 4 constructs Fisher price indices to explore price relatives across OECD countries and 
investigates possible relationships between these price relatives and the type of health system 
in place as well as the underlying health system structures (in particular focussing on the actor 
dominating regulation, financing, and provision within the system) using pairwise correlation.  
 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND PREPARATION 
A very large dataset was acquired for this project from IMS Health. Data came in the form of 
an IMS-specific “Dataview” format, including monetary sales and unit sales volume data from 
the decade 1999 through the third quarter of 2008, including from the following country 
markets: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey ,UK, United States, and a 
commercially aggregate West African zone including Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, and Togo.  Data were 
extracted and loaded into STATA where they were reshaped, variables named and grouped 
                                                 
2 Only the first three quarters of data were available for 2008 
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where appropriate, and categorical variable values coded.   Duplicates in terms of all variables 
were dropped. Combination products were dropped. 
Positive sales (in terms of thousands of USD) were summed across all country-ATC3-
molecule combinations by quarter, conversion from local currency having been undertaken by 
IMS Health using exchange rates in effect at time of sale (converted by quarter).  Sales data for 
quarter 4 in 2008 (missing data) were calculated as the average of the first 3 quarters of that 
year. Positive unit sales (in terms thousands of standard units3  and kilograms) were summed 
across all country-ATC3-molecule combinations by quarter. Unit sales data for quarter 4 in 
2008 (missing data) were calculated as the average of the first 3 quarters of that year. 
Pharmaceuticals with very small (smallest 3% by volume in terms of standard units) were 
dropped.  Sales and unit sales were then converted to years. [Data outlay: Each ATC34 
category had at least one molecule within in, usually several.  Each molecule fell within one 
indication, sometimes more than one. Pharmaceuticals were defined as ATC3-molecule 
combinations, allowing any multiple indications to be counted separately.]  Prices were 
calculated by dividing sales by unit sales and deflated (to 2005 dollars) using World Bank 
estimates of the annual GDP deflator for each country.  Here the GDP price index is 
preferable to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), a better known general index, for a several 
reasons. Most importantly here, the composite CPI only covers approximately 60% of the 
economy, omitting government purchases, rural consumers, and investment goods. With the 
high proportion of health care expenditures—including pharmaceuticals--coming from federal 
and state governments it becomes particularly important to use a price index, such as the 
GDP deflator, that more broadly reflects the whole economy (MEPS 2014).   
The data include all drugs sold to the retail market. As such it does not include those sold to 
hospitals, except in the case of hospital private pharmacies that purchase through retail 
channels. (Together the retail and hospital sectors comprise the complete formal 
pharmaceutical market within each country.) It should be noted that the implications of 
omitting pharmaceuticals destined for hospitals may include a selection bias in that hospitals 
                                                 
3 Standard units are the small common dose unit. For oral solid forms this is one tablet or capsule, for 
syrup forms this is 5 ml, and for injectable forms this is one ampoule or vial. Defined Daily Doses 
were not available.   
4 The 3rd Anatomic Therapeutic Class (which classifies with 3 to 4 digits). 
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use a greater number of intravenous drugs, a greater number of drugs for serious diseases and 
diseases with pathogens resistant to first/second-line therapies. This may suggest that the 
database used for the analyses had a downward bias in prices due to a cheaper selection of 
drugs. However, hospitals are also known to be price sensitive and thus to switch quickly to 
generic substitutes as soon as they are on the market. This, on the contrary, would suggest that 
in omitting pharmaceuticals in the hospital channels the dataset utilized may have suffered 
from an upward selection bias if compared to the overall price (whole market) in the 
respective country markets. Prescribed drugs as well as OTC drugs are both included in the 
dataset.   
In the creation of the price indices (Chapters 1,2, and 4), drugs are collapsed by molecule-
indication combinations. This means that there may be some variation across all other 
attributes from country to country, including in quality. So indeed the drugs matched across 
countries may have some differences in terms of their quality. This method of matching drugs 
is meant to be as inclusive as possible given that there is so much variation in the other 
attributes of the drugs available across different countries or even local markets. Inclusiveness 
in this case was traded off against an exact like-for-like comparison as the latter would have 
dramatically reduced the sample size.  In Chapter 3 quality was able to vary across countries as 
the data did not have to be collapsed down as it did in the index calculations. In this case 
quality pertained to each drug by way of several proxies (e.g. level of global penetration, 
molecule age). 
Prices were weighted by sales volumes across all products, pack-sizes, forms, and strengths. 
Prices represented ex-manufacturer prices for medicines being sold to the retail market except 
in the case of a few countries for which distribution pathways are not delineated between retail 
and other5.  Data from the United States were based on drugstore, food store and mail service 
distribution channels.   
                                                 
5 Singapore and Sweden prices include those for medicines destined for retail and hospitals. 
Indonesia and Malaysia prices include those destined for retail, hospitals, and dispensing 
doctors.  
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Copies of base country price and volume data were made and renamed for use as separate 
weighting variables. Level of global presence was calculated for ATC3-molecule combinations 
for multilateral matching across country groups of interest.  In an identical, separate file only 
ATC3-molecule combinations matching with the US were kept in order to create bilaterally-
matched indices.  Samples were then created to calculate the price indices. 
Calculation of price indices was undertaken using the following formulas. The Laspeyres 
index, L, for a comparator country, C, weights prices according to consumption patterns of 
the base country, i.e., the United States in most of the study: 
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Where QM,USA is the quantity weight of the pharmaceutical sold in the USA, and PM,C  and 
PM,USA  are the prices of the pharmaceutical per standard unit in the comparator country and in 
the USA , respectively.  
Paasche index, P, weights prices according to consumption patterns of the comparator 
country (sometimes called “own-weighting”):  
))((
))((
P
,,
,,
USAMCM
CMCM
C
PQ
PQ



 
Where QM,C is the quantity weight of the pharmaceutical sold in the comparator country, and 
PM,C and  PM,USA are the prices of the pharmaceutical per standard unit in the comparator 
country and in the USA, respectively. 
Fisher price indices were also calculated for each country.  
L*PFisher
 
Where P is the Paasche index value and L is the Laspeyres index value. (Fisher indices are the 
geometric mean of Paasche and Laspeyres Indices.) 
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As part of a separate but related branch of this project a regression model was estimated using 
panel data with random effects.  
    
for molecule m, in country i, in year t.  
The vector Z represented the country-specific predictor variables, whilst the vector X 
represented the drug-specific predictor variables. Log transformations were used for prices (ln 
P) and characteristics, reflecting proportional effects as they were not normally distributed. 
Full variable descriptions are provided in Paper 3 itself. 
Paper 4 constructs Fisher indexes (described above) for the entire pharmaceutical market 
within each OECD country, also utilizing the IMS price/volume dataset.  The same is then 
done for originator and generic pharmaceuticals individually in order to detect differences in 
price trends in these sub-markets.  The three sets of price relatives are then used in multiple 
simple pairwise correlations to test for relationships to health system type and the actor 
dominant in regulation, financing, and provision within the health system.  
   
n.b. There were some problems encountered with the original IMS data. Indeed upon hearing 
of major omissions IMS re-uploaded and re-sent new versions of the database (this occurred 
twice). However, some problems with the data were never resolved. For example, many UK 
prices for the year 2007 were negative (IMS failed to provide an explanation for this but it is 
assumed that some change in their methodology changed that year). Price data expressed per 
kilogram also contained major errors from the year 2004 on. Again, IMS was approached 
about this but gave no explanation. A representative did however informally suggest that there 
may have been some conversion errors when creating the database. Therefore, whilst 
numerous price indices were constructed using kilograms as the volume measure, none of 
these was used as the basis for the studies presented here.  
  
mitmtitimit XZP   ln
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UNDERLYING THEORY 
DIFFERENTIAL PRICING  
Pharmaceutical companies that are geared towards research and development often provide 
innovative products to the market. In some cases such new products may even introduce an 
entirely new class of therapeutics.  If there are no therapeutic alternatives from the same 
therapeutic class or from another class with similar application, then such a product can, in 
theory, command a very high price (premium price) in a free market.  In this sense innovative 
pharmaceutical companies can function much like monopolies in that they are a single 
supplier of a product. Given that access to innovative products can represent life or death for 
a patient or can significantly prolong life, the issue of monopoly pricing and the level to which 
it restricts access is at the forefront of any debate over health system financing (e.g. the ability 
of single or multiple payors to negotiate prices down), intellectual property protection, and, of 
course, equity in access. 
In normal monopoly pricing strategies, prices are set at a level above a socially optimal point 
and only populations that are relatively well off and have low price elasticity of demand can 
purchase the goods.  Under such conditions, both consumer and producer surpluses are 
foregone. The principles of differential pricing according to elasticity of demand (also known 
as Ramsey pricing or Boiteux-Ramsey pricing6) allow for a product to be offered at more than 
one price level, commensurate with the respective elasticities of those consumers who could 
not afford the product under normal monopoly pricing.  Such an approach follows an inverse-
elasticity rule according to which higher prices are offered to consumers with lower price 
elasticity of demand and lower prices to those with higher price elasticity of demand.  It is 
often applied by utility firms in the electric and telecommunications industries, as well as 
railroads, airlines and other deregulated industries (Shepherd 1992).  The fairness argument 
underpinning such pricing strategies (“vertical equity”; see below) hinges upon the idea that 
                                                 
6 William Baumol was actually the one responsible for attaching Ramsey’s name to the work 
although Ramsey’s one paper on the subject (published in 1927) actually dealt with optimal 
rates of taxation. Ramsey had noted that the inverse-elasticity rule was appropriate in that 
context in order to minimize the loss of efficiency from taxing alternative goods.  Baumol 
applied this idea to utility pricing (Shepherd 1992)  
The structure of Boiteux pricing (1956) and Ramsey pricing (1927) are very similar and, as 
such, the strategy is often referred to as Boiteux-Ramsey pricing. 
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poorer populations will be offered essential products at prices in line with their level of 
affordability and they will not be simply priced out of the market as in the case of pure 
monopoly pricing. Beyond the equity argument, differential pricing strategies are also 
considered to offer advantages in terms of economic efficiency. For example, rather than 
offering one high price to the small population that can afford the product, differential pricing 
strategies offer the product (often with slight differences in branding or formulation) at 
different price points in order to be able to sell to more price elastic markets. In theory sales 
can be increased until all demand is saturated out towards the equilibrium point where supply 
equals demand.  The net result is to maximize both total output and consumer surplus, thus 
improving static efficiency.  
The version of differential pricing referred to as Ramsey pricing is not without controversy. 
Ramsey pricing advocates often claim it to be “the one superior, automatic, and effective 
device for efficient results” and use it to argue for a complete hands-off approaches, 
particularly in debates on deregulation and privatization.  A primary example is that of 
formerly monopolistic utility firms that are evolving toward full competition. Ramsey pricing 
advocates argue that such dominant firms should be permitted total freedom in pricing and to 
discriminate at will, stressing that it will result in a set of efficient prices that will not, on the 
whole, exploit customers.  
A key argument against Ramsey pricing is that price discrimination can be used to under-price 
smaller competitive firms and to prevent their growth and innovation. In retaining greater 
dominance, the former natural monopolistic firm is able to control and limit innovation, in 
some cases considerably (Shepherd 1992). By using differences in demand rather than cost as 
the basis for prices, Ramsey pricing has in principle no lower limit, not even long-run marginal 
cost, a condition that can violate basic notions of fair competition. As stressed by Shepherd, 
this situation could be tolerable if Ramsey pricing assured an efficient outcome. But he argues 
that it does not because a quasi-monopolistic company cannot be trusted to abstain from 
reaping excess profits, and hide the fact that it does (Shepherd 1992).  
The debate over the use of Ramsey pricing has focussed primarily on utilities and seemingly 
created a rift between those “for” and those “against.” In this dissertation, which deals with 
the pharmaceutical industry instead of utilities, the issue of price discrimination requires a 
nuanced approach. There is, of course, a basic similarity in the economic structure of utility 
and pharmaceutical companies that makes Ramsey pricing arguably suitable for both: marginal 
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costs are well below average costs and thus across the board marginal cost pricing leads to 
financial loss (Shepherd 1992).  In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, the immense costs 
associated with pharmaceutical research and development is in wide contrast with the very 
small cost of manufacturing an additional pill (especially in the case of synthetic compounds).  
As in the case of utilities, a fundamental reason for differential pricing of pharmaceuticals is to 
increase the global access to essential goods. This argument has particular weight when the 
accessibility to drugs can be a matter of life and death. 
The possibility of excess profits resulting from Ramsey pricing clearly exists in the 
pharmaceutical industry as it does in others. This possibility is magnified by the simple fact 
that the complicated nature of investment in pharmaceutical companies, the different and 
purposeful way by which they discount and estimate the opportunity cost of capital, and the 
high level of secrecy they maintain regarding their finances make it effectively impossible to 
know their true internal costs. In theory, firms using differential pricing can increase sales and 
profits through finely tailored pricing bands that correspond closely to individual consumer 
affordability. (In reality, however, the practical number of possible pricing bands for 
pharmaceuticals may be more limited.) In middle- and low-income countries in which little 
was previously offered for a particular class of therapeutics, the potential size of the new 
market and the ensuing new revenues may be substantial. This is especially true for makers of 
innovative products that stand to expand into large new markets.   
Nonetheless there are particular characteristics of pharmaceutical markets that militate in 
favour of differential pricing.  First, whilst pharmaceutical firms may be effectively 
monopolistic in the case of drugs for which there is no clear alternative treatment, this 
situation is undermined as patents expire and competitors enter the market, or alternatives 
become available. More importantly, differential pricing of pharmaceuticals can be justified by 
the need to provide sufficient profits (from high prices to the populations that can afford 
them) to defray the very high costs of R&D (typically 20-30% of costs, compared to much 
lower proportions in other industries) whilst simultaneously providing access to essential 
goods to those with lesser means.  
Differential pricing of pharmaceuticals can also offer benefits such as enforcing patents by 
helping to deter involuntary licensing. Firms are of course very fearful of licensing in that it 
puts immense downward pressure on prices towards marginal costs – a price level at which 
pharmaceutical firms are not financially viable over the longer term given their cost structure 
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characterized by high early sunk costs. In this sense differential pricing can be argued to 
improve dynamic efficiency. 
However, for differential pricing to be efficient two things are required. First, sales into the 
various markets must be segmented with the separation determined by elasticities of demand. 
If there is leakage across markets, either across consumer groups within a country or across 
different countries, such that cheaper priced products become available in markets with lower 
elasticity of demand, then the strategy breaks down as firms are unable to accrue sufficient 
profits.  For the pharmaceutical industry, the perceived threat of leakage and arbitrage are 
believed to be the primary reason that firms do not make their products available in many 
parts of the developing world. Second, in order to properly tier their prices, firms need to be 
able to divide customers into groups according to their respective elasticities of demand. This 
is no easy task, especially for sales into countries where the firm may have little experience.  
Short of being able to either directly observe behaviour or estimate willingness-to-pay for 
pharmaceuticals, firms are in most cases limited to using proxies for price elasticity of demand. 
In this situation national (or regional) income is usually the most convenient such proxy. 
As mentioned above, a major motivation for differential pricing of pharmaceuticals has to do 
with “fairness.” In economics this notion is generally discussed in terms of “horizontal” and 
“vertical” equity. Horizontal equity implies that people with the same financial situation 
should make similar contributions towards something. It implies that there shouldn’t be 
discrimination on the grounds of differences in personal background, type of work, etc.  
Vertical equity implies that groups with a greater ability to pay should pay proportionally 
more.  In this sense vertical equity is concerned with the redistribution of resources within 
society. Both types of equity are important in the case of pharmaceuticals. The most obvious 
justification for differential pricing of pharmaceuticals is founded in principles of vertical 
equity: people should be charged drug prices commensurate with their relative income. But 
the issue of relative contribution to global pharmaceutical R&D is a matter of horizontal 
equity: countries with similar income should make similar contributions to the common good 
that is pharmaceutical research. The question of the fairness of pharmaceutical prices being 
higher in the US than in other countries can be viewed in this framework. High US prices are 
not a result of prices being lower elsewhere; rather they are the prices that the US market will 
bear. So whilst overall pharmaceutical prices in the US may be higher than elsewhere, this 
shouldn’t be viewed as being unfair in that US preferences are responsible for these price 
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levels. The amount of R&D made possible through high US prices should therefore be seen as 
a reflection of what is “fair or better” according the US’s own view (a concept in line with 
Baumol’s notion of “superfairness” (Baumol 1980).    
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES IN MEDICINE PRICE COMPARISON  
Understanding the differences between medicine prices across countries can be important on 
several levels. For example, national (or even local) health and pricing strategies may need to 
be aware of the relative prices of medicines sold in a neighbouring country to better predict or 
prevent patient migration. National authorities may be interested in understanding relative 
differences to better manage parallel imports and their impact on local availability. Payors are 
interested in relative prices in order to leverage price negotiations with manufacturers, rebates, 
discounts, refunds, etc. Patients, especially those living near national borders, are interested in 
relative prices to inform their choice of where to seek care. The public and civil society 
organizations are interested in understanding the difference in medicine prices internationally 
to understand and indeed better fight for fairness in pricing and access to medicines. Indeed 
international medicine prices are a major issue across civil society and in geopolitics.  (See 
Appendix 5 for an exploration of how these differing desires might be reflected in how the 
price comparisons are undertaken.) 
When comparing prices across goods there is the desire to compare those of like-for-like 
products to achieve a meaningful comparison. In this sense price comparisons should have a 
sample that is defined according to clear criteria for matching medicines across countries and a 
common unit for measuring both price and volume.  In reality however, the immense diversity 
in available medicines makes defining a sample for comparison challenging. Even within a 
single country, a given pharmaceuticals can be available with a variety of names reflecting 
significant variation in licensing status and marketing strategies.  For example, they may have a 
known brand name, a generic brand name, or just a generic international non-proprietary 
name. Also, the same molecule may be used in many different products and be sold in a 
variety of different forms. For example, a given molecule may come as a traditional tablet, a 
slow-release tablet, a capsule, a suppository, an injection, etc. Often the different forms are 
launched by the same manufacturer but this is not always the case.  Also, with respect to their 
prices, the different technology used to produce the different forms as well as the marketing 
strategies behind their sales can create significant variation in price amongst products with the 
same molecule.  Further, within a single country medicine price can also vary by batch, which 
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is in turn affected by the scale of purchasing, pharmaceutical policies, and sales sector (e.g. 
retail, hospital, prescription, over-the-counter).   
When price comparisons are done across countries, further complications are imposed.  The 
comparison of medicine prices across national borders (or across sub-national areas of 
differing regulatory jurisdiction) is in some ways just like for other goods.  However, given the 
enormous diversity in products on the market, indirect nature of purchases, and the rapid pace 
of technological progress in medicine, comparison can be more complex.  Indeed medically-
used molecules sold throughout the world come in a plethora of different names, product 
type, levels of patent protection and license status, therapeutic purpose, packaging, 
formulations/ combinations, and strengths.  This can make comparisons using even the most 
sophisticated and specially-designed software very challenging.  For example, products are 
launched at different times from country to country, thereby leading to often very different 
measures of time-on-market (sometimes used as measure of age) which has been found to 
have implications for price. The level of intellectual property protection accorded to a 
medicine also varies from country to country and may have important implications for price.  
In addition, variation in societal preferences has led to different products and strengths being 
dispensed as well as to different approaches to dispensing (e.g. pack-splitting) which also 
impact unit price and can make standardization difficult.  Currency conversion poses further 
challenges for international price comparison.  Whilst exchange rates are a common method 
of converting from one currency to another, as they are affected by often volatile financial 
market conditions, they too can fluctuate significantly. Purchasing power parities are meant to 
smooth out fluctuations in exchange rates since they are independent of financial market 
conditions, however, they are not actual transaction prices.  
Given this immense diversity in product mix both within and across countries, standardization 
across samples imposes poses significant challenges.  Whilst standard physical units such as 
grams, kilograms, litres, tablets, etc. as well as packs and prescriptions are common ways to 
measure volume of medicines, these units are only useful if the medicines being studied are 
uniform. Comparison involving drugs with even slightly different characteristics requires other 
units for standardization. If volume is standardized in terms of grams of active ingredient, 
drugs with low potency will comprise a larger fraction of the total than drugs with higher 
potency.  The use of tablets as the unit of standardized measurement also presents problems 
due to their differing strengths. The price per pill or “standard unit” is often used but leads to 
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bias if the relation between unit price and volume is non-linear because of economies of scale 
in packaging or high-volume discounts.  
In sum, medicine price comparison is a complicated process and implies numerous trade-offs.  
The more narrowly the sample is defined to ensure similarity of products, the more the sample 
is restricted and thus less representative of the country’s medicine market as a whole.  Also, 
the greater the number of countries included in the comparison, the more difficult it is to 
match identical products—thus decreasing the size of the comparison sample and further 
diminishing the representativeness of the sample.  Given the inherent differences in and 
between drug markets, there is no single ideal measure of price differences. However, whilst 
none are perfect, certain methods are more appropriate than others. The methods chosen for 
the studies presented here purposefully tackle medicine price comparison from multiple angles 
in order to mitigate these problems and provide robust estimates for relative differences 
across as many products and countries as possible. 
LACK OF AVAILABLE COMPARATIVE PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE DATA 
Whilst some data can be laboriously extracted from reimbursement tables and National 
Formularies there are very few sources of data on drug prices (Mossialos and Mrazek 2003). 
Generally governments do not provide detailed price data to external researchers (Mossialos 
and Mrazek 2003). In the European Community an attempt was made in 1988 to compile 
drug price and reimbursement rates (along with other product information) across Member 
States. However, as explained by Mrazek and Mossialos (2003), the initiative ultimately proved 
too ambitious and by 2001 plans for the database were abandoned. The best available data for 
research are those tabulated by commercial organizations who do many (opaque) adjustments 
to the data in an attempt to make it more complete, representative of the whole market, and 
generally more standardized.  For example, much of IMS data is disseminated as retail or 
hospital level data but in fact it is measured at another level of the distribution process and 
marked up or down based on numerous assumptions (see Appendix 1 for list of assumed 
price evolution from manufacturer to patient). Prices are often expressed as ex-manufacturer 
prices but taken to reflect retail price movements.  The retail price of prescribed drugs 
normally includes a dispensing fee and some prescriptions include both a mark-up and a 
dispensing fee (CIHI 2001). The complexity in real transaction does put into doubt the 
validity of prices when such broad brush standardization practices are used.  
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A handful of countries have extensive experience in gathering drug prices and constructing 
drug price indices. For example, Statistics Canada tracks drug prices charged by manufacturers 
using a drug component of the Industrial Products Price Index. Canada’s Patented Medicines 
Price Review Board also follows manufacturer price increases, but in this case only for 
patented drugs. The Canadian CPI health component includes sub-components for drugs. 
However, even in this context it is questioned how well the price changes are captured given 
that there are only a limited number of drugs included (listed by generic name) and that in 
some cases treatment patterns change very quickly (CIHI 2001). In sum, short of conducting 
one’s own surveys, IMS data (the data used in the papers making up this dissertation) for 
comparing drug prices cross-nationally is not perfect but it is the best data we have. 
PRICE INDICES AND THEIR USE IN POLICY MAKING 
The difficult problem of comparing prices over time or across countries is an old one in 
economic theory. The major underlying difficulty is that not only the prices of individual 
goods or services vary over time or across countries, but the volumes consumed of those 
goods and services vary as well. These simultaneous variations in prices and volumes make the 
definition of a single measure of average price extremely difficult and has given birth to an 
extensive literature on index number theory.  
Indices allow us to take vast amounts of price and sales volume information stemming from a 
large number of products, and summarize that information into a very small set of numbers. A 
price index is a measure of proportionate, or percentage, change in a set of prices over time 
(temporal indices) or across places, e.g. countries at a given point in time (spatial indices). In 
this dissertation, I make use of both temporal (in this case yearly) and spatial indices. 
However, the use of spatial indices is relatively new compared to that of temporal indices, 
which have been the topic of an extensive literature. Most of the succinct review of index 
theory that follows is thus largely based on the temporal index literature, although it applies 
equally to spatial indices, mutatis mutandis.   
An Italian, G. R. Carli, is credited with developing the first index numbers in 1764, as part of a 
report on price fluctuations in Europe observed between 1500 and 1750. One of the first 
known uses of a price index, dating back to the 1780, was commissioned by a government 
agency in order to adjust the pay of soldiers just after the American Revolution, as the war had 
shifted prices of basic goods substantially (IMF 2010). The first industrial commodities index 
in the US was later produced in 1902, developed in response to a U.S. Senate Finance 
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Committee request for an investigation into the effects of tariff laws on prices of domestic 
and foreign agricultural and manufactured products.  The index used an unweighted average 
of price relatives for 250 commodities.  
It took until the beginning of the 20th Century for the collection and reporting of data in index 
form to become systematic (McGraw Hill 2004).  In the 1920s several important 
developments occurred in index number theory, the most influential of which was the 
publication of Irving Fisher’s monumental work, “The Making of Index Numbers” in 1922. 
This work was initially prompted by Fisher’s interest in inflation and advocacy of the Quantity 
Theory of Money, in which changes in the money supply could be used to lead to 
corresponding changes in the price level. The work required a dependable measure of changes 
in the price level—in other words, it needed a good price index—leading Fisher to undertake 
a systematic investigation of the properties of hundreds of different kinds of possible formulas 
for price indices. (IMF 2010)  The Consumer Price Index (CPI), the most widely known index 
today, was introduced in 1913 and since then many other indices have been compiled.  The 
systematic collection of price information as products left factories began in the 1970s when 
Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union (EU), began a programme to build 
producer price indices (PPIs), intended to measure the change in prices producers receive at 
the factory gate (IMF 2010). More recently the collection of PPI data has extended to service 
industries, which in many countries account for almost two-thirds of GDP (IMF 2010).  
Today, as emphasized by Diewert, the ability of indices to make sense of the overwhelming 
abundance of microeconomic information allows them to “intrude themselves on virtually 
every empirical investigation in economics” (Diewert 1993). 
The calculation of price indices is very closely linked to policy-making. The best known index, 
the CPI, measures changes in the prices of goods and services that households consume over 
time, usually within a country.  Price changes captured in a CPI affect the real purchasing 
power of consumers’ incomes and their welfare. There is now a long history of using CPIs to 
guide the evolution of public payments – a practice known as index linking. Generally 
speaking, index linking means that payments are adjusted in proportion to the change in some 
specified price index (often the CPI), in order to maintain the real purchasing power of wages 
over the kinds of goods and services typically consumed by wage earners (IMF 2010).  For 
example, numerous government payments are linked to indices to ensure their “appropriate” 
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increase or decrease over time.  In many countries pensions and unemployment payments are 
linked to the CPI7.  
Whilst less obvious to the public because they influence on the lives of individuals only 
indirectly, macro-economic indices play an increasingly important role in geopolitics. For 
example, high-level aggregations of manufacturing goods are useful for observing and 
comparing macroeconomic trends, which can, amongst other things, help identify the effect 
of government intervention (IMF 2010). Aggregations of commodity prices can also be 
undertaken in order to explore the total impact of commodity price change on the economy 
(IMF 2010). Analysis of aggregate prices by commodity can reveal the impact of inflationary 
pressure from raw materials, an issue of global relevance as those materials are often priced on 
international markets and therefore outside the control of national-level agencies. In view of 
the central role of energy in modern economies, the price index of crude oil plays a 
particularly important role in national and international economic analysis and planning (IMF 
2010) Productivity measures such as the PPI can be used to deflate the nominal value added 
of a given industry into a real value added. Industry measures of real value added can then be 
divided by labour input into the industry in order to estimate industry-specific labour 
productivity.  Alternatively, the real value added in a given industry can be divided by an index 
of primary input usage in order to estimate industry total factor productivity (IMF 2010) 
Productivity increases are seen as a key driver of standard of living increases within a country 
and there is therefore an interest in identifying the industries that lead productivity 
improvements (IMF 2010)  
Internationally index calculation measures have been, and continue to be, developed to allow 
for comparable data to be collected and published by international agencies such as (the 
statistical offices of) the United Nations, the International Labour Organization, the 
International Monetary Fund, or the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
                                                 
7 The CPI is often described as a cost-of-living index, however, technically this is inaccurate. A 
true cost-of-living index would measure changes in the cost of attaining a fixed level of 
economic well-being, or utility, whilst a CPI estimates the change in cost of obtaining a fixed 
basket of goods. The idea of a cost-of-living index (arguably impossible to accurately calculate) 
is a standard against which economists gauge biases in the CPI (Moulton 1998).  
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Development. However, despite efforts for standard-creation and adoption, variation does 
persist in data collection and aggregation practices. So whilst national statistics agencies supply 
the data to the international agencies, their subsequent publication by the international 
agencies is not—and should not be interpreted as—an endorsement of their reliability (IMF 
2010).    
Beyond allowing for the comparison of data amongst countries, international standards for 
index calculation are used by many countries as the norms for their own individual statistics 
(IMF 2010). Domestic pressure to avoid errors or biases (see below) led to a significant push 
to improve index calculation methods in the 1990s. Much of the current literature on price 
indices stems from the work of the International Working Group on Price Indices, established 
under the auspices of the UN Statistical Commission in 1994.  This body of experts, known as 
the “Ottawa Group” is made up of public servants responsible for national statistics offices 
and leading academics, and meets every other year. Today research on index calculation 
methods continues on, primarily from the economic as well as the statistical perspective (e.g. 
in terms of sampling of goods). 
FOCUS ON PRICE INDEX THEORY IN THE POLITICAL REALM 
Price index theory is usually left to specialists. It is only when a suspicion arises that something 
is wrong and that there is a possibility of large political or fiscal benefits from fixing it, that the 
topic moves into the limelight (Deaton 1998). Much of the present day interest in inflation 
calculation dates back to the 1990s when details of CPI calculation methods in the United 
States went from being an academic issue to one of public concern.  At that time, an 
influential part of the population, largely dominated the highly educated and highly informed 
group, feared that public payments would be adjusted downward, following the revelation of 
previous miscalculation of, or strong bias inherent in, the CPI. The potential consequences of 
adjusting for the bias were vast as much of the US economy is based on the CPI. An example 
of the potential effect of bias in the CPI given by Moulton (1998) considers that an annual 
upward bias of 0.7% (the lowest estimate of the CPI Advisory Commission) over 25 years 
would lead to the growth of real wages and other quantities deflated by the CPI to be 
understated by 19%. Using the upper estimate of the Commission of 2% would lead to the 
same quantities being understated by 64%. Our assessment of the growth of our economy and 
people’s well-being is therefore substantially affected by index calculation methods and their 
biases (Moulton 1998). 
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American economists had noted for several decades that the CPI may have been 
overestimating the increase in the cost of living. However, the bias only became a newsworthy 
topic when the issue got tied up in the debate over the balancing of the budget, with 
Greenspan mentioning in 1995 that the overestimation of 1-1.5% was the equivalent to an 
overpaying of $55 billion over five years in federal programmes (Moulton 1998). This bias in 
the CPI was arguably the critical event that brought the issue of index calculation to the 
forefront of the political realm.  
OPTIMIZING INDEX NUMBER CALCULATIONS TO SUPPORT POLICY-
MAKING 
How microeconomic information can be aggregated to quantify overall price differences is the 
“index number problem,” a classic and long-standing problem in economics, which is the 
subject of an extensive literature (see for example Fisher 1922; Samuelson and Swamy 1974; 
Afriat 1978; and Diewert 1978).  The choice of a particular method to calculate an index 
number can be optimized for a particular purpose. Even if such optimization takes place 
behind the scenes, there is increasing awareness that for such calculations to be justifiable and 
as robust as possible a number of key issues must be addressed. 
The calculation of a price index is necessarily based on basic choices, including the following 
(ILO 2004):  
1. which goods (and/or services) to include in the sample 
2. how to determine item prices 
3. which transactions that involve these goods should be included 
4. how to determine the weights and from which sources they should be drawn 
5. what formula or type of mean should be used to average the relative prices within the 
sample 
 
Except for the last one, all these questions can be answered on the basis of the purpose of the 
index to be calculated.  The aggregate value, V, for a given collection of items and transactions 
is computed as (ILO 2004): 
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where pi is the price of the i
th good in national currency units, qi represents the corresponding 
quantity purchased in the relevant time period and the subscript i identifies the ith elementary 
item in the group of n items that make up the chosen value aggregate V. Within this aggregate 
definition is the specification of which items and transactions to include, as well as principles 
of the valuation and timeframe within which economic agents undertake the transactions, or 
the determination of prices. The choice of parameters pi and qi is therefore all dependent on 
the definition of the aggregate value being calculated whilst the choice of formula used to 
calculate a price index from V is not (ILO 2004). 
APPROACHES TO THE OPTIMIZING THE CHOICE OF INDEX 
“The answer to the question what is the mean of a given set of magnitudes cannot in 
general be found, unless there is given also the object for the sake of which a mean 
value 
is required. There are as many kinds of average as there are purposes; and we may 
almost say in the matter of prices as many purposes as writers. Hence much vain 
controversy between persons who are literally at cross purposes”. [Edgeworth (1888, 
p. 347)]. 
The two main approaches to determining the optimal formula for a price index are: i) the test, 
or axiomatic, approach, and ii) the economic approach.  The test approach assumes that 
vectors of prices and quantities are regarded as independent variables, whilst in the economic 
approach the two price vectors are taken as independent but the quantity variables are seen as 
solutions to a variety of economic maximization or minimization problems (Diewert 2010).  
Whilst experts do tend to take either an axiomatic or economic perspective on index numbers, 
the approaches should not be perceived as mutually exclusive.  
AXIOMATIC APPROACH 
The axiomatic, or test, approach seeks to choose the most appropriate formula for an index 
based on the number of tests that the index satisfies.  Examples of important axioms include 
the following (summarized here by IMF 2010) 
• Positivity Test: The price index and its constituent vectors of prices and quantities 
should be positive. 
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• Identity Test: If the price of every product is identical in both periods, then the price 
index should equal unity, irrespective of what the quantity vectors are. 
• Commensurability Test: The price index does not change if the units in which the 
products are measured are changed (invariance to changes in the units of 
measurement). 
• Time (or country) Reversal Test: If all the data for the two periods (or countries) are 
interchanged, then the resulting price index should equal the reciprocal of the original 
price index.,  
• Quantity Reversal Test: If the quantity vectors for the two periods are interchanged, 
then the price index remains invariant. 
• Mean Value Test for Prices: The value of the price index lies between the highest and 
the lowest ratio of prices for all products. 
• Paasche and Laspeyres Bounding Test: The price index lies between the Laspeyres 
and Paasche indices. Paasche (Pc) and Laspeyres (Lc) indices are described here: 
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Where QM,USA is the quantity weight (volume) of the pharmaceutical sold in the USA, 
and PM,C  and PM,USA  are the prices of the pharmaceutical per standard unit in the 
comparator country and in the USA (the base country), respectively. Such weighting is 
often referred to as “own-weighting”. 
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Where QM,C is the quantity weight of the pharmaceutical sold in the comparator 
country, and PM,C and  PM,USA are the prices of the pharmaceutical per standard unit in 
the comparator country and in the USA (the base country), respectively. Such 
weighting is often referred to as “base-weighting”. 
Some axioms are more important than others and, most index numbers satisfy several of 
them, including the most obvious ones   For example, the commensurability test implies that 
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if milk were to be measured in litres instead of pints, the index should clearly remain 
unchanged. (IMF 2010)  But even such obvious axiom does not always hold. For example, the 
Dutot index, defined as the ratio of the mean of unweighted individual prices at time t and 
time 0: 
 
which was widely used in the initial stages of producer price index calculations, does not 
satisfy the commensurability test. The IMF PPI calculation manual (2010) uses the example of 
salt and pepper to illustrate the problem: Suppose the unit of measurement for pepper is 
changed from ounces to grams whilst that for salt remains unchanged (in either ounces or 
kilograms). Given that an ounce is equivalent to 28.35 grams, the absolute value of the price 
of pepper decreases by more than 28 times, whilst that of salt is unchanged. As a result, the 
weight of pepper in the calculation of the Dutot index decreases by more than 28 times 
compared to that of salt.  Basically, when the products covered collectively by an index are 
heterogeneous and measured with different physical units the value of any index that does not 
satisfy the commensurability test depends on the arbitrary choice of units -- making the index 
conceptually unacceptable. (IMF 2010)  A useful price index must necessarily include some 
weighting of the prices of individual products that quantifies in some way their quality 
attributes. And these attributes reflect necessarily the preferences of, or the values to, the 
consumers, which are linked to the units of measurement (e.g., caviar vs. potatoes). Thus, 
upon aggregation, the price variations per physical unit of the higher-priced varieties (e.g. the 
price of pepper or caviar per gram) must be appropriately tempered in the index calculation 
(IMF 2010).  When prices are weighted by consumption, the problem of units effectively 
disappears.  
The widely used Laspeyres and Paasche indices given above fail both the quantity reversal test 
and the time (country) reversal test.  Obviously, inverting the quantity vectors in the formula 
of the Laspeyres index gives the corresponding Paasche index, and vice versa.  Reversing the 
time (or the country) in the formula of the Laspeyres index gives the inverse of the 
corresponding Paasche index; and conversely, reversing the time (or the country) in the 
formula of the Paasche index gives the inverse of the corresponding Laspeyres index.  There is 
thus an underlying symmetry between the Paasche and the Laspeyres indices that makes their 
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geometric mean, the Fisher ideal index particularly satisfying from the point of view of the 
axiomatic approach.  In fact the Fisher index fulfils all the axiomatic tests listed above  
Overall the axiomatic approach is not without its limitations. A perhaps obvious shortcoming 
is that the list of axioms is itself somewhat arbitrary (IMF 2010). Furthermore, a simple 
application of the axiomatic approach only signals which tests are failed by the index in 
question, without indicating the degree to which the index fails (IMF 2010). However, the 
importance given to the respective tests is not uniform and whilst failing a major test such as 
the Commensurability Test should be enough to rule out the use of a particular index, failing 
several minor tests may not necessarily rule out its use.  
ECONOMIC APPROACH 
Aside from the axiomatic approach, candidate indices can also be analysed using another lens, 
such as the economic approach, which seeks to develop index number formulas based on 
“reasonable” models of economic behaviour between actors in the economy. In contrast to 
the axiomatic approach, the economic approach acknowledges that quantities purchased or 
produced are in fact dependent on the prices. Indeed in practice, rational consumers and 
producers adjust the relative quantities they consume or produce in response to changes in 
relative prices (this concept is discussed in Paper 2). 
 The economic approach assumes that the consumer has a set of well-defined preferences for 
different combinations of goods. Each combination of goods is perceived as a positive vector 
and the consumer’s preferences in favour of one set of goods over another are perceived as a 
continuous, non-decreasing, concave utility function. The consumer is assumed to minimize 
the cost of achieving the utility level within the period (or country in the case of spatial 
indices) – thereby solving the cost minimization problem. The equivalent for producer indices 
is the assumption of revenue maximization (ILO 2004).   
The assumption of optimizing behaviour -- cost minimization or revenue maximization -- 
along with other assumptions, is used to derive a theoretical index that is “true” under these 
conditions. The approach then examines practical index number formulas such as Laspeyres, 
Fisher, Törnqvist, etc. to consider how they compare with “true” formulas defined under 
differing assumptions.  Diewert used the term “exact” for indices that can be derived from an 
underlying utility, cost, production, revenue, transformation or profit functions (Diewert 
1976). 
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Consumer Price Indices draw on the economic theory of consumer behaviour whilst Producer 
Price Indices draw on the economic theory of production (and the short-term rigidities in the 
production process). However, these two underlying economic theories are isomorphic and 
lead to similar conclusions regarding index number compilation (IMF 2010). 
SUPERLATIVE INDICES 
“In mathematics disputes must soon come to an end, when the one side is proved and 
the other disproved. And where mathematics enters into economics, it would seem 
that little room could be left for long-continued disputation. It is therefore somewhat 
surprising that one economist after another takes up the subject of index-numbers, 
potters over it for a whilst, differs from the rest if he can, and then drops it. And so 
nearly sixty years have gone by since Jevons first brought mathematics to bear upon 
this question, and still economists are at loggerheads over it. Yet index-numbers 
involve the use of means and averages, and these being a purely mathematical element, 
demonstration ought soon to be reached, and then agreement should speedily follow.” 
Walsh [1921; preface, as quoted in Diewert 2010] 
 
Despite the vast number of possible index number formulas developed over the past two 
centuries, each with their champions, in practice the choice of index number formula has 
narrowed to only a very small class of indices. In some ways this confirms the prediction made 
in the Walsh (1921) quote above. Whilst historically important indices such as the Laspeyres 
and the Paasche indices are still widely in use, economists favour the use of a few indices with 
particularly useful properties according to both the axiomatic and the economic approach: the 
Fisher ideal index, the Persons-Törnqvist index, and the Walsh index.  These indices are 
known as superlative indices (Diewert 2010).and they have been shown to closely approximate 
an exact cost-of-living index for any utility function (Moulton 1998). 
L*PFisher   
Where P is the Paasche index value and L is the Laspeyres index value. (Fisher indices are the 
geometric mean of Paasche and Laspeyres Indices.) 
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Törnqvist 
which is effectively the geometric average of the n price relatives (current to base year) for n 
goods weighted by the arithmetic average of the volumes for the respective periods. 
 
Walsh 
 
which is the weighted sum of the current period prices divided by the weighted sum of the 
base period prices with the geometric average of both period volumes serving as weights. 
A characteristic feature of superlative indices is that they treat the prices and quantities in both 
periods or countries being compared symmetrically (see section below for further discussion 
of the importance of this symmetry). Further, superlative indices tend to provide very similar 
results and perform overall in very similar ways. (IMF 2010)  The superlative index often 
perceived as the “best” is the Fisher index (IMF 2010). In practice, when other indices are 
chosen it is due to a lack of price or volume data. For example, the use of Laspeyres or 
Paasche indices only requires volume data from one time period or country whilst superlative 
indices require volume data for each time period or country in the comparison.  
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TYPES OF INDICES UTILIZED IN THIS 
DISSERTATION 
As emphasized 40 years ago by Samuelson and Swamy (1974), given heterogeneity in 
preferences, we cannot hope for one ideal formula for the index number. Explicit choices 
have to be made. For spatial indices the natural choice is to utilize the volume weights (a 
reflection of preferences via consumption) determined by the preferences of one country or 
the other – the equivalent of fixed basket indices from the temporal price index counterpart. 
A common choice for such indices are the Paasche and Laspeyres indices, the former utilizing 
own-country weights (determined by the preferences of the country in question) and the latter 
utilizing base-country weights (the US is very often taken as the base country for international 
comparisons).  Laspeyres indices are the most common type encountered, due largely to their 
more limited data requirements, as mentioned above.  In the context of spatial comparisons 
this means that they only require volume data for the base country. Paasche indices, for their 
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part, require volume data of only the comparator country. Beyond mere data practicalities and 
resource minimization, some of their attributes make Laspeyres and Paasche indices clear 
contenders for answering some policy questions. For example the single country dominance 
(the fact that the index is constructed solely on the consumption patterns of one country) that 
is embodied within these two indices has benefits to address particular questions. For 
example, Laspeyres indices are arguably highly relevant for policy questions relating to the 
base country given that they are based on the consumption patterns of that country.   
However, in the application of Laspeyres and Paasche indices to inform policy requires 
attention to their methods of construction as noted by Danzon (Danzon and Chao 2000). For 
example, taking the view of the US as the base country, Danzon describes Laspeyres indices as 
lower-bound estimates of how much the US could potentially save if it were to adopt a 
comparator country’s pharmaceutical prices, assuming constant US consumption patterns 
over time. Conversely, Paasche indices, for their part, provide an upper-bound estimate of 
potential savings, if US consumers were to adopt the comparator country’s consumption 
patterns, assuming that such changes in US consumption volumes do not affect prices. 
Therefore, Laspeyres indices could be informative if the US were to be evaluating the 
potential use of price regulations or other, perhaps indirect, price-influencing policies utilized 
by other countries. In contrast the Paasche indices would be unlikely to be of great use in a US 
policy context, as the assumption of US consumers exhibiting comparator country preferences 
is arguably too far-fetched, due, in part, to the cultural origin of preferences.  
In other words, the choice of a single country to base indices makes it difficult to dissociate 
indices from the country-specific context and draw broad conclusions about price differences 
across countries. In essence, price relatives are inextricably linked to their country policy 
context. One example, also taken from the pharmaceutical policy context, to illustrate this 
point is the question of whether or not the rest of the world is free riding on the high levels of 
R&D provided by high US pharmaceutical prices. The first issue one has to examine in 
attempting to answer this constantly arising question is which pharmaceuticals we are talking 
about. US consumers often hear of new pharmaceutical technologies through direct-to-
consumer advertising and there is minimal state role for product comparison or cost-
effectiveness analysis. US preferences therefore favour newer technologies, arguably in a 
manner dissociated from real product quality or effectiveness. So if the question of free riding 
is posed in the US policy context, then the answer should arguably be based on price relatives 
of a sample made up of pharmaceutical products purchased by Americans, therefore reflecting 
45 
 
 
 
the preference for newer pharmaceuticals.  But European preferences may be different for 
cultural or other reasons such as:  public payor reimbursement (based on health technology 
assessment or some form of cost-effectiveness analysis); prohibition of direct-to-consumer 
pharmaceutical advertising; limited advertising to prescribers; etc. If, as a result, Europeans 
tend to prefer more thoroughly proven (and often cheaper) pharmaceuticals then is it fair to 
ignore their preferences in determining their purported free riding behaviour?  
Whilst useful for examining questions posed for national purposes, the index values provided 
by Laspeyres and Paasche indices are at once unsatisfying (in that they fail to give a concrete 
answer regarding cross-national price relativity) and too country-bound to provide fair 
answers to questions posed at an international for international purposes.  
The effect of using a single country consumption to base indices can perhaps be best 
illustrated by examining their temporal counterparts. Using the Lasypeyres index—which uses 
the volume measures of the base year-- tends to overestimate the rise in the cost of living by 
not allowing any substitution between goods (e.g. from higher to lower priced goods) to 
occur. Conversely, the Paasche index—which uses current year volume measures—tends to 
underestimate the rise in the cost of living. Diewert’s work (1983) has shown that the true cost 
of living index (whilst not observable) is between the Paasche and Laspeyres price indexes 
(which are observable). The key finding of this work was that some average of the Paasche 
and Laspeyres indexes should provide a reasonably close approximation to the underlying true 
cost of living. The Fisher index, the geometric average (square root) of the Laspeyres and 
Paasche indexes, is a strong candidate for such an average.   
Importantly, the Fisher index is a superlative index, as noted above and treats prices and 
quantities being compared symmetrically.  As stressed by Walsh (1901) such symmetric 
treatment of countries is required if they are to be given equal importance in the policy 
question at hand. Whilst the detachment from the base country context makes Fisher indices 
less relevant to country-specific policy questions, it is arguably more appropriate when the 
goal is broad comparison of prices across countries.   
Fisher indices appear to dominate other indices from an axiomatic viewpoint. For example, 
Fisher indices satisfy four tests that are considered “minimal”: positivity, time/country 
reversal, quantity reversal, and factor reversal.  The other two symmetric indices, the Walsh 
and Törnqvist indices, do not do as well in testing. (IMF 2010) The geometric averaging of the 
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quantities in both countries results in an equal weight to the consumption patterns of each of 
the countries. In addition, the use of the Fisher index, rather than the other superlative 
indices, can be justified on grounds of economic theory, in particular the fact that it is 
consistent with revealed preference theory (Diewert, 1976).  
In this thesis we aim to compare pharmaceutical prices amongst several countries and over 
time. Whilst it is clear from the above that the Fisher index is the best choice for such 
comparison, the aggregation of all the individual price and volume data into a single number 
necessarily eliminates useful information.  As noted above, no single price index can provide a 
“true” quantification of relative prices when customers in different countries exhibit different 
preferences. The use of price indices is particularly fraught in the case of pharmaceuticals, 
which come in presentations, dosages and compositions that vary from country to country. In 
addition drug prices are controlled in some way in most countries, and often not fully paid by 
the consumer as a result of private or national health insurance programmes.  
In view of these difficulties, this study takes a pragmatic approach and makes simultaneous 
use of several indices that respond differently to consumption patterns and to the variations in 
the prices of individual products.  This approach has the double benefit of circumventing the 
inherent impossibility to define a true price index for pharmaceuticals and of providing useful 
information not only from the numerical values of the various indices and their evolution over 
time, but also from their differences. It must also be noted that the theoretical considerations 
of the necessary or useful properties of price indices that have fuelled much of the discussion 
regarding index theory (Fisher 1922; Samuelson and Swamy 1974; Afriat 1978; and Diewert 
1978) are largely irrelevant in this pragmatic multi-index approach since it does not rely on the 
use of a single parameter. 
This thesis takes advantage of the richness of the available data on pharmaceutical prices and 
quantities to calculate Paasche and Laspeyres indices, in addition to Fisher indices. Further 
these indices are calculated for data sets that are common for all countries considered 
(multilaterally matched samples) and for data sets that are common to only two countries 
being compared (bilaterally matched samples.)  Such an approach provides useful information 
because the Laspeyres and Fisher indices are dependent on the size of the data-base from 
which they are calculated as a result of their sensitivity to consumption patterns: the larger the 
number of samples being considered, the greater the range of differences in consumption 
patterns being captured.  
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As will be seen, in several instances the calculated values of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices 
exhibited large differences.  This occurs sometimes for indices calculated from the same data 
set or for those based on multilaterally or bilaterally matched samples.  Such contrasts serve as 
flags indicating unusual features of the pharmaceutical market in individual countries during 
the period of the study. In several instances, a detailed examination of the indices points to to 
a likely explanation in terms of differences or changes in pricing or consumption patterns 
amongst countries. Conversely, when the values of Laspeyres and Paasche indices are close to 
each other, the corresponding Fisher indices must necessarily provide a good estimation of 
overall price differences between two countries or between two time periods. In essence, the 
difference between the values of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices provides a measure of 
how good an estimation of price differences is given by the Fisher index, 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview 
Whilst cross-national pharmaceutical price variation is a relatively new area of study, the 
methodological progress made over the past two decades has been significant. Starting with 
studies dating back to the early 1990s, one can see an effort over time to increase accuracy, 
representativeness, and policy relevance. Each of the key early studies is reviewed below. 
Whilst the policy context is not explicit in all of the papers, it actually informs much of the 
previous work.  The early studies in cross-country price comparison focussed on a very limited 
selection of pharmaceuticals found in the United States and one, or sometimes a few, other 
countries. The goal of such studies was seemingly largely political, focussed on highlighting 
the discrepancy, generally seen as unfair, between drug prices in the US and in other countries. 
Indeed the issue of other countries “free riding” on the pharmaceutical R&D made possible 
through high US prices was seemingly never far from the minds of the authors of the early 
studies. Not surprisingly, the results of those studies tended to support this conclusion.  
Interestingly, whilst most of the early studies were conducted as part of reports intended to be 
used in the political setting, they were not themselves policy-related documents.  The 
description of the work remained largely technical with little explanation regarding its 
motivation or how it was going to be used. Nonetheless, in many cases, the policy intent can 
be inferred or, at the very least, the work can be placed into a political context. In some cases 
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the studies appeared to miss their mark—having been seemingly designed for a given political 
end but falling short as a result of technical choices. The technical underpinnings of these 
studies and their limitations are described in the timeline below. Importantly, it is the studies 
by Danzon and colleagues in 1999-2000 that brought to light the key limitations of the earlier 
comparisons. Although there have been only a few studies published since the Danzon work, 
one can see in those a more balanced approach to the question of relative pharmaceutical 
prices amongst countries. This dissertation can be seen in part as an updating and a very large 
expansion (to more countries and over a longer period of time) of the work of Danzon and 
colleagues. 
 Government Accounting Office 1992 
Motivated by the sudden rise in pharmaceutical prices in the US in the 1980s, the US 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) 1992 compared factory prices of medicines bought in 
retail pharmacies in the US relative to their similarly purchased counterparts in Canada. They 
selected one single, commonly used US dosage form, dosage strength, and package size for 
each of the drugs in their sample.  Of the 200 drugs in their study, they were able to match 
121 by brand name, manufacturer, strength, and dosage form across the two countries. 
Overall the authors found that a basket of the 121 frequently dispensed drugs would cost 32% 
more in the United States than in Canada. Looked at independently, the large majority of the 
121 pharmaceuticals they studied were more expensive in the US, median price differential per 
package estimated at 43%.  The price differentials between the two countries varied widely, 
the per package price to wholesalers in the US ranging from 44% lower to 967% higher than 
the Canadian price. Although there was a wide range, most drugs studied were found to be 
more expensive in the United States. The same manufacturers were found to charge US 
wholesalers much more than Canadian wholesalers for identical products. In selecting 
pharmaceuticals with a single dosage form, strength and pack size that was common in the 
US, the GAO sample for comparison presented significant bias. Also, US prices were 
compared with imputed prices from similar packs in Canada (using the Ontario formulary) 
and prices per pack were imputed (by multiplying the per unit price by the number of units 
per pack) since most of the Ontario formulary prices were per unit. As highlighted by Danzon 
and Kim, this linear imputation is likely to understate prices in Canada, since formulary prices 
tend to be based on the largest pack size, which has the lowest unit price. Further, to calculate 
price the authors use the unweighted sum of prices in the US relative to the sum of prices in 
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Canada as well as the median of price relatives.  Also highlighted by Danzon and Kim, the 
first measure is usually not invariant to the units of measurement, which is normally a desired 
characteristic of index numbers (which is why it is not often used).  The latter price used also 
poses limitations in that the median is unstable across samples. 
Government Accounting Office 1994 
In their 1994 report the GAO compared US prices to those in the UK.  They looked at a 
sample of 200 drugs most frequently dispensed in U.S. drugstores and compared them to 
those dispensed in the UK with the same manufacturer. These 200 drugs represented 55% of 
all prescriptions dispensed in U.S. drugstores in 1991. They selected a single, commonly used 
dosage, strength and packsize in the US.  Of the 200 most frequently dispensed drugs, the 
authors were able to match 77 drugs by brand, manufacturer, strength, and form. Of the 77 
drugs compared, 66 medicines were priced higher in the US whilst 11 were priced higher in 
the UK.  Forty-seven (61%) of the 77 medicines in the US had a price more than double that 
in the UK. The most commonly dispensed drug at the time, Amoxil, was found to cost 40% 
less in the US than in the UK. But the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th most frequently dispensed drugs in 
the US--Premarin, Zantac, Lanoxin, and Xanax—were found to cost 197,58, 169, and 278% 
more respectively in the US than in the UK.  Seventeen of the 21 brand-name medicines were 
priced higher in the US than in the UK, whilst 17 of the lowest US generic prices were lower 
than the corresponding UK brand-name prices.  Perhaps spurred on by methodological 
challenges to their 1992 report, the GAO 1994 report used the manufacturer, per unit prices 
to construct volume-weighted indices.  However, this expenditure weighting can be seen to 
have been merely approximate since the weights pertained to all packs whilst the price in each 
country was based on a single pack.  This is believed to have resulted in significant selection 
bias. This bias is further compounded by the focus on leading products in one single country. 
The perspective of the GAO reports must also be borne in mind.  These studies only 
considered drugs that were popular on the American market.   
In reality the basket of drugs used in the 3 countries they looked at differ and, where the same 
drug is used across them, they are used differently, in different forms and dosages (Payer, 
1998).  The GAO price comparison effectively poses a narrow question of how the prices of 
pharmaceuticals popular in the US compare with those of less commonly used medicines in 
other countries. As emphasized by Comanor and Schweitzer (2007), this is a different question 
than asking whether pharmaceuticals in general cost more in the US.    
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US House of Representatives 1998 study: Prescription Drug Pricing in the 1st 
Congressional District in Maine: An International Price Comparison 
In 1998 the 1st Congressional District of a large border state (importantly bordering Canada, a 
country with a significantly different health and pharmaceutical policy and where residents 
could in theory seek care), Maine, issued a minority staff report examining the differences 
between pharmaceutical prices across a handful of countries. The study considered prices of 
ten on-patent branded products with the highest 1997 sales under the Pennsylvania 
Pharmaceutical Assistance Contract for the Elderly, comparing their retail prices in 
pharmaceuticals based in several Congressional districts to prices from four Canadian 
pharmacies and three Mexican pharmacies. The report concluded that US pharmaceutical 
prices were 72% higher than in Canada and 102% than in Mexico. Aside from the extremely 
limited and thus biased sample used to draw broad conclusions, the study also had numerous 
other limitations. For example, it did not consider the use of the generic equivalent to the ten 
on-patent drugs. This was despite the fact that--as previously pointed out by Danzon (2000a), 
generics accounted for 46% of prescriptions in the US at the time, most managed care and 
Medicaid programmes allow for and indeed encourage generic substitution (e.g. through 
reimbursement caps or charging higher patient co-payments for branded products). Payors in 
the other countries also allow generic substitution. Indeed this was particularly surprizing 
given that, as of 1996, the US the Bureau of Labor Statistics has recognized bio-equivalence of 
branded and generic pharmaceuticals and included them as effective equivalents in price index 
calculations. Price comparisons that ignore generics over-estimate the average price of drugs 
in countries where generics are a large part of the market and tend to be sold at relatively low 
prices, like the US (Danzon 2000a).  In addition, the study focussed on single packs of 
products, thereby ignoring important multipack discounts (Danzon 2000a). Finally, it should 
be noted that this study uses prices that are un-weighted by volume, effectively separating 
price calculations from actual consumption.  
Danzon and Kim 1998  
Danzon and Kim used data from 1992 to compare the prices of cardiovascular drugs, 
including all matching products, including generics, within the category of cardiovascular 
drugs. They used this data to demonstrate the sensitivity of international pharmaceutical price 
comparisons to the choice of sample used, the volume unit of measurement, the weight given 
to consumption patterns, and the method of currency conversion.  In the context of their 
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findings they also stressed the need for any international price comparison to be representative 
of the market, to include generics and over-the-counter pharmaceuticals, all forms, strengths 
and packs. This was the first study to emphasize the failure of all preceding studies to achieve 
broad representation by limiting their focus to pharmaceuticals with the same manufacturer, 
brand, dosage form, strength, and/or pack size. With respect to the limitations of their own 
study, the authors highlighted that their inability to estimate the value of direct rebates granted 
to managed care providers and government purchasers had overstated US prices. 
Danzon and Chao 2000  
The authors compared prices using indices of manufacturer-level outpatient pharmaceutical 
prices for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the UK.  Pharmaceuticals were defined 
by molecule name and third Anatomic Therapeutic Category (ATC 3)8.  Prices were measured 
against US prices and the sample was far more representative than in previous studies, for 
example incorporating over-the-counter drugs that substitute for prescribed drugs. In total 
171 molecules were found to be present in all seven markets.  For these “global molecules” 
the authors computed a weighted average price per kilogram and standard unit.  Prices were 
averages across all products, formulations, strengths and packs for each molecule. The 
Laspeyres indices were US volume-weighted. They found that differences for comparator 
country to US differences to be: Canada +2.1%; Germany +24.7%; France -32%; Italy -13%; 
Japan -12%, and the UK -17% which were not as great as suggested by previous studies 
(which used small samples of only leading branded products and unweighted averages). They 
also matched molecules bilaterally across each of the countries independently and the US. This 
resulted in a larger sample size than for the global molecules, ranging from 365 molecules in 
the Japan–US comparison to 438 molecules in the Germany–US comparison.  Generally the 
price indices for the bilaterally matched molecules show slightly greater price differences 
between countries than the indices based on the smaller, globally-matched samples.  The 
authors find that price differences depend to a great extent on the framing of the comparison, 
in particular the choice of country used to determine consumption patterns to weight prices.   
In an effort to examine the determinants of prices this study also constructed a fully interacted 
model that allowed quality and competition parameters to differ across 7 countries.  Overall 
                                                 
8  Which uses the 3 to 4 digit European Pharmaceutical Market Research Association (EPhMRA) 
classification. 
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regression results suggest that cross-national price differences reflect differences in product 
characteristics and in their implicit prices, which are a reflection of the regulatory regime in 
place.  They conclude that strict price regulation systematically lowers prices for widely 
diffused molecules as well as for older ones and that generic competition lowers prices in less-
regulated regimes.   
Cabrales and Jimenez-Martin 2008 
Cabrales and Jiménez-Martín looked at prices from 25 largely high-income countries from 
1998-2003 to conduct multilevel regression analyses.  Findings from the first stage country-
specific regressions included the following: 
Market share of national products and concentration of local products had little effect 
on prices 
New products received a small premium in several countries, the largest being 
observed in the US. Product nationality does not command significant premium 
change for novel products with two exceptional cases (Italy, where new products from 
exclusively local producers receive an extra premium; Canada, where new product 
from local multinationals also receive a substantial premium) 
The effect of firm size on prices is either non-significant or negative but small (ceteris 
paribus), the largest effects being found in Denmark and the US. 
The number of generics in the molecule significantly reduces prices in many countries, 
the effect being greater in the case of Italy and Japan. (For the US the effect of the 
number of generics was found to be insignificant.) 
With the notable exceptions of Spain, US, and Germany, global prices were found to 
have very little independent effect 
Key findings from second stage country-specific regressions included the following: 
Products from exclusively local corporations had lower prices in almost all countries 
(ceteris peribus). It was suggest that, in many cases, this may be at least partially due to 
the fact that they were perceived to be of lower quality. The effect of being a local 
multinational company was less clear. Multinational conglomerates seemed to receive a 
premium over small, local producers. 
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The single molecule effect was either non-significant or positive, especially in big 
pharmaceutical markets (notably Canada, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
UK and the US), with the exception of Poland 
Molecule diffusion positively affected prices in a large number of countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Rep., Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Japan, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK and the US) 
n.b. The critique of this paper was limited by the lack of information regarding price 
calculation and model composition.  (The paper was found within the grey literature. It was 
never formally published and the author did not provide any other information other than to 
say that the paper was never published.) 
Department of Health 2006 (replicated in Office of Fair Trade 2007)  
The DH compared manufacturer-level prices for branded medicines in the UK to those found 
in other European countries9 and the US for the years 1999 to 2005.  The study compares 
prices of the molecules comprising the top 150 branded products (matching across form and 
strength). It used all brands under which the product was sold.  The DH sample included 211 
brands, some with small sales volumes.  Comparisons were conducted multilaterally using 
molecules matched across all countries as well as bilaterally using molecules matched across 
just the UK and the comparator country.  In its multilateral comparison, the DH found prices 
consistently highest in the US. It also found that prior to 2005, UK prices were consistently 
higher than those in all European countries with the exception of Germany, in some cases 
substantially higher. However, with the 7% price cut in 2005 there was realignment, leading to 
the UK prices becoming the fourth highest amongst the ten European countries assessed, 
behind Germany, Finland and Ireland. However, as the DH study does not include post-2005 
price, it is not possible to determine the long-term effect of the price cut on ranking.  In its 
bilateral comparisons the DH found UK prices to be significantly lower than those in the US 
and higher than those in the other European countries except Germany and Ireland, where 
prices were found to be broadly similar.  The relative ranking for UK and Ireland, however, 
was found to be sensitive to the exchange rate used. The DH price comparison has several 
                                                 
9 European countries included were France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, UK, Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Ireland 
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limitations.  First, price calculations do not take into account rebates which can be significant 
in some countries and thereby may overstate prices for countries in which rebates are a 
common method of overall price control.  Also, in terms of its contribution to the 
understanding of relative average therapy prices, this study presents a serious drawback in its 
exclusion of generic drugs.  Excluding generics leads to a systematic bias within the 
comparison as generics are almost always less expensive than their branded counterparts. 
Given that generics account for over one-third of prescription sales in some countries and an 
even larger proportion of overall medicines sales, this is a significant omission (as often 
stressed by Danzon and colleagues).  
Anderson, Shea, Hussey, Keyhani and Zephyrin 2004 
In a 2004 study commissioned by Health Affairs, Anderson and colleagues homed in on 30 
leading drugs (in terms of highest total spending in US), comparing prices with Canada, UK 
and France. Their findings suggested greater discrepancies between US and foreign prices than 
those found by Danzon and Furukawa, a difference explained as possibly due to 
methodological differences (the main one being the focus on 30 leading products rather than 
across all drugs). Another reason was that the others used more recent data (2003 versus 1999) 
and that US prices had seen a more rapid increasing in the period 1999-2003 than in other 
countries.  The authors find that compared to US prices, prices in Canada were 52% lower, 
59% lower in France, and 47% lower in the UK. After incorporating US discounts prices were 
found to be 40% lower in Canada, 48% lower in France, and 34% lower in the UK.  The 
differences between US prices and foreign prices measured in Anderson et al. are greater than 
those reported by the most comparable Danzon studies.  However, it should be noted that in 
limiting the sample to 30 leading drugs, the Anderson study sought to answer a specific 
question that was posed: “..whether the adoption of some mechanism of to control 
pharmaceutical spending such as price controls would allow for the elimination of the 
‘doughnut hole’” in the Medicare drug benefit program. It thus explicitly chose a more 
standardized approach to medicine price comparison over the representative approach utilized 
by Danzon and colleagues (Anderson et al. 2004).  
Background on the donut hole: Medicare beneficiaries pay $35 per month for prescription 
drug coverage that covers 75% of prescription drug expenses up to $2,250. There is then a 
gap in coverage from $2,250 to $5,100 (the “doughnut hole”). Above $5,100 coverage 
resumes with Medicare paying 95% of a beneficiary’s prescription drug expenses. The 
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resulting gap originated from a desire to hold Medicare drug spending below a previously 
agreed target of $400 billion over a ten-year period and it was seen as a middle option 
intended to encourage people with small drug bills to enrol whilst also protecting people with 
really large drug expenses. The Anderson study concluded that indeed if the US were to 
impose price regulations that bring prices of leading pharmaceuticals (the 30 drugs that 
together represented 30% of US sales) in line with other rich countries (specifically if it could 
reach the benchmark of 3 other countries combined: Canada, France and UK) that the “donut 
hole” or coverage gap in prescription drug benefit of the Medicare programme could be filled 
and keep overall Medicare drug spending within the limits previously set by Congress. 
However, the authors also seemed convinced that the price controls considered would have 
knock-on effects on the level of R&D undertaken. 
Schustereder and Jutting 2008 
The 2008 study by Schustereder and Jutting looked at how the trade related intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS) impacted drug prices in seven middle income countries. They 
summarize “TRIPS and Public Health” as divided into two different camps: Those (generally 
civil society and non-governmental organisations) who argue that the big research-based 
pharmaceutical companies unfairly use trade-related intellectual property rights to charge 
higher prices for their products under patent (Baker, 2007; MSF, 2001; Myhr, 2000; Oxfam, 
2002), thereby imposing a major barrier to accessing essential medicines. Major 
pharmaceutical companies and other proponents of TRIPS retort that a global respect for 
pharmaceutical patents is the essential precondition for drug developers to take on research 
and development at all (Bale, 2000). This group stresses that TRIPS do not actually have a 
major impact on local medicine prices in contrast to many country- specific factors such as 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, taxes, and excessive wholesale and retail mark-ups. Mark-ups indeed 
are argued by many to have the biggest influence on local prices and thus accessibility (Bale, 
2001; Bate et al., 2005; Bate et al., 2006; Levison, 2003). The authors use these arguments as 
background to examine the potential impact of TRIPS on the price of essential medicines in 
middle-income countries. The study focuses on the prices of drugs to treat HIV/AIDS and 
malaria across seven countries, including Morocco, Tunisia, South Africa, Jordan, Philippines, 
Thailand, and Malaysia. Using econometric analysis, complemented by exploratory methods 
the authors concluded that, thus far, the introduction of TRIPS had made no major impact on 
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the development of drug prices. Excessive procurement and marketing costs appeared to be 
more important determinants for observed high drug price levels.   
Kanavos and Vandoros 2011 
In their 2011 study Kanavos and Vandoros looked that the determinants of prices of 50 
originator, prescription-only pharmaceuticals across 15 OECD countries10 in the first quarter 
of 2004 and the irst quarter of 2007 respectively (32 of the products being common across the 
two years analysed). The study calculates volume-weighted prices for the retail sector and for 
those paid by insurers and looks at the influence of product-specific properties such as launch 
date and patent status as well as market dynamics and the regulatory context in which the 
products diffuse. Results suggest that prices are significantly different between the US and 
major European markets when ex-factory prices are compared but that these differences 
narrow down significantly when public prices are compared across countries. Public price 
differences between the US and European countries are found to be much greater for off-
patent originator brand than for those that are still on-patent. Key findings highlight the 
importance of distribution fees and taxes as key contributors to public prices of prescription 
branded pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
10 Including the US, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Australia, Mexico, Austria, 
Portugal, Sweden, Greece, Slovakia and Belgium. 
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PAPER 1   
THE LEVEL OF INCOME APPEARS TO HAVE NO CONSISTENT BEARING ON 
PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES ACROSS COUNTRIES 
(This paper has been included in its published format as it was clear that this version was far 
more aesthetic and readable than any version the Candidate herself could produce.) 
 
 
By Chantal M. Morel, Alistair McGuire, and Elias Mossialos
The Level Of Income Appears
To Have No Consistent Bearing
On Pharmaceutical Prices
Across Countries
ABSTRACT A generally accepted view is that it is more efficient and ethical
if global pharmaceutical prices vary according to countries’ relative
income. To understand manufacturers’ pricing strategies, we compared
average pharmaceutical prices in fourteen middle-income countries to
those in three high-income countries and a low-income region in western
Africa from 1999 through 2008. We found that some middle-income
countries pay more for pharmaceuticals than high-income countries—for
example, prices in several middle-income countries exceeded those in the
United Kingdom for some years of the study period. Other middle-income
countries paid less than low-income countries—for example, average
prices in India were consistently below prices in western Africa. These
variations suggest that we need new policies on pharmaceutical pricing to
improve access to pharmaceuticals around the world.
A
ccording to theWorldBank, 70per-
cent of the world’s population to-
day lives in middle-income coun-
tries, including Brazil, India, and
South Africa.1 The bank defines
middle-income countries as those with an annual
per capita gross national income of US$936–US
$11,455 (using the bank’s 2008 calculations).2
The InternationalMonetary Fund predicted in
2011 that the world’s emerging and developing
economies—which generally correspond to
middle- and low-income countries—will collec-
tively grow by more than 50 percent between
2011 and 2016, based on current US dollars.3
And PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated in
2011 that the recent global financial crisis had
accelerated the shift in global economic power to
what are known as the “emerging economies.”
The company estimated that the combined gross
domestic product of the so-called E7 countries
(Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,Mexico,Russia,
and Turkey) would exceed that of the G7 coun-
tries (Canada, France,Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) some-
time between 2018 and 2032, depending on the
calculation method. By 2050 the E7 economies
are predicted to be approximately 64–100 per-
cent larger than the current G7 economies.4
Evidence from the fourteen middle-income
countries in our study between 1995 and 2006
suggests that such economic growth will lead
to increased expenditures on health care
(Exhibit 1).
The World Health Organization estimated in
2004 that expenditures on pharmaceuticals be-
tween 1990 and 2000 grew by $150 billion in
high-income countries, $41 billion in middle-
income countries, and $4 billion in low-income
countries.5 The fastest growth in this expendi-
ture occurred among middle-income countries.
With economic growth, demand for pharmaceut-
icals is expected to increase greatly in middle-
income countries. PricewaterhouseCoopers ex-
pects that by 2020, the E7 countries will account
for 19 percent—up from 8 percent in 2004—of
the global pharmaceuticalsmarket, which is pro-
jected to have $1.3 trillion of sales in 2020.6
According to IMS Health—a provider of market
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information to the pharmaceutical and health
care industries—the E7 countries will soon
spend more than the G7 countries on pharma-
ceuticals.7
Very little is knownabout pharmaceutical pric-
ing levels in many of these middle-income coun-
tries. To address this issue, we constructed price
indexes that measure the relative difference in
pharmaceutical prices across different countries
from 1999 through the third quarter of 2008.
Such indexes normalize prices across countries
to account for thedifferentmixesof pharmaceut-
ical consumption in different markets, as the
Consumer Price Index adjusts for inflation to
permit direct comparisons of the real prices of
consumer goods within a country over time. Our
pharmaceutical price indexes allowed us to esti-
mate the prices of pharmaceuticals in a number
of middle-income countries compared to prices
in high- and low-income countries.
We wanted to see if pharmaceutical prices var-
ied in any systematic way over the ten-year study
period. A finding of systematic variation would
suggest the need for further investigation of, for
example, the global pricing strategies pursued
by the pharmaceutical industry and further
analysis of any underlying factors—such as in-
come levels—that might explain the variation.
Income is of particular interest because many
experts agree that income-related differential
pricing among countries would be economically
most efficient—that is, it would appropriately
balance short-termdesires to increase social wel-
fare with long-term desires to sustain adequate
levels of research and development—yet it is not
clear that income has any bearing on pharma-
ceutical pricing strategies. Conversely, a finding
of no systematic variation would suggest that
analyses of price changes in individual countries
would be useful.
Study Data And Methods
OverviewWe analyzed pharmaceutical prices in
fourteen middle-income countries: Algeria, Bra-
zil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa,
Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey. We compared
prices in those countries to prices in three
high-income countries: France, theUnited King-
dom, and the United States. These three are
major pharmaceutical exporters, and it is logical
to assume that manufacturers in those countries
develop global pricing strategies to ensure
adequate returns for future research and devel-
opment, among other objectives.
We also compared the middle-income coun-
tries’ prices to those in French West Africa, an
aggregation by IMS Health of Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea,
Mali, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, and Togo.
This is the sole source of pharmaceutical prices
in low-income countries.
To resolve the inherent difficulties in compar-
ing very different products within a market (in
our case, the pharmaceutical market) and a
Exhibit 1
Per Capita Total Expenditure On Health In Fourteen Middle-Income Countries, 1995–2006
PP
P
Poland
South Africa
Brazil
Mexico
Turkey
Malaysia
Tunisia
Thailand
Egypt
Morocco
Philippines
Algeria
India
Indonesia
SOURCE World Health Organization. Global Health Observatory data repository [Internet]. Geneva: WHO; [cited 2011 Jul 14]. Available
from: http://apps.who.int/ghodata. NOTES International dollars reflect how much a local currency unit is worth within the country and
provide a more valid measure to compare standards of living than exchange rates. They are calculated using purchasing power parities
(PPPs), which adjust currencies according to what they can buy in the respective country markets..
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heterogeneous productmix across countries, we
used an approach developed by Patricia Danzon
and colleagues8,9 to create broadly representative
price indexes that were comparable for each
country. We constructed indexes to describe
the relative difference in prices for pharmaceut-
icals in middle-income countries compared to
the base countries of France, the United King-
dom, the United States, and French West Africa.
We calculated Laspeyres indexes, which use
the quantities of goods consumed in a chosen
base country to weight—that is, to apply the
appropriate level of importance to—prices of
the different goods within the index calculation.
We also calculated Paasche indexes, which use a
country’s own quantities of goods consumed as
weights to calculate the price indexes. In other
words, Laspeyres indexes apply weights to all
other countries’ consumption based on the pat-
tern of consumption in the chosen base country,
while Paasche indexes are based on consump-
tion within the country of analysis. Using both
indexes allowed us to see the impact that differ-
ent weights for quantities of consumption (con-
sumption patterns in the base country versus
those of the country of analysis) had on our cal-
culations of relative prices.
To ensure comparison of like-for-like prod-
ucts, many past studies of pharmaceutical prices
have limited their analysis to products with sim-
ilar formulations, strengths, brands, and manu-
facturers. However, given the vast differences in
sales from one country to another because of
variations in consumers’ preferences or in pric-
ing and reimbursement systems, these limited
comparisons give only indications of overall
prices. They are particularly unrepresentative
when they exclude generic drugs, which can be
a large proportion of the pharmaceuticals
consumed.9
We broadened the analysis to include drugs
based on the same molecule and used for the
same purpose, but differing in formulation,
strength, brand, and manufacturer across coun-
tries.We thereby increased the number of prod-
ucts that we could compare, as well as our chanc-
es of capturing a sample of pharmaceuticals that
were representative of national markets as
a whole.
Data The data were provided by IMS Health
and covered the period from January 1, 1999,
through September 30, 2008.10 Pharmaceuticals
were identified according to molecule name and
use. Prices were calculated from sales expressed
in US dollars, using exchange rates in effect at
the time of sale, anddeflated to 2005 dollars (see
the online Appendix for more details).11 Sales
were expressed in terms of standard units.12
Prices were weighted by the number of stan-
dardunits sold, regardless of the specific product
name, pack size, form, or strength.Within each
Laspeyres or Paasche index, a given country’s
price per standard unit for a given drug was
the volume-weighted average price per dose over
all of the possible presentations in that country.
The drugs in our sample had to have consistent
molecule names and uses across all countries in
the comparison in that given year. That is, the
analysis is based on year-on-year comparisons
even though a number of such comparisons
are given across a number of years (see the on-
line Appendix for more details).11
Drugs and uses were rematched for each year,
allowing for the sample of pharmaceuticals
being compared to change over time, in linewith
variations in availability and buyers’ prefer-
ences, and innovations in the pharmaceutical
sector.
Comparisons We compared drugs and uses
bilaterally, between selected middle-income
countries and selected base countries. We com-
pared prices in the United States to those in all
middle-income countries. We also compared
prices in the United Kingdom with those in
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Poland,
South Africa, and Turkey; prices in France with
those in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; and pri-
ces in FrenchWest Africa to prices in all fourteen
middle-income countries. We chose the former
two comparisons based on potential lingering
economic ties (originating in colonial times)
that could affect pricing strategies. Because
IMS Health’s prices omit manufacturers’ dis-
counts in theUnited States, we assumed an over-
all discount of 8 percent in bilateral comparisons
using that country’s weighting.10
We used Spearman rank correlations, which
test for a monotonic relation—for example, in-
creases in prices as incomes or health costs in-
crease—without assuming such a relation to be
linear.We did this to examine the relationships
between relative pharmaceutical prices and
gross domestic product and between relative
prices and one standard cost of health ser-
vices—the cost per hospital bed day, as estimated
by the World Health Organization.13
We also analyzed market structure, assuming
the IMS Health data for pharmaceutical sales in
each country were representative of the coun-
try’s market as a whole. That is, we explored
the degree to which the drugs in our analysis
were representative of all products sold in the
country markets in terms of the proportion of
generic products, products that carry any type of
brand, and those with original brand names.
Product characteristics were not available for
all categories in all countries.
We compared each sample in our analysis to
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overall countrydata to assess thedegree towhich
the sample represented the wider market in
product type (including brands, whether it was
over the counter orbyprescription, and lengthof
time since it entered the country’s market).
Limitations Our findingsmust be interpreted
carefully, given the sensitivity of relative prices
to how they are measured. For example, the
drugs that we used to create our price indexes
represent only a portion of the medicines avail-
able in the respective countrymarkets. Although
we tried to compare prices of similar drugs, we
gave priority to drugs that represented a coun-
try’s overall pharmaceutical market. This means
that although the sample drugs fromother coun-
tries will match US samples in molecule and use
(as shown on the identifying label of the drug
package), they may differ in such features as
formulation, manufacturer, length of time on
the local market, and whether they are available
in generic form.An ideal analysis of priceswould
control for these characteristics, but the meth-
odology used to create the indexes does not lend
itselfwell to such ananalysis.Relativepricesmay
also be very sensitive to other elements of study
design (see the online Appendix for more
details).11
This study has additional limitations from a
policy perspective. First, it does not address
the important issue of differences in price and
access to pharmaceuticals within a particular
country. Indeed, inequities in income and access
to health caremay well be worse in somemiddle-
income countries than anywhere else in the
world, and if drugs in those countries were
merely to have a uniform price based on average
national income, poorer citizens would still be
unable to afford them. Farmoreneeds to be done
to bring in-country prices in line with local af-
fordability. Policy makers are often reluctant to
price-discriminate within countries for the ben-
efit of the poor, because of political reasons or
convenience.14
Second, IMSHealth collects the data on which
we based our analysis only through audits of
formal distribution channels. This may produce
inaccurateprices for countrieswithhigh levels of
informal or black-market sales. Also, given that
the prices exclude distribution-chain mark-
ups—markups added to the product at each step
in the distribution chain—the price differences
between countriesmay not accurately reflect dif-
ferences in what patients pay (see the online
Appendix for more details).11
Study Results
Throughout the study period, prices in thirteen
of the fourteen middle-income countries were
belowUS prices. The exception isMexico, where
prices were similar to prices in the United States
between 2003 and 2007, and higher than US
prices during the other years when we used
theLaspeyresprice index (Exhibit 2).Whenman-
ufacturers’ price discounts are included (see the
online Appendix11), Mexican prices exceededUS
prices for all years. In addition, prices in the
Philippines exceededUSprices in 1999by 15 per-
cent (data not shown).
Exhibit 3 presents similar comparisons using
Exhibit 2
Pharmaceutical Prices In Selected Low- And Middle-Income Countries Compared To US Prices, 1999–2008, Using
Laspeyres Price Indexes
In
de
x 
v
Mexico
Brazil
Poland
French West Africa
South Africa
Egypt
India
SOURCE Authors’ calculations based on IMS Health data (see Note 10 in text). NOTES See the text for explanations of the differences
between Laspeyeres and Paasche price indexes. French West Africa is an aggregation of low-income countries constructed by IMS
Health (see the text for a list of the countries). Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico, Poland, and South Africa are middle-income countries. A
fuller version of this figure appears in the online Appendix (see Note 11 in text).
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Paasche price indexes. These results suggest that
prices in all of the six middle-income countries
shown were below those in the United States,
although prices in Mexico again were higher
than those in the othermiddle-income countries
(in this analysis, 62–74 percent of US prices
after 2000).
Both Exhibits 2 and 3 compare prices in lower-
income countries to those in the United States,
based on the argument that the United States is
the dominant source of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts.However, countries thatwere once colonies
of theUnitedKingdomorFrancemayhave closer
market relations to those countries than to the
United States. Data from French West Africa
were also used to assess price differences with
low-income countries. Below we describe price
comparisonsbetween these “base” countries and
middle-income countries, which we include in
tabular form in the online Appendix.11
Results from comparisons with the United
Kingdom based on both Paasche and Laspeyres
price indexes suggest that pharmaceutical prices
in several middle-income countries exceeded
those in the United Kingdom for some years of
the study period. Results of the comparisons
with France suggest that prices in Morocco ex-
ceeded French prices in some years, when
weighted according to French consumption vol-
umes (using the Laspeyres price indexes). Both
price comparisons with French West Africa sug-
gest that several middle-income countries had
prices consistently below those in that region.
As indicated above, we looked for associations
between a country’s Laspeyres and Paasche price
indexes, its gross domestic product, and its cost
of a hospital bed day.
There is no statistically significant relation-
ship between pharmaceutical prices in middle-
income countries and their gross domestic prod-
ucts (Exhibit 4). Using the Laspeyres indexes
gave a correlation of 0.1826 (p ¼ 0:5320); using
the Paasche indexes gave a correlation of 0.2203
(p ¼ 0:4492). Pharmaceutical prices are much
more closely associated with the cost of health
care, such as the cost per hospital bed day
(Exhibit 5), than with income. Here, the
Laspeyres indexes gave a correlation of 0.4466
(p ¼ 0:1094, almost significant at the 10 percent
level). The Paasche indexes gave a correlation of
0.5771 (p ¼ 0:0307, significant at the 5 per-
cent level).
Discussion
This study sought to determinewhether pharma-
ceutical prices varied systematically with income
across a range of middle-income countries be-
tween 1999 and 2008. We found no such varia-
tion. Instead, we found wide variability in phar-
maceutical prices around the globe, with prices
in some middle-income countries (such as
Mexico) being similar to those in industrialized
countries (such as the United States) regardless
of whether we used Laspeyres or Paasche
indexes.
Exhibit 3
Pharmaceutical Prices In Selected Low- And Middle-Income Countries Compared To US Prices, 1999–2008, Using Paasche
Price Indexes
Mexico
Brazil
Poland
South Africa
French West Africa
Egypt
India
SOURCE Authors’ calculations based on IMS Health data (see Note 10 in text). NOTES See the text for explanations of the differences
between Laspeyeres and Paasche price indexes. French West Africa is an aggregation of low-income countries constructed by IMS
Health (see the text for a list of the countries). Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico, Poland, and South Africa are middle-income countries. A
fuller version of this figure appears in the online Appendix (see Note 11 in text).
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Prices in other middle-income countries are
low compared to prices in high-income coun-
tries, and even compared to prices in low-income
countries. For example, prices inEgypt and India
were lower than those in French West Africa
(data not shown). This lack of association be-
tween prices and income generally confirms—
although it is not identical to—findings of earlier
studies.15,16
Exhibit 4 shows the lack of any clear associa-
tion between a country’s gross domestic product
and its pharmaceutical prices. This figure shows
2008 data; the lack of association is similar for
all years in the study period. The Spearman rank
correlation reinforces this result.
The lack of a clear relationship between phar-
maceutical prices and gross domestic product is
of particular interest because differential pricing
across countries, relative to income, has been
shown to be efficient on the grounds of both
static and dynamic efficiency (that is, increasing
social welfare and supporting long-term re-
search and development).12,17,18 Furthermore,
the need to use such differential pricing to en-
sure access to pharmaceuticals may increase as
developing countries make up a larger share of
the global market for drugs.
For example, if countries arepushed to comply
with the patent rules outlined in the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS; and in TRIPS-plus, which
includes an even stricter application of intellec-
tual property rules19), developing countries
could have even greater difficulty in accessing
pharmaceuticals than they do now, because of
delays in generic drugs’ entering the market.
This further limiting of generic drugs’manufac-
turing would lead manufacturers of other drugs
to adopt pricing strategies that can dictate more
directly theprices thatpayers andpatientswill be
charged. Thus, differential pricing driven by rel-
ative income may become increasingly vital to
ensuring affordability in these markets.
Although we found no clear association be-
tween pharmaceutical prices and national gross
domestic product (Exhibit 4), there does appear
to be a link between pharmaceutical prices and
other health care costs, represented in our study
by cost of hospital bed day (Exhibit 5). The rela-
tionshipholds forboth2005, shown inExhibit 5,
and 2000—the only years for which health ser-
vices cost data were available. Spearman rank
correlations between 2005 cost per hospital
bed day and prices also suggest an association.
The relative prices paid for pharmaceuticals in
middle- and low-income countries appear higher
when the comparison is based on the volume of
drugs sold in the United States (Laspeyres price
indexes) than when it is based on the volume
sold in the other countries (Paasche price in-
dexes). This tendency for prices in each country
to appear cheaper when the consumption pat-
terns in that country—rather than those in the
base country—are used to determine the relative
importance of each drug in the overall index,
regardless of the base country used, is known
as the Gerschenkron effect. It may simply reflect
a substitution effect, as consumers in each coun-
try purchase relatively more of those pharma-
ceuticals that are comparatively cheap there.8
In our study, all Laspeyres index values exceeded
their Paasche index counterparts, which indi-
cates that as prices rose, the consumption of
the drugs in our sample fell—confirmation that
Exhibit 4
Price Indexes And Gross Domestic Products For Fourteen Middle-Income Countries, 2008
Laspeyres indexes
Paasche indexes
SOURCE Authors’ calculations based on IMS Health data (see Note 10 in text) and World Bank Devel-
opment Indicators (see Note 1 in text). NOTES The gross domestic products are as follows: Tunisia,
$40,180; Morocco, $86,329; Egypt, $162,818; the Philippines, $166,909; Algeria, $173,882; Malay-
sia, $194,927; Thailand, $260,693; South Africa, $276,764; Indonesia, $514,389; Poland, $526,966;
Turkey, $794,228; Mexico, $1,085,951; India, $1,217,490; and Brazil, $1,612,539. A fuller version of
this figure appears in the online Appendix (see Note 11 in text).
Exhibit 5
Pharmaceutical Prices And Cost Per Hospital Bed Day In Fourteen Middle-Income Countries,
2005
Laspeyres indexes
Paasche indexes
SOURCE Authors’ calculations based on IMS Health data (see Note 10 in text) and World Health Or-
ganization data (see Note 13 in text). NOTES For an explanation of international dollars, see the notes
to Exhibit 1. The costs per hospital bed day are as follows: India, $18.75; Indonesia, $30.36; Egypt,
$35.35; Morocco, $37.09; Algeria, $38.06; the Philippines, $44.92; Turkey, $52.14; Tunisia, $57.34;
Thailand, $60.23; South Africa, $60.89; Brazil, $61.78; Mexico, $67.49; Malaysia, $68.46; and Poland,
$81.89.
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the drugswe selectedwere not atypical products.
There appear to be simple explanations for
some of the price differentials we found. For
example, thedip inBrazilianprices in themiddle
years of the study period (Exhibits 2 and 3) may
be due to that country’s overall economic situa-
tion at the time. Brazil’s gross domestic product
declined from 2000 to 2002 and then rose very
sharply, with income more than doubling be-
tween 2002 and 2008.1
The fact that Mexican prices were so close to
US prices might be explained by the overlap of
our study period with the implementation of
major health system reforms in Mexico20 that
could have affected procurement and thus rela-
tive prices. And the sharp decline of prices in
Turkey from 1999 to 2001 may be related to
the banking and currency crisis that occurred
in that country around this time (data not
shown).21 Further analysis of the effect of such
events would be of interest.
Conclusion
The pricing of pharmaceuticals in markets
around the world from 1999 through 2008 does
not appear to have been systematically related to
different countries’ income category or gross
domestic product. Despite the generally ac-
cepted view that it would be efficient—that is,
it would produce an appropriate balance be-
tween meeting immediate social welfare needs
and supporting future pharmaceutical innova-
tion—and ethical to price pharmaceuticals in
various markets according to relative income,
manufacturers do not appear to use that ap-
proach consistently in setting prices. Some
middle-income countries pay higher prices for
pharmaceuticals than high-income countries,
while other middle-income countries pay prices
below those found in low-income countries.
This lack of association between prices and
income suggests that we need policies to bring
pricesmore in linewith income, so that everyone
has access to the pharmaceuticals they need. ▪
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PAPER 2   
COMPARISON OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES AMONGST HIGH-INCOME 
COUNTRIES USING MULTIPLE INDICES 
 
ABSTRACT 
With major differences in disease treatment globally despite increasing global trade, there is 
growing attention to the relative prices paid for pharmaceuticals across countries. However, 
gaining an accurate picture of these price differences is very difficult due to variations in the 
presentation of pharmaceuticals and their local availability. Variations in consumption patterns 
as a result of social and cultural disparities also make the calculation of relative prices of 
relevant pharmaceuticals very challenging. This study aims at a quantitative understanding of 
the differences in the prices of pharmaceuticals amongst countries by using several indices that 
respond differently to consumption patterns and to the variations in the prices of individual 
products. It examines prices in the United States compared to 20 other high-income countries, 
and their evolution from 1999 to 2008, utilizing a much larger data set than ever used before. 
The results demonstrate how the different price indices provide a range of estimates for the 
relative prices of pharmaceuticals between two countries and how the differences between 
indices can be analysed to investigate differences in pricing or consumption patterns.  
With few exceptions, drug prices in the comparative countries were lower than in the US but 
became gradually more similar to the US over the 10 years of the study. However, for only a 
few countries could the prices relative to the US be characterized by a single number based on 
similar values of the various indices.  A good estimation of relative prices could be obtained 
for a much larger number of countries if the comparison was limited to “global” molecules 
(capturing on average 33% of the various markets). In cases where the indices were divergent, 
their differences provided useful insight into the underlying causes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
With increasing global trade the value of cross-national price data increases. Understanding 
the differences between pharmaceutical prices amongst countries in particular can be useful 
on several levels. For example, to develop national (or even local) health strategies and trade 
policies may require awareness of the relative prices of pharmaceuticals sold in neighbouring 
countries to better predict or manage patient migration. National authorities may also be 
interested in understanding relative price differences to better manage parallel imports and 
their impact on local availability. Payers are interested in relative prices in order to leverage 
price negotiations with manufacturers to secure rebates, discounts, refunds, etc. Patients, 
especially those living near national borders, are interested in relative prices to inform their 
choice of where to seek care. The public and civil society organizations are interested in 
understanding the difference in pharmaceutical prices internationally to understand and indeed 
better fight for fairness in pricing and access to pharmaceuticals.  
Quantifying differences in prices (or income or productivity) over time or amongst countries 
is a classic and long-standing problem in economics.  There is an extensive literature dealing 
with the mathematical approaches to quantifying such differences with a single number, 
sometimes referred to as the Index Number Theory (see in particular Fisher 1922; Samuelson 
and Swamy 1974; Afriat 1978; and Diewert 1978). To make the problem tangible consider a 
simple two country-two product gedanken example: drug alpha costs $3 in country A and $1 in 
country B, whilst drug beta costs $1 in both A and B.  Drug alpha represents 20% of the 
market by volume in A and 80% of the market in B, whilst beta represents 80% of the market 
in A and 20% in B. The pharmaceuticals in country B are clearly cheaper on average than in 
country A.  But how much cheaper?  To answer such questions, we rely on indices that 
measure overall differences in prices by comparing a comprehensive or representative sample 
of products that is appropriately weighted.  Such indices summarize into one number a vast 
amount of price and sales volume information stemming from thousands of products. Indices 
make price differences more readily comprehensible and in recent decades they have become 
important tools for comparing prices and other important economic indicators across 
countries and regions. Indeed under the aegis of some of the major international organizations 
(and often carried out by national agencies) such international comparisons have become 
increasingly important in the geo-political landscape (Balk 2008).   
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The difficulty is that different indices can give widely diverging estimations of price 
differences between two countries.  For example two prominent indices, which have been 
often used to compare the prices of pharmaceuticals, give very different answers to the 
relative drug prices in countries A and B in our gedanken example: prices in B are 71% of the 
prices in A according to the Laspeyres index but only 38% according to the Paasche index (see 
below for the mathematical definition of these indices). Which of these indices provide a true 
quantification of prices in A and B? Or is the true value some average of the two?  Samuelson 
and Swamy gave the sobering answer 40 years ago: “…we cannot hope for one ideal formula 
for the index number: if it works for the tastes of Jack Spratt, it won’t work for his wife’s 
tastes” (Samuelson and Swamy 1974). In other words, heterogeneity in preferences makes the 
search for any single perfect price index a priori futile. 
This study aims at comparing pharmaceutical prices in the United States and 20 other high-
income countries.  As in previous studies, this is achieved by using price indices despite the 
fundamental difficulties in using such indices, which are further magnified in the case of 
pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceutical products come in a dizzying variety of presentation, dosage 
and composition that vary from country to country such that it is inherently difficult to 
properly classify and compare like goods. Whilst the US pharmaceutical market is the closest 
the world has to a free market, all other countries use some form of price containment 
strategy or controls to manage prices, with the net result that the relation between price and 
consumption does not follow that expected of a free market. This phenomenon is exacerbated 
by private and national health insurance programs, which tend to dissociate price and 
consumption and, at the limit, can result in a marginal price of zero (Newhouse 1992).  This 
makes it difficult to use the results of the literature that link “ideal” or “superlative” indices to 
some type of maximization of welfare or utility (see van Veelen and van Weide 2008, and 
references within).  The difficulty of defining a proper price index for pharmaceuticals is 
greatly amplified when the objective is to compare prices amongst countries over time as is 
done in this study.  This is so because preferences and prices in any given country co-vary 
over time in a manner that depends on the specifics of that country’s pharmaceutical market.   
In view of all these fundamental and practical difficulties, this study takes a pragmatic 
approach and makes simultaneous use of several indices that respond differently to 
consumption patterns and to the variations in the prices of individual products, as explained 
below.  This approach has the double benefit of obviating the inherent difficulty in defining a 
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true price index for pharmaceuticals and of providing useful information not only from the 
numerical values of these indices and their evolution over time, but also from their 
differences. It must also be noted that the theoretical considerations of the necessary or useful 
properties of price indices that have fuelled much of the discussion regarding index theory 
(Fisher 1922; Samuelson and Swamy 1974; Afriat 1978; and Diewert 1978) are largely 
irrelevant in this pragmatic multi-index approach since it does not rely on the use of a single 
parameter. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Cross-national price differences have been examined by a handful of authors in the past. 
Previous work on the construction of drug price indices has considered within country price 
variation (Berndt ER., Griliches Z., Rosett JG 1993; Griliches and Cockburn 1994) and cross-
country variation (GAO, 1992, 1994; OFT, 2007, Minority Staff Report 1998).  These early 
studies all found US prices to far exceed foreign prices, feeding the popularly held notion that 
the rest of the world is effectively free-riding on the innovation made possible by US prices. 
However, these studies were limited in numerous ways.  Problems have ranged from 
unrepresentative samples (e.g. omitted generics despite widespread local consumption), to 
failing to account for large-pack discounts (Danzon 2000). Some studies used prices 
unweighted by volume, thereby detaching them from consumption and making them 
extremely sensitive to the products included and thus limiting their reliability. (See Danzon 
and Kim 1998 for a discussion of the limitations of the earliest of these). To-date studies 
published by Danzon and colleagues present the most comprehensive and methodologically 
advanced comparison of prices cross-nationally.  Prices were measured against US prices and 
the sample was far more representative than in previous studies. As a result, the Danzon 
studies brought into question the generally held view that US prices were much higher than 
elsewhere. These studies, however, covered only a relatively small number of countries (seven 
in Danzon and Chao 2000 and eight in Danzon and Furukawa 2004) and were each based on 
only one year of data (1992 in Danzon and Chao 2000, 1999 in Danzon and Furukawa 2004).  
The Danzon and Furukawa 2004 study used the 1999 data to examine how drug prices had 
changed from the previous study based on 1992 data. Contrary to the Danzon and Chao 2000 
study, this new study sought to account for important off-invoice discounts that 
manufacturers make to large public and private payers in order to give a more accurate picture 
of relative prices.  Crucially Danzon and Furukawa demonstrated that restricting the sample to 
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presentations that match on form and strength severely reduces the proportion of a country’s 
sales that are captured by the sample (limiting it to only 10-21% of sales in many countries). 
Matching molecules according to usage characteristics such as OTC was also demonstrated to 
be very limiting. In essence the Danzon and Furukawa (2004) study demonstrated the need 
for a large, representative sample to obtain accurate measures of relative prices.  
In a 2004 study commissioned by Health Affairs, Anderson and colleagues homed in on 30 
leading pharmaceuticals (in terms of highest total spending in the US), comparing prices with 
Canada, UK and France (Anderson, Shea, Hussey, Keyhani and Zephyrin 2004). Their 
findings suggested greater differences between US and foreign prices than those found by 
Danzon and Furukawa 2004. This discrepancy was explained as possibly due to 
methodological issues, including in particular the focus on only 30 leading products. Another 
reason proposed for the different finding between the two studies was the more rapid increase 
in US prices than in other countries between 1999, when the data used by Danzon and 
Furukawa were collected, and 2003, when the data used by Anderson et al. were collected.   
The approach used in this paper extends the work of Danzon, Anderson and colleagues in 
several ways.  First the data set that is used is much larger, covering ten years, twenty one 
countries and many more pharmaceutical products.  The study also makes explicit use of two 
different indices, Laspeyres and Paasche, each calculated in two different ways: one based on 
about 150 samples matched each year for all countries, and another based on a many more 
samples (~ 1000 to 2500) matched each year for any two countries being compared.  This 
approach provides a much richer description of the price differences amongst countries. In 
addition to using the values of the individual indices as indications of price differences, this 
study explores how the differences between the two indices calculated from two different data 
bases (a total of four indices) may be diagnostic of the underlying causes of the price 
differences. In several instances, the Fisher Index, which is the geometric mean of the 
Laspeyres and Paasche indices, provides a useful quantification of price differences and it is 
used here for both the multilaterally and the bilaterally matched samples, bringing the total 
number of indices used to six. 
 
 
 
70 
 
 
 
METHODS 
This study analyses IMS data from 20 comparator countries from 1999-200811 relative to the 
US.  The comparator countries are all high-income countries as defined by the World Bank: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. The pharmaceutical prices analysed 
represent deflated manufacturer prices (which exclude wholesaler and pharmacy markups and 
taxes) for pharmaceuticals sold in the retail market except in the case of a few countries for 
which distribution pathways were not delineated between retail and other outlets12.  Prices 
from the United States were based on drugstore, food store and mail service distribution 
channels.  In a first analysis, US prices assumed no off-invoice discounts to allow for 
comparison with previous studies, in particular those of Danzon and Chao 2000 and of 
Anderson et al. 2004. But in a second analysis an overall average discount of 8%, was 
assumed, in line with Danzon and Furukawa (2004). Pharmaceuticals were defined by 
molecule name and indication, here the third Anatomic Therapeutic Category (ATC 3)13.  All 
other characteristics were allowed to vary (e.g. brand name, pack-size, strength, form, etc.). A 
table describing the sample data is included in Appendix 2. 
In the first instance pharmaceuticals were matched across all 21 countries (multilateral 
comparisons) in each year. This limited the analysis to only about 150 pharmaceuticals 
(depending on the year) that were available in all comparator countries, providing a common 
basis for price comparison. Pharmaceuticals were then matched between each individual 
country and the United States (bilateral comparisons), allowing for a much larger sample 
(between 750 and 2600 samples depending on the comparator country and the year) that was 
more representative of the whole market in each country.  Prices in comparator countries 
could in this case only be compared to the base country, not across comparator countries. The 
product mix across the multilateral samples and bilateral samples respectively were the same 
but the volume weights differed according to the consumption patterns of the base country.  
Pharmaceuticals with very small sales volumes (lowest 3% in terms of sales measured in terms 
                                                 
11 Data was available for years 1999 through the 3rd quarter of 2008, hence just under one full decade. 
12 In Singapore and Sweden prices include those for pharmaceuticals destined for retail and hospitals.  
13 Which uses the 3 to 4 digit European Pharmaceutical Market Research Association (EPhMRA) 
classification. 
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of standard units14) were excluded to minimize small number errors.  Conversion from local 
currency was done by IMS Health using exchange rates in effect at the time of sale.  
Methodologically the comparison of pharmaceutical prices across national borders (or across 
sub-national areas of differing regulatory jurisdiction) is in principle just like price comparison 
for other goods.  However, given the enormous diversity in products on the market, the 
indirect nature of purchases, and the rapid pace of technological progress in pharmaceuticals, 
price comparison in this market are more difficult in practice.  Medical molecules sold 
throughout the world come in a plethora of different names, product type, levels of patent 
protection and license status, therapeutic purpose, packaging, formulations/combinations, and 
strengths.  This can make data analysis quite difficult even when using the most sophisticated 
and specially-designed software.  For example, products are launched at different times 
thereby leading to often very different measures of time-on-market (sometimes used as 
measure of age) which can have implications for price. The level of intellectual property 
protection (also linked to age) accorded to a pharmaceutical also varies from country to 
country and may have important implications for price.  In addition, variation in societal 
preferences has led to different products and strengths being dispensed as well as to different 
approaches to dispensing (e.g. pack-splitting) which also impacts unit price and makes 
standardization difficult.  Dispensing policies also differ across countries or jurisdictions. For 
example, generic substitution or equivalent brand substitution is common in some markets 
but less so in others. There is also variation in the political and regulatory environment. For 
example, some governments show preferential status to local manufacturers, allowing them to 
charge higher prices (Anderson et al. 2004)..  
Availability of products is also not uniform and can thus limit the ability to match samples. 
For example, in their 2004 study of the relative prices of 30 leading pharmaceuticals, 
Anderson and colleagues initially examined the top 50 pharmaceuticals (in terms of highest 
total spending) in order to find 30 that were sold in all 4 countries used in the comparison.    
This study aims at resolving the trade-off between the desirability of comparing only identical 
products and the need to compare a truly representative sample of a country’s pharmaceutical 
market.  This is achieved by 1) defining pharmaceuticals across therapeutic category and 
molecule combinations, and 2) conducting both multilateral (limiting the sample to only 
                                                 
14 Standard units are the smallest common dose unit. For oral solid forms this is one tablet or capsule, 
for syrup forms this is 5 ml, and for injectable forms this is one ampoule or vial. 
72 
 
 
 
globally-relevant pharmaceuticals) and bilateral comparison of prices (vastly increasing the 
sample size but narrowing the comparative analysis between countries).   
Overall the methodology used in this study is similar to the one developed by Danzon and 
colleagues. It includes branded as well as generic products, and considers all formulations, 
pack-sizes, and strengths. Some small changes were made to reflect changes in the form of the 
available data and the application of the methodology was different in that this study looks at 
pricing over a much longer time period (10 years as opposed to 1 year in the Danzon studies 
and the Anderson study) and incorporates many more countries for comparison.    
The particular basket of pharmaceuticals used in the sample for each year was determined by 
availability. For indices based on bilaterally-matched samples the basket was made up of all 
molecule-indications that matched between the comparator country and base country. For 
indices based on multilaterally-matched samples the basket was made up of only those 
molecule indications that matched across all HICs.   
As the importance of individual pharmaceuticals for patient treatment varies, price indices are 
weighted by actual consumption patterns—in this case proxied by volume sold. As alluded to 
above, a key concern in the building of indices is the fact that the consumption patterns in the 
countries being compared are a result of numerous contextual factors such as cultural 
preferences, demographics, relative prices, availability of goods and related services, and 
income levels.  As a result, the consumption patterns of the two countries can be quite 
different.  To take these differences into account, this study utilizes two indices that weight 
prices according to consumption patterns from each country.  The Laspeyres index, L, for a 
comparator country, C, weights prices according to consumption patterns of the base country, 
i.e., the United States in most of our study: 
 
Where QM,USA is the quantity weight of the pharmaceutical sold in the USA, and PM,C  and 
PM,USA  are the prices of the pharmaceutical per standard unit in the comparator country and in 
the USA, respectively.  
In contrast, the Paasche index, P, weights prices according to consumption patterns of the 
comparator country (sometimes called “own-weighting”):  
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Where QM,C is the quantity weight of the pharmaceutical sold in the comparator country, and 
PM,C and  PM,USA are the prices of the pharmaceutical per standard unit in the comparator 
country and in the USA, respectively. 
We note that for a given comparator country C, P is the inverse of L calculated for the US 
with C as the base country. One may consider L as quantifying how much the US would save 
if it adopted the prices in country C with no effect on consumption patterns. And one may 
consider P as quantifying how much less country C pays than it would if its drug prices were 
the same as US prices with no change in consumption pattern (Danzon and Chao 2000).  
However, as discussed later, the prices and consumption patterns are of course inter-related, 
rendering these conditions purely imaginary. 
Using two ways of weighting prices for two different baskets of goods yields four distinct 
indices to compare drug prices between two countries. In what follows, the Laspeyres and 
Paasche indices based on multilaterally matched samples are denoted as LM and PM, and those 
based on bilaterally matched samples as LB and PB.  In addition it is convenient to use the 
Fisher Ideal Index (Fisher 1922) which is the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche 
indices.  This index –henceforth the “Fisher Index” although it is one of thousands of such 
indices proposed by Irwin Fisher (1922)—has been shown to provide an approximation of an 
“ideal” or “exact” index under some conditions (Samuelson and Swamy 1974; Afriat 1978).  
In a practical way, this index must necessarily provide a reasonably good estimation of overall 
price differences between two countries when the Laspeyres and Paasche indices are close to 
each other. The Fisher indices based multilaterally and bilaterally matched samples are denoted 
FM and FB, respectively: 
FM =  (LM 
. PM)
1/2 
FB =  (LB 
. PB)
1/2 
In order to gauge HIC price differences independently from the US (although still linked 
through the US dollar conversion rate used by IMS), additional L and P indices were 
calculated using UK and France as base countries and multilaterally- as well as bilaterally-
matched samples.  
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RESULTS 
The calculated Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher indices based on multilaterally matched samples 
and on bilaterally matched samples with the US, LM, PM & FM and LB, PB & FB for all the 
comparator countries and for the 10 years of the study are presented in Tables 1-6 and Figures 
1-6. A summary presentation of the 10-year means of LM and PM, LB and PB is also given in 
Figure 7.  The values of the indices for a given country are generally consistent over the whole 
data set with only six suspiciously high numbers: LB for Austria in 1999, for Japan in 1999 and 
2000, and for Canada in 2003 and 2004, as well as LM for Japan in 2000. 
TABLE 1. LM: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.45 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.66 0.75 
AUSTRIA  0.44 0.40 0.41 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.51 0.60 0.70 
BELGIUM  0.53 0.46 0.49 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.65 0.75 
CANADA  0.55 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.61 0.65 0.70 0.84 0.92 
FINLAND  0.46 0.42 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.61 0.71 
FRANCE  0.42 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.60 0.67 
GERMANY  0.45 0.43 0.43 0.50 0.56 0.54 0.56 0.64 0.73 
GREECE  0.35 0.33 0.34 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.50 0.63 0.75 
ITALY  0.53 0.49 0.50 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.66 0.72 
JAPAN  3.05 0.60 0.59 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.64 0.74 0.92 
KOREA  0.45 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.53 0.62 0.61 
NETHERLANDS  0.54 0.49 0.48 0.55 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.63 0.67 
PORTUGAL  0.50 0.45 0.45 0.51 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.63 0.73 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.71 0.69 0.63 0.56 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.52 
SINGAPORE  0.52 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.52 0.60 
SPAIN  0.40 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.61 0.69 
SWEDEN  0.52 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.60 0.67 
SWITZERLAND  0.74 0.70 0.74 0.83 0.90 0.85 0.78 0.83 0.99 
TAIWAN  0.49 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.46 0.49 0.53 
UNITED KINGDOM  0.54 0.49 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.56 
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TABLE 2. PM: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.33 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.45 0.47 
AUSTRIA  0.38 0.34 0.34 0.41 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.50 
BELGIUM  0.45 0.39 0.40 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.47 0.55 0.68 
CANADA  0.49 0.24 0.38 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.61 0.66 0.59 
FINLAND  0.39 0.36 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.46 0.50 
FRANCE  0.35 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.51 
GERMANY  0.36 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.46 0.37 0.53 
GREECE  0.32 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.64 
ITALY  0.45 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.42 0.48 
JAPAN  0.43 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.63 
KOREA  0.28 0.27 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.56 0.39 
NETHERLANDS  0.44 0.41 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.52 0.53 
PORTUGAL  0.44 0.41 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.63 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.68 0.70 0.65 0.58 0.53 0.56 0.63 0.35 0.41 
SINGAPORE  0.29 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.34 0.32 
SPAIN  0.36 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.49 
SWEDEN  0.41 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.48 
SWITZERLAND  0.54 0.54 0.58 0.66 0.71 0.68 0.61 0.47 0.69 
TAIWAN  0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.35 
UNITED KINGDOM  0.44 0.40 0.41 0.44 0.47 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.41 
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TABLE 3. LB: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.87 0.71 0.56 0.56 0.65 0.74 1.21 1.05 1.14 1.15 
AUSTRIA  1.40 0.89 0.76 0.74 0.61 0.64 0.56 0.58 0.78 1.06 
BELGIUM  0.72 0.56 0.51 0.53 0.64 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.86 1.22 
CANADA  0.72 0.67 0.61 1.11 5.89 4.76 1.57 1.65 1.39 1.34 
FINLAND  0.55 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.69 0.94 
FRANCE   0.45 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.64 
GERMANY  1.18 0.85 0.73 0.74 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.94 1.50 
GREECE  0.46 0.36 0.36 0.39 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.64 0.70 
ITALY  0.64 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.57 0.76 1.08 
JAPAN  2.30 2.35 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.79 0.91 1.23 
KOREA  0.56 0.48 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.53 
NETHERLANDS  0.67 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.60 0.62 0.58 0.57 0.64 0.68 
PORTUGAL  0.62 0.50 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.56 0.61 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.82 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.62 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.55 
SINGAPORE  0.62 0.60 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.43 0.45 0.49 0.54 
SPAIN  0.52 0.43 0.39 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.55 0.61 
SWEDEN  0.60 0.53 0.44 0.47 0.55 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.79 1.10 
SWITZERLAND  1.01 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.92 0.97 0.83 0.77 0.81 0.91 
TAIWAN  0.48 0.51 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.47 
UNITED KINGDOM  0.79 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.59 0.58 0.64 0.61 
 
80 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. PB: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.33 0.28 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.31 
AUSTRIA  0.37 0.25 0.33 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.43 
BELGIUM  0.38 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.43 0.26 0.49 
CANADA  0.24 0.27 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.49 0.51 0.45 0.46 
FINLAND  0.23 0.22 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.40 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.45 
FRANCE   0.19 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.38 
GERMANY  0.29 0.24 0.35 0.33 0.43 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.45 0.55 
GREECE  0.19 0.18 0.23 0.25 0.30 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.48 
ITALY  0.43 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.40 
JAPAN  0.32 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.31 0.34 
KOREA  0.16 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.35 0.40 0.30 
NETHERLANDS  0.42 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.48 
PORTUGAL  0.38 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.47 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.30 0.38 0.52 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.29 0.26 
SINGAPORE  0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.29 
SPAIN  0.31 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.41 
SWEDEN  0.27 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.26 0.43 
SWITZERLAND  0.49 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.48 0.56 
TAIWAN  0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 
UNITED KINGDOM  0.34 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.40 0.37 
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TABLE 5. FM: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.38 0.33 0.34 0.42 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.54 0.59 
AUSTRIA  0.41 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.59 
BELGIUM  0.49 0.42 0.45 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.60 0.71 
CANADA  0.52 0.35 0.44 0.51 0.56 0.59 0.65 0.74 0.74 
FINLAND  0.42 0.39 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.53 0.60 
FRANCE  0.39 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.59 
GERMANY  0.41 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.62 
GREECE  0.33 0.32 0.33 0.40 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.54 0.69 
ITALY  0.49 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.59 
JAPAN  1.15 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.59 0.76 
KOREA  0.35 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.42 0.50 0.59 0.49 
NETHERLANDS  0.49 0.45 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.57 0.59 
PORTUGAL  0.47 0.43 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.68 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.69 0.69 0.64 0.57 0.53 0.55 0.59 0.45 0.46 
SINGAPORE  0.39 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.43 0.44 
SPAIN  0.38 0.34 0.34 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.59 
SWEDEN  0.46 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.51 0.57 
SWITZERLAND  0.63 0.62 0.66 0.74 0.80 0.76 0.69 0.62 0.82 
TAIWAN  0.36 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.43 
UNITED KINGDOM  0.49 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.48 
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TABLE 6. FB: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.54 0.44 0.38 0.36 0.43 0.49 0.63 0.56 0.60 0.60 
AUSTRIA  0.72 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.67 
BELGIUM  0.52 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.48 0.77 
CANADA  0.42 0.43 0.42 0.64 1.58 1.49 0.88 0.92 0.79 0.79 
FINLAND  0.35 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.54 0.65 
FRANCE   0.29 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.49 
GERMANY  0.59 0.45 0.51 0.49 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.91 
GREECE  0.30 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.58 
ITALY  0.52 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.65 
JAPAN  0.86 0.90 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.65 
KOREA  0.30 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.40 
NETHERLANDS  0.53 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.57 
PORTUGAL  0.49 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.54 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.49 0.53 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.42 0.38 
SINGAPORE  0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.40 
SPAIN  0.40 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.50 
SWEDEN  0.40 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.69 
SWITZERLAND  0.70 0.58 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.75 0.69 0.63 0.62 0.71 
TAIWAN  0.27 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.26 
UNITED KINGDOM  0.52 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.51 0.47 
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Looking at the general features of the data (and keeping a detailed examination of the 
differences amongst indices for the discussion) some general trends are readily apparent.  
With very few exceptions the indices show that pharmaceutical prices in the comparator 
countries were lower than in the US for the period of the study.  Following a general decrease 
between 1999 and 2001, most of the indices increased from 2001 to 2008, indicating a 
lessening of the price differential with the US over time.  As clearly seen in Fig. 7 and 
explained below, the Laspeyres indices are greater than the Paasche indices in all instances 
and the ranking LB > LM > PM> PB remains throughout for all countries considered. As a 
result of this ranking, the Fisher indices based on multilateral and bilateral samples, FM and FB, 
for a given country (which are the geometric means of the corresponding L and P indices) 
remain numerically close to each other at nearly all dates and thus provide a first order 
quantification of relative prices and their evolution.    
As seen in Table 5 and Figure 5, the Fisher indices based on multilaterally matched samples, 
FM, in 2000 range from 0.33 for Greece to 0.63 for Switzerland (and a suspicious 1.15 for 
Japan). In 2008, the range in FM is slightly elevated with a low value of 0.43 for Taiwan and a 
high value of 0.82 for Switzerland.  The most common trend in FM is a decrease from 2000 to 
2001, followed by a gradual increase until 2007 and, in several instances, an abrupt increase in 
2008.  One country, Saudi Arabia, shows a decreasing FM over time, and two countries, 
Taiwan and the United Kingdom, show very little change over the 9 years of data.   
The results for the Fisher index based on the much larger data base of bilaterally matched 
samples, FB, (Table 6 and Figure 6) are generally similar to those observed for FM. In 1999, FB 
ranges from 0.27 in Taiwan to 0.86 in Japan, and in 2008 from 0.26 in Taiwan to 0.91 in 
Germany.  The variations in FB over time confirm: 1) a general decrease in drug prices in 
comparator countries compared to US from 1999 to 2001; 2) a general increase from 2001 to 
2007; 3) an abrupt increase in 2008 in a few countries; 4) a relative decrease in prices over 
time in Saudi Arabia; and 5) little change over time in the UK and Taiwan.  In addition the FB 
index indicates little change over time in the average price of the pharmaceuticals considered 
in the bilateral analysis for Singapore compared to the US. 
Including a discount of 8% in the US prices automatically increases all the indices by 8.7% 
(1/0.92 = 1.087), bringing the cost of drugs in the US closer to that of other countries.  
Whilst significant, the resulting change in the average values of the indices (e.g., from 0.43 to 
0.47 for PM, 0.56 to 0.61 for LM and 0.49 to 0.45 for FM across all countries for all years) is 
actually much smaller than the difference between PB and LB (0.35 and 0.72, respectively 
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averaged across all countries for all years) both of which represent defensible measures of 
relative drug prices in comparator countries and the US.  
Indices based on multilaterally-matched sample, LM and PM, using UK as a base suggest that 
prices in other HIC evolved to become relatively higher than UK prices over the course of 
the decade. Whilst the UK starts the decade in the middle of the group of comparator 
countries, by 2008 it ties for the position of lowest relative prices. Indices based on bilaterally-
matched samples, LB and PB, using UK as the base suggested a similar overall trend as those 
based on the multilaterally-matched sample. (See Appendix 2 for these indices: LM
UK, PM
UK, 
LB
UK, and PB
UK.) This result is consistent with the fact that drug prices in the UK remain 
relatively stable compared to the US during the period of the study whilst they increase in 
other countries. 
Indices based on a multilaterally-matched sample using France as the base suggest French 
prices fell in the bottom third of HIC prices. Austrian prices dipped below French prices in 
one year, Saudi Arabia over 2 years, and Greece, Korea, Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, and UK 
over at least 4 years. Indices based on bilaterally-matched samples suggested that all other 
HIC had higher prices than in France during the period in question. Exceptions included 
Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and Spain in some years. See Appendix 2 for these indices: LM
FR, 
PM
FR, LB
FR, and PB
FR.  
 
DISCUSSION  
GETTING AN ACCURATE AND REPRESENTATIVE PICTURE OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 
AND THEIR TIME EVOLUTION USING MULTIPLE INDICES 
As discussed in the introduction, the price differences in pharmaceuticals amongst countries 
are difficult to quantify because of variations in the availability of compounds and 
presentations and disparities in consumption patterns. To better understand how the 
Laspeyres (L) and Paasche (P) indices used together provide insight into the price differences 
amongst countries, it is useful to consider what factors affect the values of these two indices 
and the differences between them.  There are two limiting cases in which the difference in 
prices between two countries is well-defined and can be captured in a single number: 1) when 
the factor of the prices between one country and another is the same for every 
pharmaceutical (e.g., all pharmaceuticals are 1.3 times more expensive in country A than in 
country B); or 2) when the consumption patterns for pharmaceuticals are identical in both 
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countries, such that an accurate quantification of overall relative prices is obtained by using 
the same relative quantity to weight each individual pharmaceutical price for both countries.   
In both of these limiting (and extremely unlikely) cases, the numerical values of the L and P 
indices are identical.  The differences that are seen between these two indices stem from 
differences in consumption patterns and price sensitivity amongst countries: the more 
dissimilar the patterns of consumption for pharmaceuticals and the more responsive 
consumption is to price (or the price is responsive to consumption as a result of competition 
or regulation15) in the two countries being compared, the greater the difference between L 
and P.  Because of the inverse relationship between usage and price, own-weighting provides 
a relatively lower average price, and the Laspeyres index is always larger than the Paasche 
index (L > P as can be seen in Tables 1-4). This result has been called the Serendipity 
Theorem by Samuelson and Swamy (1974). 
As a result of their sensitivity to consumption patterns, the L and P indices are dependent on 
the size of the data-base from which they are calculated: the larger the number of samples 
being considered, the greater the range of differences in consumption patterns being 
captured.  Because of the negative correlation between price and consumption, the net result 
is an increase in L and a decrease in P as the size of the data-base increases. Here we have 
considered multilaterally-matched samples, with a mean sample size of 146 (range 140 to 
158), and bilaterally-matched samples, with a mean sample size of 1250 (range 745-2548). As 
can be seen in Tables 1-4, the Laspeyres indices based on bilaterally-matched samples are 
indeed always larger than those based on multilaterally-matched samples (LB > LM) and the 
reverse is true for the Paasche indices (PB < PM).  The overall relationship LB > LM > PM > PB 
for the indices averaged over 10 years is illustrated in Fig.7.  
Together, the four indices, LB, LM, PM and PB, provide a useful estimation of the range of the 
overall differential in drug prices amongst countries.  Further, the differences between the 
values of these four indices give some insight into the relative roles of consumption patterns 
and individual drug prices in causing the overall price differentials amongst countries. This is 
particularly useful when examining the relative evolution of drug prices over time.  Consider, 
for example, the limit case in which all the prices in the US (or more generally in the reference 
                                                 
15 The point here is that the relationship between price and consumption is not uni-directional. Prices 
can respond to changes in consumption as a result of competition (e.g. availability of several products 
with similar usage may drive down their prices) or as a result of regulation (e.g. because the pricing 
authority may force low prices on widely used drugs whilst allowing high prices on infrequently used 
drugs). 
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country) increase by the same factor , and all the prices in the comparator country, increase 
by a factor µ, from one year to another.  Then, if there is no change in consumption patterns 
in the US and C, both the Laspeyres and the Paasche indices increase by the same factor µ/.  
Because consumption patterns change relatively slowly (i.e. there is typically less difference in 
the consumption patterns from year to year within a country than between two countries at 
any given time), similar relative increases in the values of the two indices are suggestive of 
relatively uniform differentials in price increases amongst countries.  In contrast, differences 
in the relative increases in L and P from one year to another suggest a differential in the 
relative price increase of widely and sparsely used drugs, between the comparator country and 
the US.  
COMPARISON OF MEAN LASPEYRES AND PAASCHE INDICES  
Bilaterally-matched samples captured on average 85% of pharmaceuticals in a given country’s 
market in any given year (ranging from 65% for France to 99% for Australia; see tables in 
Appendix 2). In eight countries, Finland, France, Italy, Korea, Spain, Portugal, Greece and the 
Netherlands, the total range of the bilateral index values is relatively narrow with a difference 
LB - PB < 0.25. In that situation, the bilateral Fisher index, FB, which is the geometric mean of 
LB and PB, provides a reasonable and practically useful single number approximation of 
relative prices of a large fraction of pharmaceuticals in two countries. On this basis, it can be 
said that, on average over the ten years of the study, the manufacturer-level prices of 
pharmaceuticals were between 40% and 50% of US prices in Finland, France, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and the Netherlands and somewhat lower in Korea (34%; see Table 6).  For 
all other countries, the substantial differences in the values of LB and PB are indicative of 
disparities in consumption patterns that make the use of a single price ratio problematic if not 
meaningless for the basket of drugs included in the bilateral comparisons.   
To the extent that the pharmaceuticals included in the multilaterally-matched samples 
represent an important part of the international market, the corresponding indices provide an 
interesting means of comparison between countries and the US. Multilaterally-matched 
samples captured on average 33% (ranging from 16% for Japan to 44% for Finland) of total 
country markets (by volume) in each year of the comparison. When the two multilateral 
indices, LM and PM, are close to each other, their mean value is indicative of the overall price 
differences for this important basket of pharmaceuticals.  For all the countries except three –
Japan, Singapore and Switzerland-- the average difference between LM and PM is less than or 
equal to 0.15.  In this situation the corresponding Fisher index, FM, provides a useful measure 
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of the price differential with the US.  Accordingly, over the ten years of the study, the 
manufacturer prices of the pharmaceuticals included in the multilaterally matched samples for 
16 countries -- Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, , 
Korea, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, , Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom-- were on average between 40% and 50% of the US prices, 
with only Taiwan below at 37%. Within a few percent, these price differences for “global” 
molecules are independent of whether they are weighted by US or domestic consumption 
patterns and they can thus be used for international policy decisions.  
In one country, the L and P indices based on multilaterally matched samples show a very 
large mean difference: LM-PM = 0.49 for Japan. The most likely explanation for this singularity 
is that Japan and the US exhibit very large differences in their patterns of consumption for 
pharmaceuticals (which of course engenders differences in prices); this explanation is 
consistent with the very low fraction (16%) of the Japanese drug market that is included in 
the multilaterally-matched samples.  Differences may be attributed to geographical barriers 
and the predominantly domestic nature of the Japanese market. 
EFFECT OF DATA-BASE (MULTILATERALLY- VS. BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLES) 
ON INDICES 
As discussed above, because larger data sets capture more differences in consumption 
patterns and price, the effect of the negative correlation between price and consumption on 
the corresponding indices is magnified.  The net result is that the bilateral Laspeyres indices 
are always larger than the corresponding multilateral Laspeyres indices (LB > LM), and, vice 
versa, the bilateral Paasche indices are always smaller than the corresponding multilateral 
Paasche indices (PB < PM).  
The differences between LB and LM are relatively small in several instances: the ten year 
average values of LB and LM are within 10% of each other for 12 out of 20 countries.  This 
agreement indicates that, despite the relatively small data-base of the multilaterally-matched 
samples, the values of LM provide a reasonably robust integration of the consumption 
patterns for comparing the pharmaceutical prices of many countries with US prices.  Besides 
Japan (see above), four countries, Australia, Austria, Canada and Germany, exhibit large 
differences in the average values of LB and LM.  Whilst the underlying reason is unknown, a 
likely possibility is that some pharmaceuticals that are included in the bilateral but not the 
multilateral sample are widely used and much cheaper in the US than in these countries.  
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As Laspeyres price indices use US weighting, the increase from LM to LB must be particularly 
sensitive to the negative relation between price and volume in the US. Vice-versa because P is 
using own-weighting for the comparative country, C, the decrease from PM to PB must 
depend chiefly on the negative relation between price and volume in country C. The generally 
larger difference observed between LM and LB than between PM and PB (Fig. 1) thus reflects in 
part the larger price elasticity in the free pricing US than in other countries. This result may be 
falsified in countries where price regulations are particularly effective at controlling the prices 
of highly used drugs. According to the study results this situation may obtain in France, 
Greece, Korea, Portugal, Spain and Taiwan, where the mean difference between LM and LB is 
smaller than between PM and PB (Figure 7). 
In four countries, Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan, there is a large difference between 
PM and PB.  These are countries where the pattern of drug use is likely very different from the 
US as a result of cultural differences. In addition, in the case of Japan, the bilateral sampling 
only captures a small fraction of the market such that the corresponding indices are poor 
indicators of drug prices compared to the US. 
In contrast in three countries, Germany, Singapore, and Austria, the difference between PM 
and PB is quite small; in other words there is little sensitivity to the change from multilateral to 
bilateral sampling when using own-weighting. The fraction of the pharmaceutical market 
captured by the multilateral sampling in these countries (31, 35, 30% respectively) is not 
particularly different from that of other countries (mean across all countries 33%) and the 
corresponding mean values of PM are within the range of other countries (except for 
Singapore for which the mean PM is low). The explanation for the similarity between PM and 
PB in these three countries must thus lie in the prices and consumption patterns of the drugs 
included in the bilateral samples and not in the multilateral samples.  A likely explanation is 
that the drugs that are not included in the multilateral samples and are heavily used in these 
countries must have prices approximately PB times cheaper than the US prices.  It is 
interesting that in the case of Austria and Germany PM ≈ PB  whilst  LB >> LM.  Some drugs 
that are not included in the multilateral samples must be more widely used and much cheaper 
in the US than in these two countries. 
GENERAL EVOLUTION OF INDICES OVER TIME 
As can be seen in Figures 1-4, the Laspeyres and Paasche indices show a generally increasing 
trend over time.  As explained above, the relative changes in these indices over time provide 
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insight into the underlying evolution of consumption patterns and individual drug prices.  It is 
thus convenient to normalize the indices to their value in a given reference year to study the 
change of drug prices relative to the US over time.  Because 2001 is generally the year in 
which the indices were lowest, it was chosen as the reference year for our calculations. This 
choice avoids the complication posed by very large (and possibly wrong) values of indices for 
Japan and Canada in 1999 and 2000.  The four indices, LB, LM, PM and PB, normalized to their 
2001 values are given in Appendix 2. 
As can be seen in 2001-based indices (LB 
2001base, LM
 2001base, PM
 2001base and PB
 2001base, in Appendix 
2), for most countries, all four indices increase over time between 2001 and 2008 with a mean 
increase of about 50% for the Laspeyres indices and of 30% for the Paasche indices.  The two 
exceptions are Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom.  In Saudi Arabia, all four indices 
decrease systematically over time whilst in the UK, all the indices remain approximately 
constant. In other words, whilst the drug prices in most high income countries increased 
compared to the US between 2001 and 2008, they decreased in Saudi Arabia and remained 
relatively constant in the UK. In the case of the UK this would be suggestive of an overall 
containment pressure from the combination of policy tools in place at the time, including 
health technology assessments and the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (previous 
model), as well as policies promoting generic prescription and dispensing.  
DIFFERENTIAL INCREASES IN LASPEYRES AND PAASCHE INDICES  
In most countries the relative increase in the Laspeyres indices, both LB and LM, are somewhat 
larger than the increases in the corresponding Paasche indices, PB and PM.  This is what is 
expected as the negative relation between price and consumption tends to buffer the increase 
in the price average in each country calculated using the country’s own weighting. The result 
is a relatively large increase in L because of the relatively small increase in US prices weighted 
by US consumption, and a relatively small increase in P because of the relatively small 
increase in the comparator country prices weighted by this country’s consumption.   
Interestingly, the relative increase in PM is markedly larger in Canada than the relative increase 
in LM and the same is true of the relative increase in PB compared to LB in Korea. A possibility 
is that some drugs that are widely used in these countries but not in the US may have become 
relatively more expensive in these countries compared to the US over time. Such an effect 
may be caused by changes in price regulations in Canada and Korea compared to free market 
forces in the US.  
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In five countries, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Taiwan (plus the UK), the 
relative increases in LB and PB are close to each other, possibly indicating a fairly uniform 
relative increase across all drugs compared to the US as explained above.  The same is true for 
the relative increases in LM and PM in a subset of these countries --the Netherlands, Sweden 
and Taiwan-- plus Japan (and the UK), indicating a similar uniformity of relative price 
increases for the basket of about 150 global pharmaceuticals in these countries.  In all these 
cases the increases in the corresponding Fisher indices provide good measures of the changes 
in drug prices relative to the US:  a range of no increase (Taiwan) to a near doubling (Sweden, 
0.36 to 0.69) for the bilaterally matched samples, and a more muted range from 23% (Taiwan, 
0.35 to 0.43) to 46% (Sweden, 0.39 to 0.57) increase for the multilaterally matched sample.   
DIFFERENTIAL INCREASES IN INDICES BASED ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL 
SAMPLES 
As can be seen in Appendix 2, no general pattern can be seen in the comparison of the 
relative increases of the Laspeyres indices based on multilateral and bilateral samples: for 
some countries LB increases more than LM over time whilst the opposite is true for other 
countries.  This presumably reflects a wide range in the comparator countries pricing of some 
drugs that have a sizeable effect on the average prices weighted with US consumption 
patterns.  Often these increases in Laspeyres indices likely reflect relative price increases in the 
comparator countries of drugs that are widely used in the US; in some cases these drugs are 
part of the basket of global (multilaterally matched) drugs; in some cases they are not. 
In contrast, the relative increases of the Paasche indices based on multilateral and bilateral 
samples are rather consistent with each other: for many countries the relative increase in PB 
over time is within 10% of the relative increase in PM.  The most likely underlying reason is 
that the relative increases in prices (compared to the US) for the relatively small basket of 
global pharmaceuticals and for the much larger baskets of drugs included in the bilateral 
samples were similar, and that the consumption patterns changed relatively little over time.  
There are three countries in which the increases of PM and PB diverged markedly over time: PM 
increased more slowly than PB in Korea and faster in Canada and Taiwan.  In the case of 
Canada and Korea, this unusual pattern is to be compared with the unexpected larger increase 
of Paasche indices over Laspeyres indices noted above. These interesting observations may 
reflect either unusual changes in prices of drugs that are widely used in these countries 
(presumably as a result of changes in price controls), or, possibly, a significant change in 
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consumption pattern. A detailed examination of the individual data sets is required to 
pinpoint the underlying causes.  
PRICE DISCOUNTING 
As competitive forces of the free market are the primary cause of downward pressure on 
prices in the US (i.e. there is relatively limited direct price regulation) and IMS data is limited 
to list price, an overall average off-invoice discount was assumed. Discounting of US prices 
was not assumed in the first instance in order to make this study comparable to previous 
studies (e.g. Danzon and Kim 1998). However, the fact that IMS prices do not include the 
numerous types of discounts offered in the US market results in an upward bias in US prices 
(the author confirmed that they had already been accounted for in the list prices of other 
countries).  Whilst fragmented and difficult to reliably document on a country-wide basis, 
wholesale discounts to large payers, including pharmacy benefit managers (PBM), Medicare, 
Medicaid etc. are known to be very common across the US pharmaceutical market. Omitting 
discounts also leads to unrealistic differentials between US and foreign prices in that the 
downward pressure on prices felt through price regulation (utilized in most other HIC 
markets) is captured in IMS prices in that they affect prices pre-listing. As previous authors 
have noted in the past, discounting in the US market can be significant. In one of their 
analyses, Anderson and colleagues assumed a 20% discount in their study of the 30 
pharmaceuticals with the highest total spending in the US (that were also sold in the 
comparator countries), based on the upper end of the discounts that private insurers 
negotiated with pharmaceutical companies within the context of the Medicare drug benefit 
programme16. Indeed leading pharmaceuticals are often very highly discounted (Danzon 
2000). This study however used the Danzon and Furukawa estimate of 8% as the sample 
drew from a much broader basket of pharmaceuticals17. The estimate came from a study that 
looked in detail at the discounts offered by payor group in the US and is based on the average 
that the study found for all drugs across the US market. As explained in the Results section, 
the net effect of such discounting of US prices is to increase all indices by 8.7%.  Whilst 
significant, such an increase does not change the broad features of our results, as can be seen 
from the results of the sensitivity analysis (see Appendix 2) where most of the indices would 
simply increase by 0.04 to 0.06.  Nonetheless, if one takes the Laspeyres index based on 
                                                 
16 The Anderson analysis assumed that Canada, France, and the United Kingdom paid the full average 
wholesale price. 
17 Danzon and Furukawa estimated adjustment for off-invoice discounts overall reduces U.S. prices by 
approximately 8%, which they found to also be comparable to previous estimates. 
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bilateral comparisons, LB, as the measure of relative prices, discounting results in a change in 
ranking in 2008: when US off-invoice discounts are included the US falls to the position of 4th 
highest payer by 2008 in the global sample and becomes part of a general upper tier within 
the HIC group.   
COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Using undiscounted 1992 prices, Danzon and Chao concluded, based on bilateral Laspeyres 
indices, that the percentage foreign/US price differences were (here expressed in a commonly 
used, more easily compared, format): Canada +2, Germany +25, France, -32, Italy -13, Japan 
-12, and UK -17. This compares to an average for these countries across the ten years of our 
data, LB, of: Canada +97 (+13)
18, Germany -8, France -49, Italy -37, Japan +21, UK -37. The 
relative standing of US prices was thus similar—that US prices fell in the middle of the 
selected comparator countries—albeit with significant differences in calculated relative prices.  
These differences are largely attributable to the larger sample used in our study compared to 
the Danzon and Chao study. Price relatives using Paasche index methods, PB, in our 10-year 
study were very similar to Danzon and Chao estimates for 1992: Canada -55, France -67, 
Germany -60, Italy -51, Japan -54, UK -44 from Danzon and Chao compared to Canada -60, 
France -69, Germany -59, Italy -60, Japan -67, UK -64. As expected based on our discussion, 
Danzon and Chao study found ubiquitous or what they call “global” molecules to 
demonstrate smaller price differences than those based on the larger bilaterally-matched 
samples, in accord with our results. As also expected and similar to our study, indices of 
ubiquitous pharmaceuticals showed P/L ratios closer to unity than did the indices based on 
the larger bilaterally-matched samples, reflecting a lesser degree of variation across 
consumption patterns for global pharmaceuticals than for those that are not globally 
accessible.   
Using undiscounted US prices in the first instance Anderson and colleagues determined price 
relatives for 2003, quantified by the Laspeyres index based on a small number of core 
products as follows: Canada -52, France -59, UK -47. This study found price relatives for 
France and UK for 2003 to be similar19. When using an average discount of 20% for US 
purchasers these results changed to the following: Canada -40, France -48, UK -34. Our 
                                                 
18 As mentioned in the Discussion, this high value for Canada stems from outlier price relatives for the 
years 2003 and 2004, drastically increasing the average for the decade. Omitting the values for Canada 
in these years leads to an estimate of +13. 
19 Canadian price relatives were estimated to be much higher in 2003 when looking at the market more 
broadly. 
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calculated values of LM show very similar price relatives for France and UK for 2003. Overall 
these comparative results suggest that leading US products are sold at lower prices in Canada 
than in the US but that overall Canadian prices of pharmaceuticals available in both countries 
have been higher than US prices in many years – this study suggesting an overall trend of 
Canadian prices starting below US prices 1999 and significantly surpassing them by 2008 
(when determined by US consumption patterns, arguably of more relevance to policy-making 
in the US than in Canada).  
It should be noted that in limiting the sample to 30 leading pharmaceuticals, the Anderson 
study sought to answer a specific question that was posed: “..whether the adoption of some 
mechanism of to control pharmaceutical spending such as price controls would allow for the 
elimination of the ‘doughnut hole’” in the Medicare drug benefit program. It thus explicitly 
chose a more standardized approach to pharmaceutical price comparison over the 
representative approach utilized by Danzon and colleagues (Anderson et al. 2004). 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study sought to examine relative prices across many different countries over a decade. It 
deliberately chose a very large sample of many different types of pharmaceuticals in order to 
get a picture of the overall market, based on the idea that valid measures of average price 
levels can only be obtained from comparisons of a comprehensive or representative sample 
of products that are appropriately weighted and follow standard index number methods 
(Danzon and Kim 1998). Indeed matching molecules by manufacturer, strength, pack or 
other attributes had previously been found to significantly reduce the sample size to only a 
tiny fraction of the national market and was likely to biased results (Danzon and Furukawa 
2004). However, choosing representativeness over standardization does present important 
trade-offs in that we are not necessarily comparing prices across completely identical 
products.   
Molecule prices were weighted by sales volumes across all products, packsizes, forms, and 
strengths. This weighted average price per molecule assumes that there is perfect substitution 
across products in the same ATC-3 class. This may not be accurate in all cases but is based on 
the general idea of bio-equivalence and the fact that reimbursement price set by third-party 
payers in many countries (US, Canada, Sweden, UK, etc.) recognize this equivalence (Danzon 
and Chao 2000).   
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Finally, it should be acknowledged that the data used in the analysis are not very recent and 
thus that findings may not reflect today’s price differences across markets. One difference 
between today’s market and the 2008 market when the data ended could be that the US now 
uses a greater share of generics amongst all prescription pharmaceuticals. The US Census 
Bureau estimates that from 2008 to 2010 this share has increased from 64% to 71% (Census 
Bureau 2012) and this percentage may have increased further since. Changes may have 
occurred since the introduction of coverage for most pharmaceuticals under Medicare Part D, 
which came into effect in 2006 as part of the Medicare Modernization Act. These rebates 
have been significant. In 2008 the rebates were estimated to be approximately 10% of total 
gross Part D drug costs, or worth $63 billion (HHS 2008). Also, prices in Europe may have 
decreased in recent years due to greater price control and clamping down on pharmaceutical 
budgets due to the recession. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Differences in consumption patterns make the calculation of relative drug prices very 
difficult. We have shown that a first order quantitative understanding of the relative prices of 
pharmaceuticals amongst countries can be obtained by using several indices, namely the 
Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher indices based on multilaterally and bilaterally matched samples: 
LB, LM, PM, PB, FM and FB.  As a result of the inverse relationship between usage and price, the 
Laspeyres indices (which uses weighting for the base country --the US in most of our study) is 
always larger than the Paasche indices (which use weighting for the comparator country) and 
this effect is magnified when the sample size is larger such that LB > LM > PM > PB.   
Using data from the United States and 20 other high-income countries, over the period 1999-
2008 we found that drug prices in the comparator countries were lower than in the US with 
few exceptions.  The prices in the comparator countries became more similar to the US over 
the 10 year of the study.  For a few countries similar values of the Laspeyres and Paasche 
indices (LB ≈ LM ≈ PM ≈ PB) meant that their geometric averages, the Fisher index, FM or FB, 
provided a good single estimate of drug prices relative to the US.  Based on small differences 
between multilateral indices (LM ≈ PM), representative relative price of commonly found 
“ubiquitous” pharmaceuticals (which captured on average 33% of the various markets) 
compared to the US could be obtained by using the corresponding Fisher index, FM, in more 
than half the comparator countries.  
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In a number of cases, the data showed unusual contrasts between the values of Laspeyres and 
Paasche indices based on the same sample, or between the same index based on multilaterally 
or bilaterally matched samples, or in the relative evolution of these four indices over time.  
Such contrasts served as flags indicating unusual features of the pharmaceutical market in 
individual countries during the period of the study. In several instances, a detailed 
examination of the indices led to a likely explanation in terms of differences or changes in 
pricing or consumption patterns between the comparator country and the US. In all such 
cases a detailed examination of the individual data sets would help to positively ascertain the 
underlying causes.  
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PAPER 3    
NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES AND COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT: 
HOW DO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS AFFECT 
PRICES AND HOW DO MIDDLE- AND HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES COMPARE? 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to understand the determinants of global pharmaceutical prices, focusing on 
the contribution of country-specific economic, social, and demographic characteristics, in 
addition to drug-specific properties such as quality and levels of competition in the market. In 
analyzing data from 33 middle- and high-income countries (MIC and HIC) over a 10-year 
period, this study is much larger than previous studies of medicine price determinants and is 
the first to consider the potential relationship of country social and demographic 
characteristics to pharmaceutical prices. In all countries the price of drugs was strongly 
negatively affected by their age and positively by national income per capita (although this 
latter effect was less strong in MIC than in HIC). In MIC, the percentage of old people was 
the strongest determinant of drug prices, most probably reflecting a rapid increase in 
demand.  The length of time since launch of a drug in a country was strongly positively 
related with its price, likely a result of product recognition and associated marketing strategy 
and ensuing purchaser behavior. Overall, results suggest that prices offered to purchasers in 
MIC and HIC are affected differently by globalization and competition and that social and 
demographic differences in MIC give them notably different negotiation predisposition (i.e. 
different levels of leverage) that may deserve attention in global discussions surrounding fairer 
pricing and improving access to medicines.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Whilst it is generally understood that access to pharmaceuticals varies across countries, little is 
known about what determines the price paid in each country. Indeed, the opaque nature of 
pricing and the vast disparities in access support the call for greater clarity on pricing and the 
demand for fairer global pricing strategies. The increasingly global nature of the 
pharmaceutical market along with the strong growth and the ensuing greater ability to afford 
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pharmaceuticals amongst middle-income economies such as China and parts of India further 
enhance the need for price information. This study looks at the determinants of 
pharmaceutical prices in middle- and high-income countries (henceforth referred to as MIC 
and HIC respectively). In contrast to other studies that have looked at determinants of price 
variation across countries, this study hypothesizes that country development characteristics 
(economic, social, and demographic) may influence the price at which pharmaceuticals are 
sold by manufacturers to the respective country market. The country development variables 
used in this analysis vary by country and over the period of a decade. The study also takes 
into account the influence of characteristics of the products themselves such as quality and 
competition within the market. Overall findings may be relevant for policies intended to 
improve access to pharmaceuticals via price through better knowledge of what influences 
price. 
THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
Pharmaceutical prices are not a new area of academic research. Indeed a few previous studies 
have looked at the determinants of prices within a country or subset of countries. Older 
studies (argued to be more biased in their analysis) include a 1994 estimate by the US 
Government Accounting Office which looked at the impact of national level regulation and 
competition on medicine prices. The study findings suggested that price differences between 
the US and the UK could be primarily attributed to the regulatory constraints affecting the 
ability of manufacturers to price their products freely. They also found time-on-market to be 
a determinant of the wide variation in price differentials for brand-name drugs across the two 
markets.   The effect of competition on prices has also been examined in several studies 
(Danzon and Chao 2000, Kanavos, Costa-Font, and Seeley 2008), generally finding that it 
helped keep prices low in less regulated markets and in particular when drugs were off patent.   
However, findings from many of these cross-country analyses have been questioned due to 
inherent bias. Indeed standardizing across medicines internationally in order to get a broadly 
perceived representative sample is a complicated process that implies numerous trade-offs.  
For example, the greater the number of countries included in the comparison, the more 
difficult it is to match identical products—thus decreasing the size of the comparison sample 
and reducing the representativeness of the sample. Also, the more narrowly the sample is 
defined to ensure similarity of products, the less representative of the country’s medicine 
market as a whole.   
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Whilst no methodology for cross-national drug price comparisons are perfect, certain 
methods are more appropriate than others, depending on the purpose of the comparison. 
This study largely utilizes methods put forth by Danzon and colleagues in the most 
comprehensive of all existing studies, dating from 2000 (Danzon and Chao 2000), in an 
attempt to include as many products and countries as possible whilst minimizing selection 
bias. The 2000 study looked at the influence of drug quality and market competition 
parameters on outpatient drug prices in 1992 across 7 HIC. It found cross-national price 
differences to reflect differences in product characteristics including product age, formulation, 
strength, pack-size, and in their implicit prices, which were a reflection of the regulatory 
regime in place. The authors concluded that strict price regulation systematically lowered 
prices for widely diffused molecules as well as for older ones and that generic competition 
lowered prices in less-regulated regimes. Since the Danzon study others have also looked at 
the issue of cross national prices. A 2011 study (Kanavos and Vandoros 2011) found that 
prices for a basket of 50 leading, original, branded medicines in the years 2004 and 2007 (total 
of 100 products, 68 unique molecules) across 15 OECD countries were affected by product 
age (time from product launch) and regulation. The focus on public prices highlighted the 
importance of distribution costs and taxes on price.   
This study builds on previous cross-national price determinant studies but includes a much 
more comprehensive set of data both in terms of the number of countries (33) and the time 
frame covered (10 years). In addition this study examines the impact of country-specific 
growth and development factors on prices, influences that have not previously been explored.   
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
DATA SOURCE 
The study used data provided by IMS Health for 1999 through the third quarter of 2008. 
Countries included 14 MIC20 (Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey) and 19 HIC 
(Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,  Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, United States). The 
selection of countries was a function of availability at the time. Prices represented ex-
                                                 
20 Income levels as defined by World Bank in 2008 
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manufacturer list prices (thus excluding taxes, distribution charges, dispensing mark-ups, etc.) 
per pharmaceutical sold to the retail market except in the case of a few countries for which 
data were aggregated from multiple distribution pathways21.  Conversion from local currency 
was done by IMS Health using exchange rates in effect at time of sale. Prices were deflated 
using International Monetary Fund (IMF 2009)-estimated deflators. Pharmaceuticals with 
very small sales volumes over the 10-year period (those in the lowest 3%) were excluded and 
those composed of more than one molecule were excluded to avoid double counting. Prices 
were calculated from sales and volume figures that were extracted in terms of US dollars and 
standard units22 respectively. Prices from the United States were based on drugstore, food 
store and mail service distribution channels.   
STUDY DESIGN 
Prices were decomposed using volume-weighted prices for all countries to take into account 
the respective market share of each product and thus its relevance within the market to see 
how the indicators influence the prices of products in demand. The sample for analysis first 
included volume-weighted prices of all pharmaceuticals found in any number of the thirty-
three MIC and HIC (Sample 1). A Chow test (partial F-test) was run in order to see whether 
the predictor variables had different impacts on prices in MIC and HIC and as such whether 
separate analyses would be necessary. Separate analyses were then conducted for MIC and 
HIC on their own. (See description of samples listed in Table 1.) Collinearity tests were 
conducted to explore the degree of correlation between predictor variables.   
As part of a sensitivity analysis prices were also decomposed in their un-weighted form in 
order to see influences on general price levels attained within country markets regardless of 
the relative importance of those pharmaceuticals to treatment (Samples 4, 5). All analyses 
were also repeated using only pharmaceuticals that were internationally relevant – those that 
could be found in all of the relevant countries (Samples 5-8). These have been called 
“ubiquitous” pharmaceuticals, specified for MIC, HIC, or MIC/HIC (combined). Table 1 
describes the samples used in each of the analyses.  
                                                 
21 Singapore and Sweden prices include those for medicines destined for retail and hospitals. Indonesia 
and Malaysia prices include those destined for retail, hospitals, and dispensing doctors.  
22 Standard units are the smallest common dose unit. For oral solid forms this is one tablet or capsule, 
for syrup forms this is 5 ml, and for injectable forms this is one ampoule or vial. Defined Daily Doses 
were not available.   
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLES 
Primary analysis 
1. Drugs found in any number of the countries (MIC and HIC), using prices 
weighted by volume in each country  
2. Drugs found in any number of the MIC, prices weighted by volume in each 
country  
3. Drugs found in any number of the HIC, using prices weighted by volume in each 
country  
Sensitivity analysis 
4. Drugs found in any number of the countries (MIC and/or HIC), using 
unweighted prices  
5. Only drugs found in all 32 countries (those found across all MIC and HIC), using 
unweighted prices 
6. Only drugs found in all 32 countries (those found across all MIC and HIC), using 
volume-weighted prices  
7. Only drugs found in all 13 MIC markets, using volume-weighted prices  
8. Only drugs found in all 19 HIC markets, using volume-weighted prices  
9. Drugs found in any number of the countries (MIC and/or HIC), using volume-
weighted prices. Estimation using fixed effects and limited variable selection to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
10. Drugs found in any number of the MIC, using volume-weighted prices. 
Estimation using fixed effects and limited variable selection to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity 
11. Drugs found in any number of the HIC, using volume-weighted prices.  
Estimation using fixed effects, limited variable selection. 
12. Drugs found in any number of the countries (MIC and/or HIC), using volume-
weighted prices. Similar to Sample 1 but without variables for population growth, 
rural population, and elderly population to examine effects of suspected 
collinearity.  
13. Drugs found in any number of the MIC, using volume-weighted prices. Similar to 
Sample 2 but without variable for rural population to examine effects of suspected 
collinearity.  
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TABLE 2. DESCRIPTION OF PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
    
Variable  Variable description  Source Hypothesis1 
Global penetration Number of countries in which molecule 
is available (natural log of) 
IMS2 + 
Strength Strength of molecule (milligram) (natural 
log of) 
IMS + 
Forms Number of forms each molecule comes 
in within each country (natural log of) 
IMS + 
 
Manufacturers Number of manufacturers producing 
each molecule within each country 
(natural log of)  
IMS - 
Therapeutic 
alternatives 
Number of molecules per ATC3 
indication per country (natural log of) 
IMS - 
Age1 Months from global launch of molecule 
to end of 2008 (natural log of) 
IMS - 
Age2 Months from in-country of molecule to 
end of 2008 (natural log of) 
IMS - 
Entry lag Months between first launch within the 
indication and in-country launch (natural 
log of) 
IMS + 
Older population Proportion of population aged 65 and 
over 
WB3 - 
GNI per capita Gross National Income per capita 
(natural log of) 
WB + 
Population growth Annual population growth WB - 
Rural population Proportion of population living in rural 
areas 
WB + 
Trade Trade as a proportion of GDP WB - 
Death Crude death rate per 1000 people WB - 
Year Year    
    
1. Direction of predicted relationship with price; 2. IMS Health; 3. World Bank 
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Specifications of the empirical model are given in the following section. Several country-
specific variables were used to define the size and nature of the market and population. Time 
varying country characteristics included gross national income (GNI) per capita, 
demographics relating to the annual population growth, the proportion of the population 65 
years of age and over, the death rate, the proportion of the population living in rural areas, 
and the level of international trade as a proportion of GDP. These indicators were thought to 
be important given their links to or representation of absolute and relative health status, 
access to general health care, and both access to and affordability of pharmaceuticals. 
Substantive variation amongst indicator values was expected across countries, especially 
across MIC.  The expected positive or negative effect of these variables on pharmaceutical 
prices are indicated by + or – in the last column of Table 2. 
It was expected that higher GNI per capita would be associated with greater funds available 
for the purchase of pharmaceutical products and thus greater ability to pay higher prices. It 
was expected that a rapidly growing population and an older population would also be 
associated with a greater demand and scale-related price negotiation resulting in lower unit 
prices. Greater levels of international trade were expected to lead to better capabilities to 
negotiate lower prices. An increasing death rate was expected to be representative of a more 
unhealthy population and thus also related to greater demand and lower unit prices. 
Proportion of the population living in rural areas--a proxy for physical access in low and 
middle income countries—was expected to be associated with higher prices resulting from 
lower demand as well as higher transport costs where purchasing is decentralized. The lag 
time between the first launch within the indication and in-country launch of the drug (“entry 
lag”) was used as a proxy for (inverse of) openness of the market (red tape to accrue 
administrative and regulation-related costs) and hypothesized to be positively related to price. 
(See Appendix 3 for full summary statistics pertaining to the respective variables) 
Drug-specific variables were chosen to represent the quality of the drugs and the 
competitiveness of the market for those drugs. Global penetration was included as a measure 
of expected therapeutic value (Danzon and Chao 2000, Barral 1995) and included in analyses 
that did not require ubiquitous presence (Samples 1-4, 9-13). Molecule age was included as an 
inverse measure of therapeutic value of the molecule (Danzon and Chao 2000). It was 
included both as the time-since-global-launch of the product as well as time-since-in-country-
launch of the product.  This is based on the idea that the demand-side factor that is most 
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important in determining medicine price is the degree of therapeutic advance as compared to 
products already on the market. Greater advances lead to greater willingness-to-pay and a 
resulting ability for sellers to set higher prices without driving customers away (Comanor and 
Schweitzer 2007). The number of available forms of the pharmaceutical was taken as a proxy 
for choice and convenience and therefore expected to be positively related to price (Danzon 
and Chao 2000).  Molecule strength was also included. However, as it was expressed in 
differing, incompatible formats (e.g. milligram, millilitre, vial), strength was only included in 
the analysis where it was expressed in milligram, the predominant form (these represented 63-
73% of the overall data, depending on the model).   
Competition was expected to be negatively related to price. Competition was included in the 
form of variables for the number of manufacturers producing each drug within each country 
and for therapeutic alternatives, the number of drugs in the indication. Year is included as a 
variable in order to help account for time-related changes that may affect price levels such as 
macroeconomic trends, levels of innovation, etc. A country dummy variable was also included 
to help control for heterogeneity in health care finance, delivery, advertising and other 
regulatory aspects -- sometimes known as “cultural block dummies” (Yip 2007).  
SPECIFICATION OF EMPIRICAL MODEL 
A regression model was estimated using panel data with random effects.  
    
for molecule m, in country i, in year t.  
The vector Z represented the country-specific predictor variables, whilst the vector X 
represented the drug-specific predictor variables. Log transformations were used for prices (ln 
P) and characteristics, reflecting proportional effects as they were not normally distributed.  
See Table 2 for a description of these characteristics. 
In many cases a Hausman test is used to help choose between fixed and random effects. In 
this study a Hausman test could not be performed to help inform the choice between (the 
model failed to meet the asymptotic assumptions)23. The choice was therefore based on other 
considerations. Generally fixed effects are seen to be simple in that they rule out 
                                                 
23 Some experts argue that the Hausman test is in any case “neither necessary nor sufficient” (Clark 
and Linzer 2012) to guide this main methodological decision. 
mitmtitimit XZP   ln
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heterogeneity bias and the beta coefficients can be thought to represent the ‘causal effect’ 
(Bell and Jones 2014). As such they have become the “gold standard” in many disciplines 
(Schurer and Yong 2012). However, in assuming a correlation between the error term and 
predictor variables and in order to be able to assess the predictors’ net effect, fixed effects 
remove the effect of time-invariant characteristics from the explanatory variables. Whilst this 
is very useful in many study contexts, it also means that fixed-effects do not work well with 
time-invariant variables or data comprising slow-changing variables over time (Torres-Reyna 
2011). In controlling out time-invariant variables, fixed effects models effectively remove 
context that may be of great interest. Random effects, for their part, assume that the error 
term is not correlated with the predictors so time-invariant variables can play a role as 
explanatory variables.  They also allow us to generalize the inferences beyond the sample used 
in the model. However, this type of model requires the specification of those individual 
characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables. This is problematic 
when some variables are not available, leading to omitted variable bias in the model (Torres-
Reyna 2011).   
The choice of random effects in this study was based primarily on the desire to maintain the 
effect of time-invariant variables (and not “throw the baby out with the bath water”). 
However, as the assumptions of random effects  (e.g. no omitted variable problem,  
unobserved heterogeneity) may not hold, a fixed effects model was also run on the time-
varying selection of variables (indeed in this case a Hausman test confirmed the preference 
for fixed effects when this more limited set of variables was used). Results provided by the 
estimation using fixed effects using only time-varying variables were very similar to those 
from the random effects model.  
 
RESULTS 
Results of the primary regressions for the MIC and HIC data sets together (Sample 1) and 
separately (Samples 2 and 3) are shown in Table 3. With few exceptions all variables were 
significantly associated with price at 1% significance level in the regressions run on the 
combined MIC and HIC dataset. The two dominant predictor variables were the time-since-
global-launch and the GNI per capita, with coefficients of -1.25 and +1.09, respectively (i.e., 
corresponding to -1.25% and + 1.09% change in price for 1% increase in each variable). The 
time-since-in-country-launch also proved to be an important predictor variable, with a 
  110 
 
 
 
 
coefficient of +0.63. Other variables with a noteworthy association with price were the 
proportion of population over 65, the population growth, the number of countries in which 
the drug is available and the number of forms. Chow test (partial F-test) results were 
significant (F=439.26, prob>F=0.000), suggesting that the coefficients estimated over the 
country income groups were unequal, and therefore that separate analyses could be necessary.  
Importantly, a conservative cut-off value of 10 for the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
suggested that the GNI variable could be presenting collinearity in regressions on Sample 1 
(VIF = 15.64). Indeed notable coefficients of correlation were detected between GNI and 
three other variables: 1) the proportion of population over 65 (0.84), population growth (-
0.67), and rural population (-0.80). The potential importance of the collinearity detected in 
Sample 1 is discussed below.   When the analysis was repeated without these latter three 
variables (Sample 12, see results in Appendix 3) the results were largely unchanged except for 
a small decrease in the strength of relationship between per capita GNI and price.  
Results of the regression for the MIC data set only (Sample 2) also showed most variable 
coefficients to be significant at 1%. The three dominant predictor variables were the percent 
of people 65 and over, the time-since-global-launch and the time-since-in-country-launch, 
with coefficients of +1.27, -0.98 and +0.96, respectively. The GNI, the annual population 
growth and the number of manufacturers were also important predictor variables, with 
coefficients of +0.62, +0.43 and -0.30, respectively. Collinearity tests on Sample 2 suggest 
some collinearity between GNI and rural population (VIF of 13.58, 10.37 respectively and 
coefficient of correlation of -0.80). When the analysis was repeated without the variable for 
rural population (Sample 13 in Appendix 3) the results were essentially unchanged.  
Results from HIC data only (Sample 3) showed all variable coefficients to be significant at 
1%. The dominant predictor variables were the time-since-global-launch and the GNI, with 
coefficients of -1.49 and +1.28, respectively. The time-since-in-country-launch and the 
number of countries in which the drug is available were also important predictor variables, 
with coefficients of +0.60 and +0.42, respectively. Other noteworthy variables were the 
number of forms and the proportion of rural population. VIF indicated that the predictor 
variables had no significant collinearity in the HIC only data set.  The lack of collinearity 
amongst independent variables in the HIC analysis in contrast to notable collinearity amongst 
variables in the MIC analysis is discussed in the latter section.  
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TABLE 3. PRIMARY ANALYSIS RESULTS                    
SAMPLE:      1                      2                   3 
MIC/HIC   MIC              HIC 
     Hyp.        
           
Global penetration  + 0.289*** -0.0641 0.423***    
  (0.0267) (0.0608) (0.0336)    
Strength  + 0.0425*** 0.0606*** 0.0331***    
  (0.00550) (0.00874) (0.00699)    
Forms + -0.240*** -0.0474 -0.275***    
  (0.0184) (0.0292) (0.0235)    
Manufacturer  - -0.157*** -0.304*** -0.101***    
  (0.0130) (0.0197) (0.0173)    
Therapeutic alternatives - -0.0903*** -0.0201 -0.151***    
  (0.0138) (0.0223) (0.0177)    
Time-since-global-launch - -1.254*** -0.982*** -1.485***    
  (0.0183) (0.0260) (0.0255)    
Time-since-incountry-launch - 0.632*** 0.963*** 0.597***    
  (0.0145) (0.0240) (0.0185)    
Entry lag + 0.0483*** 0.00374 0.128***    
  (0.0159) (0.0272) (0.0196)    
Older population - 0.220*** 1.273*** 0.0568***    
  (0.00683) (0.0577) (0.00874)    
GNI per capita + 1.091*** 0.615*** 1.284***    
  (0.0250) (0.0447) (0.0323)    
Population growth - 0.233*** 0.426*** -0.140***    
  (0.0156) (0.0376) (0.0203)    
Rural population + 0.0633*** 0.0168 0.198***    
  (0.00546) (0.0105) (0.00923)    
Trade - -0.0074*** -0.0095*** -.00220***    
  (0.000542) (0.00125) (0.000665)    
Death rate - 0.154*** 0.144*** 0.159***    
  (0.00760) (0.0109) (0.0133)    
Year  -0.202*** -0.301*** -0.148***    
  (0.00303) (0.00911) (0.00419)    
Constant  371.1*** 572.3*** 262.4***    
  (5.955) (18.05) (8.256)    
Observations 
Number of id 
R2 (overall) 
 396,914 
84,970 
0.1502 
114,485 
30,040 
0.1917  
281,926 
54,830 
0.1121 
   
1. Drugs found in any number of the countries (MIC and HIC), using prices weighted by volume 
in each country  
2. Drugs found in any number of the MIC, prices weighted by volume in each country 
3. Drugs found in any number of the HIC, using prices weighted by volume in each country 
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TABLE 4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
    Sample:    4       5                 6                  7                8 
Global penetration 0.231***     
 (0.0128)     
Strength 0.179*** 0.175*** 0.0787*** 0.0704*** 0.0614*** 
 (0.00263) (0.00395) (0.00958) (0.0120) (0.0105) 
Forms -0.0114 -0.115*** -0.401*** -0.0109 -0.441*** 
 (0.00879) (0.0127) (0.0307) (0.0362) (0.0349) 
Manufacturer -0.406*** -0.304*** -0.0932*** -0.394*** -0.0322 
 (0.00621) (0.00987) (0.0239) (0.0284) (0.0276) 
Therapeutic alternatives -0.254*** -0.378*** 0.0682** 0.265*** 0.0716** 
 (0.00660) (0.0135) (0.0327) (0.0410) (0.0343) 
Time-since-global-launch -1.189*** -1.157*** -0.980*** -0.816*** -1.447*** 
 (0.00873) (0.0134) (0.0325) (0.0410) (0.0386) 
Time-since-incountry-lnch. -0.179*** -0.145*** 0.592*** 0.927*** 0.674*** 
 (0.00677) (0.0103) (0.0254) (0.0339) (0.0282) 
Entry lag -0.070*** -0.076*** -0.184*** -0.285*** 0.0994*** 
 (0.00763) (0.00928) (0.0224) (0.0367) (0.0224) 
Older population 0.0455*** 0.0505*** 0.182*** 1.088*** 0.0598*** 
 (0.00113) (0.00186) (0.0111) (0.0754) (0.0124) 
GNI per capita 0.453*** 0.430*** 1.214*** 0.833*** 1.272*** 
 (0.00410) (0.00651) (0.0390) (0.0580) (0.0449) 
Population growth -0.036*** -0.059*** 0.338*** 0.498*** -0.082*** 
 (0.00257) (0.00408) (0.0245) (0.0486) (0.0285) 
Rural population 0.0918*** 0.0934*** 0.0787*** 0.00667 0.217*** 
 (0.000903) (0.00141) (0.00838) (0.0135) (0.0127) 
Trade -0.010*** -0.0102*** -0.00452*** -0.00473*** -0.00117 
 (8.90e-05) (0.000142) (0.000851) (0.00162) (0.000926) 
Death rate -0.012*** -0.0247*** 0.147*** 0.156*** 0.0938*** 
 (0.00125) (0.00196) (0.0117) (0.0141) (0.0187) 
Year -0.021*** -0.0248*** -0.203*** -0.305*** -0.159*** 
 (0.000499) (0.000785) (0.00471) (0.0118) (0.00579) 
Constant 40.00*** 46.75*** 373.4*** 579.1*** 285.9*** 
 (0.982) (1.541) (9.221) 
 
(23.35) (11.39) 
 
Observations 398,338 157,118 156,552 65,925 140,155 
Number of id 
R2 (overall) 
84,971 
0.4381 
33,519 
0.5127 
33,518 
0.1563 
17,104 
0.2016 
27,396 
0.1157 
4. Drugs found in any number of the countries (MIC and/or HIC), using unweighted prices  
5. Only drugs found in all 32 countries (those found across all MIC and HIC), using unweighted 
prices 
6. Only drugs found in all 32 countries (those found across all MIC and HIC), using volume-
weighted prices  
7. Only drugs found in all 13 MIC markets, using volume-weighted prices 
8. Only drugs found in all 19 HIC markets, using volume-weighted prices 
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TABLE 5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
Sample: 
 
9 10 11 
Older population  0.167*** 1.030*** 0.0230*** 
 (0.00383) (0.0325) (0.00463) 
GNI per capita 1.098*** 0.699*** 1.360*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0241) (0.0180) 
Population growth 0.152*** 0.410*** -0.222*** 
 (0.00849) (0.0189) (0.0111) 
Rural population 0.0304*** -0.0329*** 0.124*** 
 (0.00287) (0.00543) (0.00489) 
Trade -0.00716*** -0.00744*** -0.00221*** 
 (0.000299) (0.000674) (0.000363) 
Death rate 0.118*** 0.140*** 0.177*** 
 (0.00388) (0.00544) (0.00744) 
Year -0.199*** -0.317*** -0.153*** 
 (0.00158) (0.00496) (0.00216) 
Constant 362.3*** 604.0*** 267.6*** 
 (3.123) (9.899) (4.271) 
    
Observations 1,194,291 319,524 874,767 
R-squared 0.045 0.092 0.036 
Number of id 
 
250,788 
 
85,687 
 
165,101 
 
9. Drugs found in any number of the countries (MICs and/or HICs), using volume-
weighted prices. Estimation using fixed effects and limited variable selection to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
10. Drugs found in any number of the MICs, using volume-weighted prices. Estimation 
using fixed effects and limited variable selection to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
11. Drugs found in any number of the HICs, using volume-weighted prices.  Estimation 
using fixed effects, limited variable selection. 
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TABLE 6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
Sample: 12 13 
   
Global penetration 0.297*** -0.0645 
 (0.0268) (0.0608) 
Strength 0.0428*** 0.0607*** 
 (0.00551) (0.00875) 
Form count -0.248*** -0.0474 
 (0.0184) (0.0292) 
Manufacturer count -0.152*** -0.304*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0197) 
Therapeutic alternatives -0.0886*** -0.0202 
 (0.0138) (0.0223) 
Time-since-global-launch -1.254*** -0.982*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0260) 
Time-since-incountry-lnch. 0.638*** 0.963*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0240) 
Entry lag 0.0476*** 0.00396 
 (0.0159) (0.0272) 
GNI per capita 0.827*** 0.590*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0419) 
Trade -0.00219*** -0.00810*** 
 (0.000485) (0.000882) 
Death rate 0.176*** 0.142*** 
 (0.00730) (0.0108) 
Year -0.161*** -0.307*** 
 (0.00210) (0.00843) 
Older population  1.253*** 
  (0.0563) 
Population growth  0.421*** 
  (0.0375) 
Constant 295.4*** 584.1*** 
 (4.010) (16.50) 
   
Observations 396,914 114,485 
Number of id 
R2 (overall) 
84,970 
0.1484 
30,040 
0.1918 
 
12. Drugs found in any number of the countries (MICs and/or HICs), using volume-
weighted prices. Similar to Sample 1 but without variables for population growth, 
rural population, and elderly population to examine effects of suspected collinearity.  
13. Drugs found in any number of the MICs, using volume-weighted prices. Similar to 
Sample 2 but without variable for rural population to examine effects of suspected 
collinearity. 
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Results of the sensitivity analyses are shown in Tables 4-6. When un-weighted prices (prices 
detached from their relative use) were used in the combined MIC/HIC dataset (Sample 4) the 
time-since-global-launch and the GNI per capita remained the two dominant predictor 
variables, although the coefficient for GNI decreased to +0.45 from +1.09 in sample 1. 
Interestingly, the coefficient for time-since-in-country-launch became negative: -0.18 
compared to + 0.63 in sample 1. When the combined, un-weighted sample was restricted to 
only ubiquitous molecules (Sample 5 compared to Sample 4) small changes were detected 
such as a slightly weaker relationship between number of manufacturers to price and a slightly 
stronger relationship between therapeutic alternatives to price in the analysis of ubiquitous 
molecules.  
Restricting the combined MIC/HIC, volume-weighted sample to ubiquitous pharmaceuticals 
only (Sample 6) resulted in some small changes in variable coefficients. For example, 
(comparing analyses of Sample 6 to Sample 1) form count became more closely associated 
with price, both measures of molecule age became less closely associated with price, entry lag 
became negative (in line with the study hypothesis) and more closely associated with price, 
population age became less associated with price, GNI per capita became more closely 
associated with price, population growth became more closely associated with price.    
Restricting the MIC sample to ubiquitous molecules only (Sample 7 compared to Sample 2) 
led to the coefficient for entry lag becoming more strongly and negatively associated to price 
(result became statistically significant) and to therapeutic alternatives becoming more strongly 
and positive associated to price (and result became significant). All other coefficients stayed 
approximately the same. Restricting the HIC sample to ubiquitous molecules only (Sample 8 
compared to Sample 3) led to small changes such as form count becoming more closely 
associated to price, number of manufacturers less closely associated to price, therapeutic 
alternatives became less strongly associated with price but this relationship became positive.   
Differences between MIC and HIC ubiquitous samples (Sample 7 versus Sample 8) 
demonstrate a larger influence of several variables in high-income countries than middle-
income countries. These include time-since-global-launch (price decreasing by 1.45% in high-
income countries for every month compared to 0.81% in middle-income countries), GNI per 
capita (a 1.27% increase in price for one percent increase in per capita GNI in HIC versus 
0.83% in MIC), and form count (0.44% versus 0.01% decrease in price for very one percent 
increase in form count). Variable coefficients that were on the contrary greater in MIC than 
HIC included elderly population (1.09% in increase in price for a one percent increase in 
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elderly population in MIC versus 0.06% increase in HIC) and population growth (0.5% 
increase in price for a 1% increase in population growth in MIC compared to a 0.08% decrease 
in price in HIC). Variable coefficients that were fairly consistent across MIC and HIC include 
drug strength, death rate and trade.  
The more limited analysis focussing on the influence of only time varying, country-specific 
variables was also run using fixed effects (Samples 9-11, see descriptions in Table 1, see 
results in Appendix 3). As in the primary analysis of the study, all variable coefficients were 
highly significant and some notable differences were detected between MIC and HIC. For 
example, the relationship between the proportion of the population 65 and over and 
pharmaceutical price was much stronger in MIC than HIC (in the latter the relationship was 
weak). Per capita GNI was on the contrary much more closely related to price in HIC than in 
MIC. Population growth was found to have a positive relationship with price in MIC but a 
negative relationship with price in HIC. Proportion of the population living in rural areas was 
found to be negatively related to price in MIC and positively related to price in HIC, although 
neither of these relationships was particularly strong.  Trade and death rate demonstrated a 
fairly consistent relationship with price across MIC and HIC. These results largely echoed the 
findings of the primary analysis.     
 
DISCUSSION 
Regressions on pharmaceutical price in this large, multi-country, multi-year dataset suggest 
that country development, in addition to the characteristics of the drugs themselves, had a 
significant influence on drug prices in MIC and HIC in the first decade of the 2000s. 
Generally there was a significant influence of economic, social, and demographic indicators 
across all samples analysed24. This suggests that many country- and population-specific 
factors—in addition to characteristics of the pharmaceuticals themselves--were significantly 
associated with the drug prices offered at the manufacturer level. 
COMBINED MIC AND HIC RESULTS 
Overall two predictor variables, time-since-global-launch and per capita GNI, had a 
particularly strong relation with price: as expected, the price of drugs generally decreased with 
                                                 
24 Almost all variable coefficients were robust across all samples. Where there were exceptions at least 
one other indicator within the same proxy group (e.g. economic, social, or demographic) held within 
the sample.  
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their age and increased with purchasing power in a country  (although this latter effect was 
less strong in MIC than in HIC as discussed below). Another very important predictor 
variable was the time-since-in-country-launch, but its relation to price was positive instead of 
negative as expected. One explanation for this surprising result may be the effect of patient 
and prescriber experience with known drugs, along with marketing and reputation building. 
This explanation is supported by the analysis with un-weighted prices for the combined 
MIC/HIC dataset (Samples 4 and 5) where the coefficient for time-since-in-country-launch 
became negative (-0.18/-0.15) as was initially expected. In other words it was the price of 
commonly used drugs (rather than widely available) that increased with time of use in a given 
country, driving the observed positive correlation.  Greater product recognition over time 
(enhanced through product marketing) could be leading to greater willingness-to-pay.  In 
some cases (especially in MIC) this may also coincide with limited availability, which in turn 
could increase expressed willingness-to-pay in the face of scarcity. It should also be noted that 
in-country launch may be conducted by a different corporation than global launch (which is 
usually done by the large, international mother company, generally based in HIC), especially 
in less familiar markets such as in MIC. This can lead to different pricing strategies overall. 
For example, products may launch at a relatively low price and be increased as they secure a 
position within formularies and generally amongst prescribers. Also, in cases where parallel 
importation or external reference pricing is a threat, prices may be kept elevated where 
competitive forces would normally have lowered them.   
Two other country-specific predictor variables with noteworthy coefficients in the combined 
MIC and HIC data sets also had an opposite than expected relation to price: the percent of 
population 65 and over and the annual population growth both showed positive rather than 
negative correlations with drug prices. This result may not be meaningful as these variables 
exhibited high collinearity with GNI, a strong positive predictor of price.  This collinearity is 
largely due to the large differences between these parameters in MIC and HIC: 6.8 ± 3.1% 
people 65 and over in MIC compared to 15.5 ± 3.7% in HIC, and a population growth rate 
of 1.3 ± 0.4% per annum in MIC compared to 0.50 ± 0.5% in HIC. It is noteworthy that the 
correlation between these parameters and price became much weaker when the sample was 
not volume-weighted (Samples 4 and 5), and the correlation with population growth even 
became negative. As in the case of the time-since-in-country-launch, it is the price of heavily 
used drugs that drives these positive correlations. (See below for differences between MIC 
and HIC.) 
  118 
 
 
 
 
The negative correlation of the number of forms and the positive correlation of death rate 
with price were also contrary to the study hypothesis.  In the case of the number of forms it is 
possible that the resulting availability of choice had a competitive effect to lower prices 
instead of reflecting quality. Although the coefficient for death rate was not particularly large 
(+0.15), the positive correlation suggests that the existence of a sicker population may have 
dampened the ability to negotiate lower prices and thereby put relatively less healthy countries 
at a price disadvantage. In both cases the coefficients became much smaller when the samples 
were not volume-weighted (Samples 4 and 5). Again, it is the price of heavily used drugs that 
was responsible for these counterintuitive correlations. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MIC AND HIC 
The results of the separate analyses on the MIC and HIC data sets showed interesting 
differences in the relative importance of predictor variables. Most notable is the strong 
correlation between population age and drug prices in MIC that is not seen in HIC, with 
coefficients relating drug prices and the proportion of the population 65 and over of +1.27 
and + 0.06, respectively. Whilst this positive relation is in the expected direction, the 
difference between MIC and HIC is a key finding of this study (and one that is not an artefact 
of parameter collinearities). The explanation is likely linked to two key factors: 1) the very 
high demand for drugs by older people, and 2) the very rapid increase in the proportion of 
old people in MIC.  As noted above, in HIC the proportion of people older than 65 is above 
15% on average and increases slowly along with life expectancy. As a result the supply and 
demand in HIC pharmaceutical markets are in reasonable balance.  In MIC, in contrast, the 
proportion of people 65 and over is on average less than 7% in 1999 and increases very 
rapidly, with a projection to surpass 15% around 2020 in many countries (WHO 2011).  The 
very strong correlation between population age and drug prices in MIC thus likely reflects a 
rapidly increasing demand that is not matched by a corresponding level of supply.  This 
situation is likely to persist in these countries until the proportion of old people begins to 
stabilize. 
Another significant difference between MIC and HIC was the much weaker correlation with 
per capita GNI and price in MIC compared to HIC. This echoes previous work finding that 
national income was inconsistently related to pharmaceutical prices (Morel, McGuire and 
Mossialos 2011). This result likely reflects the much greater importance of demographic 
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variables25 such as population age (see above) and population growth in determining price in 
MIC.  Indeed the rate of population growth had a high positive correlation with price in MIC 
whilst it had a much weaker and negative correlation in HIC (and in our study hypothesis). 
These findings suggest that ageing and fast population growth stress the system in a way that 
ultimately hinders early price negotiation capabilities and, more broadly, that volume-related 
trends did not behave in a normal way and that basic price negotiation techniques were either 
not being used or were unsuccessful.  
The relationships between the respective drug characteristics and price also differed between 
MIC and HIC. The contrasting relative importance of the two molecule age variables between 
MIC and HIC was interesting. Time-since-global-launch was found to have a substantially 
stronger relationship to price than time-since-in-country-launch in HIC whilst the reverse was 
found in MIC. The magnitude of these two variable age-related coefficients were 
approximately similar (although were inversely related as mentioned above) in MIC whilst in 
HIC the magnitude of the relationship of time-to-global-launch with price was much greater 
than the relationship of time-to-in-country-launch with price. Such findings may suggest 
differing effects of globalization on competition. Purchasers in MIC do not see the same 
price reductions that HIC do even when the drugs are no longer cutting-edge therapies.  
Future research should focus more closely on these relationships, perhaps as part of a 
country-by-country analysis.  In addition, the number of manufacturers producing a 
pharmaceutical was found to have a stronger price dampening effect in MIC than HIC. This 
could have implications for policy strategies aimed at increasing access to pharmaceuticals 
through the expansion of licensing. 
OVERALL EFFECT OF FOCUSSING ON PAN-AVAILABLE DRUGS 
Restricting the sample to ubiquitous pharmaceuticals led to a smaller sample but also one that 
led to some more firm conclusions about the effect of product characteristics, especially in 
the case of MIC (Sample 7) 26. Results suggest that MIC may be affected differently by 
globalization and competition.  For example, findings from this more focussed sample 
suggest that the number of therapeutic alternatives were more closely related to price in MIC 
than in HIC. Interestingly the relationship between this variable and price switched from 
                                                 
25 It should be noted that some collinearity was detected between per capita GNI and these 
demographic characteristics in the combined MIC/HIC sample, however, these were not detected 
when the sample was separated by income group.    
26 Almost all variables in the MIC analysis became statistically significant. 
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being negatively associated with price in the primary analysis (as was hypothesized) to being 
positively associated with price for both MIC and HIC when focussing in on ubiquitous 
pharmaceuticals. The magnitude of association was however weak in the case of HIC. Results 
from this more limited sample also suggest that entry lag was more closely and inversely 
related to price in MIC compared to HIC. The predicted negative association between entry 
lag and price in MIC compared to a positive association in HIC could suggest that 
manufacturers selling to MIC seek compensatory returns where they encounter red tape 
slowing market entry. The effect of form count remained weak for MIC but became more 
pronounced for HIC.    
OVERALL EFFECT OF FOCUSSING ON AVAILABLE DRUGS BUT NOT WEIGHTING THEM 
BY VOLUME 
Interestingly leaving prices unweighted gave results that were closer to the original study 
hypotheses. The effects of the number of therapeutic alternatives, time-since-in-country-
launch, entry lag, population growth, and death rate were all associated with price in the 
hypothesized direction. Compared to the results from the volume-weighted samples, 
therapeutic alternatives became notably more closely associated with price. Also, where it had 
been un-intuitively weak in all volume-weighted analyses, product strength became notably 
more closely associated with price when prices were left unweighted. GNI per capita became 
less closely associated with price. Aside from this last result these results are interesting in that 
they may suggest that the price of available pharmaceuticals do act in a fairly predictable 
manner. However, this predictability is limited to those that are available, not necessarily 
those that are routinely used. Indeed overall the findings from this study suggest that when 
looking at purchased pharmaceuticals (volume-weighted samples) the predictability of 
influence on price from product characteristics and country development indicators 
diminishes.    
STUDY LIMITATIONS 
This study focuses on the price of products being sold to the retail market. As such it 
excludes others such as those sold directly to hospitals, for example. Prices reflect only 
manufacturer level prices, not prices paid by patients, the latter being influenced by other 
factors such as wholesaler and retailer distribution mark-ups, dispensing fees, taxation, etc. As 
such, policy relevance is limited to the more upstream aspects that determine accessibility of 
medicines to a country generally, not the downstream aspects that determine final accessibility 
to the patient (although of course the former does impact the latter). 
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On a technical level the study also has limitations. For example, the significance of country 
cultural block variables suggests that regulation, national payment structures, and other 
nationally-driven laws and processes could have a significant role in price determination.  
However these country characteristics were not closely examined.  Finally, potential 
endogeneity and omitted variable bias could be problematic. Ideally the study would have 
instrumental variables to limit such problems however all those identified were weak. Greater 
analysis of this merits future exploration.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Results from this study confirm that the stages and evolution of country development are 
significantly associated with the pharmaceutical prices paid in middle- and high-income 
countries. On the whole, all else being equal, richer countries pay higher prices; more open 
and competitive markets pay lower prices; populations that were elderly pay higher prices; 
drugs that are newer to the global marketplace are more expensive.  However, findings also 
point to important nuances in how these factors affect price and highlight important 
differences in the association of economic, demographic and social variables to 
pharmaceutical prices in middle- and high-income countries that lead to inherent differences 
in the ability to negotiate prices. Overall an older population and a higher death rate may 
dampen the ability to negotiate lower prices and thereby put relatively less healthy countries at 
a price disadvantage. The effect of having a significant proportion of the population 65 and 
over has a particularly strong bearing on prices in middle-income countries. Population 
growth, which is occurring much faster in MIC, also appears to disadvantage price 
negotiations. Middle-income countries also do not benefit from the effects of competition 
and globalization in the same way.  
Looking to the future, one might predict that despite strong economic growth in several 
middle-income countries, prices may not follow suit. Indeed price trends detected in high-
income countries will not necessarily be mirrored in richer middle-income countries given 
numerous price confounding effects of demographics and social development. As such, any 
response to the call for fairer pricing in medicines in middle-income countries should be 
nuanced. Whilst on the one hand countries should be expected to pay more than their lesser 
developed country counterparts as they themselves grow richer, their ability to adapt to the 
competitive global marketplace shouldn’t be assumed to be on par with negotiators in the 
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richest countries.  Conversely, lack of predictability and resorting to the threat of price 
regulation by new governments hinders normal market price movements and can hinder the 
ability of negotiators in MICs to gain access to the amount of drugs needed at a good price 
over the longer-term (indeed lurching movements towards price regulation may further 
reduce the ability to reap any advantages of competition and globalization). This can be 
disastrous in countries facing particularly difficult health challenges resulting from fast 
population growth or an aging population. Economies of scale are badly needed in 
negotiating price in such cases.  
If the international community is committed to seeing fairer pricing of medicines, a nuanced 
approach is merited – based on finding ways to improve the negotiating power of middle-
income countries in price discussions whilst also ensuring greater contribution relative to 
lesser developed country counterparts, where normal market functioning is rare due to poor 
resources and very limited infrastructure. Pooled funding mechanisms, for example, may be 
useful to improve leverage amongst MICs whilst maintaining control closer to country-level 
decisions-makers, payers, and relevant populations from which demand derives.  Alternatively 
external, top-down mechanisms may be needed to circumvent the difficulties in achieving 
prices in-line with affordability and country development. Indeed internationally-supported 
institutions could be used to secure prices more in line with relative affordability and to 
improve the availability of drugs most needed in these populations.  
In sum, the variation in relative and absolute influence of economic, social, and demographic 
variables detected in this study suggests some potentially important differences in how 
country drug prices are affected by these factors, giving MIC and HIC an overall different 
predisposition that deserves more explicit attention in global discussions surrounding fairer 
pricing and better access to medicines. 
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PAPER 4    
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES: HOW DO THE 
MARKETS DIFFER AND WHAT ROLE DO HEALTH SYSTEM STRUCTURES 
HAVE IN DETERMINING SUCH DIFFERENCES?  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cross-national markets are increasingly of interest to politicians, civil society, and industry.  
This is particularly the case of goods like pharmaceuticals, access to which can be a matter of 
life and death, and which raise a number of normative issues. While countries sharing 
common key characteristics such as geographic situation and wealth might be expected to 
interact in a similar way with such markets—and thereby see similar prices and similar levels 
of consumption—country market trends are in fact more complex.  The unique nature of 
each culture and market system leads to differences in the volume levels and prices at which 
similar goods are consumed. This study focusses on the ways in which the various countries 
within the wealthy group, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), have similarities and differences within their pharmaceutical markets.  It uses the 
US market as the reference case, and explores whether similarities and differences amongst 
pharmaceutical markets can be explained by the characteristics of the health system that 
dominates in each country.    
This study achieves this by building a picture of each national market, constructing price 
indices for individual markets for each the 10 years for which data were available. It then 
explores whether the type of health system or its main characteristics are related to 
pharmaceutical price levels or to other attributes of the various national markets.  This study 
also examines how the relative prices of pharmaceuticals depend on what specific parts of the 
market (e.g. originators, generics) are compared and how the national markets differ in terms 
of key attributes such as levels of generic penetration, predominance of originator 
pharmaceuticals, predominance of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals, range in therapeutics, 
diversity in products available, therapeutic similarity to the US, and overall congruence with 
US market by volume (see Methods for further descriptions of these variables).  
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METHODS 
COUNTRY SELECTION 
As a group, OECD countries are of particular interest in that they have been relatively 
successful in fulfilling their mandate of maximizing economic growth and wealth creation-- 
accounting for most of the world’s wealth, trade and development aid.  But their success in 
strengthening social objectives has been questioned (OECD 2002) and their stated mission of 
“improv[ing] economic and social well-being of people around the world (OECD 2015)” has 
not been proven.   Indeed a key aim of the OECD is “to contribute to the expansion of 
world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international 
obligations” (Article 1 of its founding Convention) and this involves a “shared commitment 
to market economies backed by democratic institutions and focused on the wellbeing of all 
citizens” (OECD 2015). On a technical and practical front, OECD countries constitute an 
interesting group for this study for much is known about the economic and political 
structures that influence how an individual country adapts to globalizing forces within trade 
and the wider economy.  Indeed the OECD classification of health systems is one of the best 
known typologies (the typology used in this work is an adaptation of the original OECD 
classification). While the OECD itself analyses and compares data (e.g. life expectancy at 
birth, number of doctor visits per capita per annum, pharmaceutical consumption and sales, 
etc.) to predict future trends and set international standards on a range of topics, including 
those in the health field, it does not examine pharmaceutical price relatives or market 
characteristics in detail. For example OECD publishes aggregate CPI data for all items, as 
well as individually for food, and energy. With regard to the pharmaceutical market the 
OECD looks at the share of generics in the market. However, it does not examine individual 
country pharmaceutical markets in much detail nor does it compare prices at which 
pharmaceuticals are available.   
BUILDING A PICTURE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET BY COUNTRY 
Price indices were constructed for each country included in the extensively cited Böhm study 
(2013)27 and for which price and volume data were available. Prices were calculated initially 
per standard unit, bilaterally-matched between the country in question and the United States 
in order to maximize sample size and seek overall market representativeness, and then 
                                                 
27 Which builds on the original OECD health system classification. 
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aggregated upwards using the Fisher “Ideal” price index formula (see Introduction of this 
dissertation for a discussion on the merits of this index).  To make comparisons possible, all 
price indices constructed represent prices relative to US prices, with the latter holding at the 
index value of one. Price indices were first constructed for the overall pharmaceutical market 
within each country and then restricted to only originator brand pharmaceuticals and only 
unbranded (here called “generic”) pharmaceuticals.  
Range in therapeutics was defined as the number of unique ATCMOLs (a variable combining 
anatomic therapeutic category and molecule) on the market28. Diversity in product availability 
was defined as the number of molecule presentations29. Therapeutic similarity to US market 
(how similar countries are to the US in terms of the drug choices they make for a given 
condition) was defined as the number of unique ATCMOLs matching with the US. Overall 
congruence with US market (how similar countries are to the US in terms of the volumes of 
each drug purchased) was defined as the proportion of total country market (by volume) 
matching with the US. Proportions of molecule presentations that were completely generic, 
originator brands, and OTC were also calculated for each national market.  
HEALTH SYSTEM CLASSIFICATION 
The oft-mentioned OECD classification of health systems (OECD 1987) in wealthy Western 
countries suggests three main health system types: the National Health Service (NHS), the 
social health insurance model (SHI), and the private health insurance model (PHI). The NHS 
model includes universal coverage, funding from general taxation, and public ownership of 
health infrastructure. The SHI model is a combination of universal coverage and funding 
primarily from employer/employee contributions, along with public or private delivery. 
Finally, in the PHI model, private insurance provides coverage and acts as the main funding 
source, while health care delivery is characterized by private ownership.  
Böhm and colleagues (2013) have more recently refined this typology by proposing a 
hierarchy of actors and functions, which is much referenced classification of OECD health 
systems.  The typology considers three core dimensions of health system: regulation, 
financing and provision of services and three types of actors including state, societal (private 
                                                 
28 This aggregate identifier was first used by Danzon and Chao 2000. It allows for the same molecule 
to be counted separately for each of its respective uses.  
29 Molecules can differ along numerous lines such as therapeutic use, strength per dose, packaging, etc.  
All presentations are included in this measure.  
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non-profit) and private (for-profit) actors, reflecting the long-established trichotomy of state, 
society, and market that predominates in the social sciences.  
Regulation refers largely to coordination or governance and includes numerous “objects” of 
regulation including coverage, administration of financing, provider remuneration, patient 
access to providers, and benefits packages (Böhm 2013). State-led or command-and-control 
systems constitute one of the main classes within regulation – here described as statist. Non-
governmental dominance in regulation refers to networks, collegiality, or corporatism – here 
described as corporatist. Finally, the market itself can also be a mode of regulation – here 
described as private.  
The financing dimension is characterized by general or earmarked tax revenues in the case of 
state financing. Böhm and colleagues highlight the lack of link between tax financing and 
direct entitlements to services. Social insurance involves parafiscal levies—often related to 
income--flowing to funds entirely separate from government and indeed to which 
government has no access. Social insurance contributions do lead to direct entitlement to 
services and are independent of individual health risks, thereby maintaining some 
redistributive elements. Private insurance and out-of-pocket payments take place in the 
private sector and are closely related to individual health risks.   
The service provision dimension is measured using an index depending on the role of public, 
societal, or private providers. 
Crucial to the classification of Böhm and coworkers is the idea of a hierarchy of dimensions 
(regulation > financing > provision) and amongst actors (state > society > private) with the 
dominant actor within the higher levels restricting the potential range of actors at the 
subordinate levels.  The degree of collectivization (state being the highest, followed by society 
and then private) of superior dimensions is considered to limit the plausible attributes of the 
subordinate dimensions in that the subordinate ones can only have an equal or lower degree 
of collectivization.   For example, state regulation is a prerequisite for tax funding, and tax 
funding is a prerequisite for public service provision (Böhm 2013).  The authors suggest a 
trade-off between a public interest in health care and free market normativity in capitalist 
societies. This leads to democratic governments having to justify any state intervention using 
reasons of market failure or in the name of achieving distributive goals. Health care being 
both prone to market failures and a good example of a merit good, state involvement in it is 
easily justified – though it may occur at highly variable levels.  
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If state involvement is limited to the regulation dimension then systems can achieve “the 
highest potential for goal-attaining with lowest economic ‘disturbance’.  But access for high-
risk and poor groups can only be guaranteed through the state (Böhm 2013). Therefore, to 
maintain high levels of coverage for all, the state either finances healthcare out of its own 
coffers or it grants privileges to societal actors to raise the necessary funds. While the result is 
not absolute state dominance, it still represents a high degree of state intervention in the 
economy since public money subsidizes market prices of providers or patients, thereby 
distorting demand. Yet provision can also be accessed by non-profit providers, which still 
represents heavy market intervention, although less intensive than state provision. Böhm and 
colleagues highlight the critical backdrop --the onus of legitimizing public involvement, which 
runs counter to the present norm of free enterprise and the interests of rent-seeking private 
actors. This onus increases at each stage of the process: during phases of welfare state 
expansion, regulation is the first area of public involvement in healthcare, followed by 
financing, and finally by service provision. Conversely during phases of retrenchment, service 
provision is most vulnerable to privatization (Böhm 2013). 
Böhm and colleagues’s framework allows for the number of plausible health system types to 
expand to five: National Health Service, National Health Insurance, Etatist Social Health 
Insurance, Social Health Insurance and the Private Health System (see Figure 1).  National 
Health Service types give a dominant role to the state in all three dimensions. In National 
Health Insurance Systems the state also dominates regulatory powers but services are 
contracted out to for-profit providers. While the state also maintains regulatory power in the 
Etatist Social Health System, it grants privileges for financing and provision of health services 
to societal actors such as sickness funds with their own health facilities. In the Social Health 
System powers are decentralized in all dimensions, leaving corporatist actors dominating in 
regulation and financing and provision privatized to for-profit providers. Finally, the last 
plausible health system type, the Private Health System, is the only one to have financing 
devolved to private insurance or out-of-pocket payments.  
To classify the health systems of different countries, Böhm and co-workers (Böhm 2013), 
obtained information concerning the regulatory dimension from WHO HiT reviews. 
Classification of financing was based on 2008 OECD Health Data, which provides health 
expenditure, differentiating between agents (such as the state/government, society/social 
security funds, private insurers, and patients), with the largest share determining the 
classification. Classification of provision was based on the service provision index previously 
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developed by Rothgang H, Cacace M, Frisina L, Grimmeisen S, Schmid A, Wendt C. (2010), 
weighted in terms of relative share of health expenditure. Contrary to other studies, the Böhm 
classification was developed deductively, looking at all possible types, rather than inductively 
through observations of existing systems. Results of the classification are shown in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 1. POSSIBLE HEALTH SYSTEM TYPOLOGIES BASED ON DEDUCTIVE METHOD. 
LIKELY COMBINATIONS PRESENTED IN BOLD (BÖHM 2013)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  129 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. RESULT OF BÖHM CLASSIFICATION, UTILIZED IN THIS STUDY 
 
National Health Service: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, 
United Kingdom 
National Health Insurance: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Italy 
Private Health System: United States 
Etatist Social Health Insurance: Belgium, Estonia, France, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Israel, Japan, Korea 
 
DETECTING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HEALTH SYSTEM AND PHARMACEUTICAL 
MARKET ATTRIBUTES  
In this study, the strength of association between variables (e.g.., price indices and 
characteristics of health care systems) was measured using simple, pairwise correlations.  
These were undertaken to examine the relationship between health system typologies (overall 
system and categorization of regulation, financing, and provision) and pharmaceutical price 
and market make-up (proportion of originator brand pharmaceuticals, proportion of generic 
pharmaceuticals, proportion of over-the-counter (OTC) pharmaceuticals). Strength of 
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association was then examined between each health system typology and broader 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical market—including range of therapeutics, diversity in 
product availability, therapeutic similarity to the US market, and overall congruence with the 
US market. 
For inclusion in this study a country had to be a member of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), have been assigned a health system classification 
by Böhm and colleagues (2013), and have been included in the list of countries for which 
price data were available (in the IMS price database).   
 
RESULTS 
Price indices based on the entire pharmaceutical market suggested that prices in OECD were 
on average approximately half of US prices in the 10 years of the study period (see Figures 3-
5), with an overall average of 0.49 amongst all comparator countries. The average price ratios 
compared to the US ranged from 0.32 for Poland to 0.83 for Canada. Switzerland had the 
second highest average ratio with 0.66 across the 10 years. The price ratios changed over time, 
with an average increase from 0.50 to 0.62 for all the countries over the 10 years of the study.  
An early dip in 2000 was followed by a steady rise, and then a sharp increase in the last year of 
the study due largely to a changes in relative prices from Austria, Germany, and Sweden. It 
should be noted that there were some unusual changes noted in prices of drugs that are 
widely used in Canada and Australia, presumably as a result of changes in price controls. Data 
error also cannot be excluded as a cause. These are discussed in a little more detail in Paper 2 
but a detailed examination of the individual data sets is required to confidently pinpoint the 
underlying causes. 
Price indices relative to the US were even lower when they were restricted to originator 
pharmaceuticals (Figures 6-7), with an overall average of 0.41, ranging from 0.31 for Greece 
and 0.32 for Portugal up to 0.60 for Japan. The relative trend amongst these price indices 
were similar to those for all pharmaceuticals but with a hump around 2003-2004 for most 
countries. 
Strikingly, when the sample was restricted to generic pharmaceuticals only, prices in 
comparator countries were much higher (Figures 8-10), many of them surpassing US prices. 
This ranged from 0.56 for Korea and 0.64 for Poland up to 1.56 for Switzerland, 1.86 for 
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Australia, and 2.57 for Canada30.  The overall average for this sample was 1.15, suggesting that 
prices for generic pharmaceuticals in other OECD countries were close to US prices in the 
years of the study. The predominance of these types of pharmaceuticals within each of the 
national markets is shown in Figure 11, the proportion being significantly higher amongst 
generic pharmaceuticals (average of 37%) than originator brands (average of 16%).  Australia 
saw particularly high prices for generic pharmaceuticals in the early years of the study but 
these then joined the norm. Canada, began with generic prices marginally above US prices but 
then saw a sharp increase in 2003, a dip in 2006, and another sharp increase in 2007-2008.   
Range in therapeutics (number of unique ATCMOLs available) across national markets as a 
whole averaged 1368, with a low value of 792 for Finland and a high value of 2532 for 
Germany (Figure 12). Diversity in products available (number of molecule presentations) 
across the national markets averaged 10,090, ranging from 4283 for Finland to 33,957 for 
Germany (Figure 13). Therapeutic similarity to the US (number of unique ATCMOLs 
matching with the US) averaged 1310 ATCMOLs, with again a low value for Finland (775) 
and a high value for Germany (2444; Figure 14). Overall congruence with US market by 
volume (proportion of total country market matching with the US by volume) averaged 84%, 
ranging from 65% for France to 99% for Australia (Figure 15). 
Most correlation coefficients did not suggest notable relationships between pharmaceutical 
prices and health system typology and characteristics (Figure 16). However, the one 
coefficient that did stand out suggested a moderate relationship between the prices of 
pharmaceuticals across the markets and the regulatory system in place. Strength of association 
between market characteristics and health system typology and characteristics was fairly weak 
across the board (Figure 16), yet, again with some notable exceptions.  Range of therapeutics 
and therapeutic similarity to the US both had a moderately strong association to regulation.  
Overall health system type had only weak associations to the market characteristics being 
measured. 
 
  
                                                 
30 As noted earlier in this dissertation there were two years of price data from Canada that appeared 
conspicuously high and thus this 10-year average may be an overestimate. 
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FIGURE 3. PRICE INDICES, ALL PHARMACEUTICALS 
FIGURE 4. PRICE INDEX TRENDS OVER 10-YEAR STUDY PERIOD, ALL 
PHARMACEUTICALS
31 
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FIGURE 5. PRICE INDEX TRENDS OVER 10-YEAR STUDY PERIOD, ALL 
PHARMACEUTICALS (NOTE: GRAPH EXCLUDES CANADA IN ORDER TO SEE PRICE 
RELATIVES IN GREATER DETAIL)  
 
FIGURE 6. PRICE INDICES, ORIGINATOR BRANDS ONLY
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FIGURE 7. PRICE INDEX TRENDS, ORIGINATOR BRANDS ONLY (NOTE: GRAPH 
EXCLUDES TWO OUTLIER INDEX VALUES FOR JAPAN 1999-2000 IN ORDER TO SEE 
TRENDS MORE CLEARLY.)  
 
FIGURE 8. PRICE INDICES, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS ONLY 
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FIGURE 9. PRICE INDEX TRENDS, GENERIC PHARMACEUTICALS ONLY32 
 
  
                                                 
32 Canada and Australia demonstrated conspicuous values for a few years presented here. It is unknown 
whether this is due to errors in the data (see Data description in introductory section for a brief description of 
such problems) or if indeed the values were a true reflection of price changes. After a brief investigation of 
price changes in these countries no obvious policy reason could be identified. However, more in-depth 
examination of the question would be needed to determine the cause. Whilst two values for Japan also 
appeared to be outliers, such price movements did seem to be potentially explained by the policy shifts (see 
Paper 2). 
  136 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10.  PRICE INDEX TRENDS OVER 10 YEARS OF STUDY, GENERICS ONLY (NOTE: 
EXCLUDES CANADA AND AUSTRALIA IN ORDER TO SEE TRENDS OF OTHER OUNTRIES 
MORE CLOSELY)
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FIGURE 11. MARKET MAKE-UP BY COUNTRY 
       generics originator brands OTC 
AUSTRALIA  47% 15% 28% 
AUSTRIA  29% 19% 7% 
BELGIUM  28% 23% 14% 
FINLAND  27% 21% 12% 
GERMANY  41% 15% 12% 
ITALY  34% 11% 8% 
JAPAN  34% 8% 3% 
KOREA  32% 4% 22% 
NETHERLANDS  45% 26% 10% 
POLAND  32% 11% 15% 
PORTUGAL  42% 12% 3% 
SPAIN  43% 9% 6% 
SWEDEN  28% 31% 10% 
SWITZERLAND  39% 19% 13% 
UNITED KINGDOM  43% 17% 19% 
 
FIGURE 12. RANGE IN THERAPEUTICS 
 
  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
AUSTRALIA 1430 1465 1494 1547 1569 1575 1536 1544 1564 1558
AUSTRIA 1205 1225 1216 1231 1244 1248 1242 1252 1252 1224
BELGIUM 1147 1156 1172 1182 1176 1173 1120 1129 1109 1067
FINLAND 784 784 784 790 795 795 800 803 799 792
FRANCE 1447 1436 1495 1458 1461 1457 1509 1608 1640 1618
GERMANY 2471 2516 2629 2630 2616 2509 2497 2481 2493 2486
ITALY 1348 1375 1367 1392 1369 1345 1330 1312 1304 1305
JAPAN 1735 1733 1742 1749 1738 1732 1720 1737 1735 1731
KOREA 1016 1333 1334 1492 1462 1501 1479 1496 1514 1482
NETHERLANDS 994 1006 1013 996 974 978 990 982 982 974
POLAND 1387 1411 1393 1416 1409 1371 1360 1350 1368 1342
PORTUGAL 924 943 953 960 973 990 937 935 929 918
SPAIN 1193 1219 1221 1220 1215 1208 1211 1181 1174 1171
SWEDEN 799 824 856 897 892 900 906 919 931 934
SWITZERLAND 1994 1990 1976 1966 1926 1858 1834 1794 1780 1739
UNITED KINGDOM 1354 1369 1388 1381 1391 1390 1387 1389 1382 1348
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FIGURE 13. DIVERSITY IN PRODUCT AVAILABILITY 
 
FIGURE 14. THERAPEUTIC SIMILARITY TO US MARKET 
 
  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
AUSTRALIA 7911 8046 8138 8251 8289 8315 8268 8293 8328 8288
AUSTRIA 5726 5798 5815 5852 5870 5902 5898 5913 5904 5850
BELGIUM 4685 4716 4787 4844 4845 4845 4782 4794 4761 4677
FINLAND 4185 4222 4245 4258 4292 4319 4340 4330 4330 4310
FRANCE 10370 10438 10622 10596 10589 10616 10746 10926 11010 10937
GERMANY 33291 33634 33970 34105 34196 34146 34139 34128 34027 33936
ITALY 9061 9165 9203 9396 9379 9358 9322 9272 9254 9231
JAPAN 17371 17390 17478 17490 17504 17503 17482 17510 17510 17483
KOREA 11168 12506 12647 12882 12914 12994 12931 12996 13022 12929
NETHERLANDS 11772 11973 12168 12202 12278 12350 12388 12373 12394 12377
POLAND 6798 6915 6928 6988 6996 6961 6945 6922 6949 6881
PORTUGAL 5287 5359 5404 5450 5498 5533 5454 5455 5455 5412
SPAIN 7773 7849 7885 7912 7916 7926 7950 7879 7874 7840
SWEDEN 5553 5702 5791 5940 5971 6020 6029 6067 6084 6078
SWITZERLAND 8320 8342 8356 8367 8311 8236 8202 8139 8106 8021
UNITED KINGDOM 7504 7573 7627 7643 7666 7677 7655 7660 7655 7592
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
AUSTRALIA 1382 1401 1427 1477 1482 1495 1452 1448 1477 1471
AUSTRIA 1171 1192 1187 1195 1204 1210 1207 1212 1217 1194
BELGIUM 1120 1133 1146 1149 1139 1138 1083 1090 1074 1038
CANADA 1395 1374 1430 1411 1406 1400 1460 1502 1526 1513
FINLAND 760 763 767 772 773 777 785 788 785 777
FRANCE 1395 1378 1373 1371 1378 1384 1374 1372 1359
GERMANY 2398 2438 2548 2541 2521 2420 2404 2384 2397 2390
GREECE 972 981 1006 1058 1049 1059 1074 1081 1079 1092
ITALY 1321 1348 1336 1354 1326 1313 1296 1272 1263 1263
JAPAN 1701 1697 1705 1709 1690 1681 1668 1681 1670 1669
KOREA 995 1313 1314 1464 1427 1464 1442 1446 1459 1427
NETHERLANDS 962 981 985 967 944 952 960 953 960 953
PORTUGAL 903 927 933 937 942 967 915 913 906 899
SPAIN 1165 1196 1190 1186 1170 1174 1170 1139 1133 1132
SWEDEN 769 796 827 867 867 876 885 899 909 910
SWITZERLAND 1923 1917 1902 1894 1846 1789 1769 1724 1718 1676
UNITED K INGDOM 1309 1323 1346 1335 1341 1343 1337 1331 1323 1294
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FIGURE 15. OVERALL CONGRUENCE WITH US MARKET 
 
FIGURE 16. STRENGTH OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN MARKET CHARACTERISTICS AND 
HEALTH SYSTEMS  
 Overall type Regulation Financing Provision 
Pharmaceutical price 0.067 0.614 0.203 0.266 
Proportion generic 0.174 0.003 0.202 0.035 
Proportion originator brands 0.170 0.120 0.073 0.198 
Proportion OTC 0.106 0.100 0.101 0.22 
Range in therapeutics 0.357 0.611 0.447 0.524 
Diversity in product availability 0.321 0.407 0.400 0.372 
Therapeutic similarity to US market  0.369 0.615 0.487 0.486 
Overall congruence with US market 0.255 0.292 0.316 0.260 
     
DISCUSSION 
INFLUENCE OF HEALTH SYSTEMS 
It seems generally intuitive that the pharmaceutical market of countries with similar types of 
market or planned economies should be generally similar.  Countries with similar health 
systems often share important cultural, political or economic precursors. For example, 
countries with SHI systems share clear linguistico-cultural similarities.  Alternatively, the 
establishment of NHSs require social democratic governments combined with negligible veto 
power on the part of providers (Toth 2010, Immergut 1992, Böhm 2013).  Nonetheless, the 
quantitative analysis in this study suggests on the whole relatively weak relationships between 
pharmaceutical prices and the type of health system in place in wealthy Western countries. 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
AUSTRALIA 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99%
AUSTRIA 71% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 72% 74% 74%
BELGIUM 80% 80% 80% 80% 81% 81% 81% 80% 82% 82%
CANADA 97% 97% 97% 97% 97% 98% 98% 95% 95% 95%
FINLAND 85% 85% 85% 85% 84% 85% 85% 86% 86% 87%
FRANCE 62% 63% 63% 62% 63% 65% 68% 70% 71%
GERMANY 79% 80% 80% 79% 79% 80% 80% 76% 79% 80%
ITALY 67% 68% 69% 70% 70% 72% 72% 73% 75% 77%
JAPAN 72% 72% 72% 72% 71% 70% 69% 67% 66% 65%
KOREA 99% 99% 98% 98% 98% 97% 97% 97% 97% 97%
NETHERLANDS 92% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 92% 92% 92%
PORTUGAL 88% 88% 89% 90% 90% 91% 92% 92% 93% 94%
SPAIN 75% 76% 75% 75% 75% 77% 77% 76% 78% 78%
SWEDEN 94% 94% 94% 93% 93% 93% 93% 92% 92% 92%
SWITZERLAND 79% 79% 79% 78% 78% 78% 78% 75% 78% 78%
UNITED KINGDOM 86% 86% 86% 87% 87% 87% 87% 86% 85% 85%
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Indeed the results shown in Figure 16 imply that there are only minor differences in the 
abilities of various types of health systems to negotiate favourable pharmaceutical prices. In 
other words, no sweeping generalization can be made regarding a given health system’s ability 
to apply more or less leverage on pharmaceutical prices, an informative and somewhat 
counterintuitive conclusion. In short, the type of health system by itself doesn’t seem to be a 
first order determinant of prices.  
A more detailed analysis of the data focussing on the structural components of health systems 
does suggest, however, that the level of state intervention at the highest levels of the system 
may affect pharmaceutical prices. The moderately strong relationship between prices and 
regulation dominance (coefficients larger than 0.6 in Figure 16) suggests that the primary 
regulation-driving actor is more important than who is in charge of financing or provision in 
determining prices. The ability of the state to contain prices in its role as primary regulator 
follows from its role in governance. This result suggests in particular that the privatization of 
provision (an effective transition from an NHS to an NHI) in the name of budget constraints 
or efficiencies does not necessarily translate into more competitive prices in the 
pharmaceutical market.  The closer relationship between pharmaceutical prices and regulation 
than between pharmaceutical prices and provision is striking, all the more so as the total 
expenditure was one of the parameters included to characterize provision. A larger total 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals does not necessarily translate into higher prices.   
The results of this study also suggest that allowing the devolvement of financing to sick funds 
(a transition from an NHS to an ESHI) does not necessarily translate into a loss of ability to 
contain prices. According to the data, such a transition would have little effect on 
pharmaceutical prices. In contrast, decentralization of regulation, finance, and provision (e.g. 
in a transition from an NHS or ESHI to an SHI) would generally be expected to limit the 
ability to contain prices.  Interestingly, this would not result from a loss of monopsonistic 
(sole payer) leverage, as there would be no change in financing dominance from ESHI to 
SHI, but rather from the transition away from state governance.  In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, prices seem to be more effectively controlled by regulation than by market 
forces.  
Interestingly a non-negligible relationship was detected between the availability of 
pharmaceuticals and regulation. In this case the direction of influence is as one might predict: 
state dominance in regulation leads to more limited availability of pharmaceuticals—but this 
comes more from state dominance in regulation than in financing or provision. The relative 
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strength of the relationship also suggests that the governance role appears to be a more 
important determinant of the number of therapeutics available than who finances them or 
who prescribes them. This may mean that when financing is devolved to corporatist groups, 
these groups do not compete on the ground of greater availability—at least in a way that 
would noticeably impact the overall measures of availability used in this study.  Similarly, 
when provision is devolved to private providers, competition based on greater pharmaceutical 
availability is not significant.  Simply stated, maintaining state dominance of regulation is 
sufficient to marginally restrain product availability, regardless of financing or provision 
arrangements.  
The US is the only country left with a private health system (Switzerland switched to SHI in 
1996), so the analysis of this particular system is limited to only the American situation.  As it 
was compared to each of the other OECD countries directly, this limitation is actually an 
opportunity to look closely at how the US market differs from others and, in particular, to 
examine common beliefs about the implications of high US prices. Findings from this study 
show that over the 10 years in question (1999 through 2008) the average across all countries 
went from 50% to only 62% of US prices (Figures 3-5). This could suggest some increasing 
convergence with US prices over time but also demonstrates that, for the most part, other 
rich countries pay far less for pharmaceuticals than in the US. When focussing only on 
originator pharmaceuticals this difference is even greater, with other countries having an 
overall average of 41% of US prices over the study period (Figures 6 and 7). However, the 
results are strikingly different for generic pharmaceuticals, the prices of generic 
pharmaceuticals in comparator countries relative to the US being much higher than those of 
originator brands (Figures 8-10), many of them even surpassing US prices. The 10-year 
average ranged from 0.56 for Korea and 0.64 for Poland up to 1.56 for Switzerland, 1.86 for 
Australia, and 2.57 for Canada33.  The overall average for this sample was 1.15, suggesting that 
prices for generic pharmaceuticals in other OECD countries were close to US prices in the 
years of the study. By the end of the study period, almost all countries had generic prices 
surpassing US prices. This is a highly significant result given the importance of generics which 
account on average for a higher proportion of pharmaceuticals (average of 37%) than 
originator brands (average of 16%) in the OECD markets (Figure 11).  
                                                 
33 As noted earlier in this dissertation there were two years of price data from Canada that appeared 
conspicuously high and thus this 10-year average may be an overestimate. 
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The finding that US prices are actually lower than many other countries when looking at the 
generics market is of particular interest given the often made claim that other wealthy 
countries free-ride on high US prices. This is indeed one of the most common critiques of the 
global pricing of pharmaceuticals, although the debate is rarely supported by concrete data. 
Market evidence suggests that US consumers (here a complex combination of prescribers, 
patients, and third-party payers) value newer, cutting-edge and generally more expensive 
pharmaceuticals (albeit not always of proven better quality). The evidence here also suggest, 
however, that the US system also allows for rapid and deep generic penetration. The price of 
generics in the US appears to face much downward pressure from free market competition – 
which is actively supported through legislation (e.g. general Wax-Hatchman provisions34). 
Conversely, the price of originator products are somewhat protected through related 
legislation (e.g. reverse payments or “pay-for-delay” permissions35). The approach to 
pharmaceutical pricing in European countries has been quite different from the laissez-faire 
or free market approach of the US (although one could argue that the aforementioned US 
legislation makes it a somewhat false free market). Most other OECD countries use either 
monopsonistic leverage or other explicit tools --including external reference pricing, internal 
reference pricing, health technology assessments, profit-limiting pricing-- to control prices 
and/or to bring price in line with expert-assessed therapeutic value (as opposed to purely 
market-assessed). The evidence suggests that these price controls result in lower 
pharmaceutical prices overall. However, these measure also restrict the normal price-limiting 
effects of competition which are particularly effective for generic pharmaceuticals.  
So in answer to the question of whether other countries are free-riding on high US prices – 
yes, US prices for originator pharmaceuticals and for the overall basket of pharmaceuticals 
consumed according to US preferences are higher than anywhere else. This means that the 
US consumers are arguably paying more for innovation as they contribute out of proportion 
to the bottom lines of drug companies that carry out pharmaceutical research. However, as 
the US has no formal cost-effectiveness assessment processes (and indeed the main public 
payer, the CMS, as well as private insurance companies, officially do not utilize such studies in 
                                                 
34 The Hatch-Waxman Act streamlines the market approval process for generic drug products, 
allowing them to file an abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) that incorporates the 
safety/effectiveness data submitted by original pioneer drug manufacturer, adding only bioequivalence 
studies. As a result, generic manufacturers can get their products onto the market more quickly and 
with less fear of pursuit for infringement by the originator company. 
35 Such permissions allow for payment by the originator patent holder to the generic manufacturer to 
delay entry. 
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their coverage decisions), the innovation Americans are paying for may not represent the real 
innovation from which the rest of the world benefits. It is very difficult here to argue that 
high US prices motivate much more than incremental innovation or that the American 
patient is seeing true value-for-money in the newer pharmaceuticals they consume.   
Looked at another way, the higher prices paid for generics in Europe may actually be 
subsidizing US generics manufacturers whose profit margin is constrained by competition.  
Overall, while the US may be subsidizing innovation to some extent, constraints on 
competition in other OECD countries arguably buoy generic manufacturers of the older 
products.  For companies that operate on both sides of the Atlantic this may translate into 
some balancing of the books.  Certainly the bigger companies, who are well aware of the 
different pricing structures, position themselves accordingly.  
One difficulty in analysing the relative prices of pharmaceuticals is to know when high prices 
result from the payer’s weak ability to negotiate them down, or from the payer’s willingness to 
pay higher prices (or at least not drive them down to marginal cost) with the aim of 
supporting long-term investment in pharmaceutical R&D.  In rich countries, governments use 
negotiation with industry to establish prices for pharmaceuticals that will continue to 
incentivize R&D while achieving a fair price for consumers—in many cases the latter being 
the government itself. The US, UK, and Germany have generally claimed to encourage R&D 
in their pharmaceutical pricing policies. However, for the UK and Germany this is not 
completely borne out by the data in that their respective overall 10-year averages for 
originator brands were still very far below US prices, at 45% and 46% of US prices, only 
slightly higher than the average for the OECD countries (average of 41% across all countries 
over the 10 years (range of average by country of 31 to 60%).  In the case of Germany, there 
is a very clear trend towards higher prices of originator pharmaceuticals over time, reaching 
58% of US prices in 2008, the highest value amongst all comparator countries, yet far below 
parity with the US. 
The policy- and price-setting environment may also in some cases work against the 
competitive nature of companies.  For example, through their national or regional industry 
associations such as Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the Association 
of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, and European Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Industries and Associations, pharmaceutical companies (primarily large ones) are able to exert 
considerable pressure on regulators (in this case mainly Congressional leaders in the US and 
public payers in Europe) to support conditions favouring originator market share and/or to 
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refrain from using monopsonistic or oligopsonistic leverage to drive down prices for newer 
products. So both as a direct result of regulation and the indirect result of hampered 
competition, prices can be higher than would result from a true free market. Such effects are 
difficult to detect with the available aggregated price data. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPECTIVE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS 
An additional finding of interest is the major difference in market structure found amongst 
some European countries.  For example, in terms of the range of therapeutics (which is the 
number of unique molecule-indications) and the diversity of available products (which 
includes all versions of all molecules, counting variety across strengths, formulations, 
packaging, etc), Finland and Germany represent opposing extremes, from smallest to largest, 
respectively (Figure 12 and 13).   This relationship holds also for their respective level of 
similarity to the US market – similarity in what is consumed (Figure 14). Interestingly this 
disparity does not relate to the congruence with the US market (Figure 15 - i.e. it does not 
hold for the amount of the goods bought) as Finland is actually closer to the US in this 
respect than Germany. This suggests that while Finland may not have as many individual 
therapeutics matching with the US, the ones that do match make up a large portion of what 
they consume (by volume). Interestingly, these two countries also represent different 
approaches in terms of health system structures (no similarity in approach in regulation, 
financing, or provision).  
The similarity of the Australian market with the US market is also of interest (Figure 14). This 
similarity could result in part from private provision and commonality of language, which 
would favour the importation of pharmaceuticals already packaged and labelled in English, 
overall easing registration processes.  The lack of similarity between the French and the US 
markets (Figures 14 and 15) is to be expected given the strong support for in-country 
production of pharmaceuticals, especially generics, in France.  
LIMITATIONS 
In order to examine potential relationships between the characteristics of various health 
systems and the pharmaceutical prices attained within those systems, it is necessary to use 
price indices that aggregate prices in each pharmaceutical market, such that price differences 
between two countries are quantified by a single number.  This is not a simple or controversy-
free task in that pharmaceuticals vary immensely in their branding, formulation, strength, etc. 
across countries and there is no single, accepted way to combine their prices to create a single 
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measure of their price differences.  It is thus with many trade-offs that this is done here. For 
example, the more one imposes a comparison of like-for-like pharmaceuticals (e.g. imposing 
that the sample include only identical brands, strengths, dosing, etc.), the more the sample 
size of products diminishes. Samples based on bilaterally-matched products matched with the 
US were used as the basis of the price indices in order to maximize the number, and thus 
representativeness, of products. Fisher indices were constructed because they depend the least 
on the choice of base country (the country whose consumption patterns determine the how 
each drug in the sample is weighted in the index calculation). Rather than using only the 
consumption patterns of the base country (as in Laspeyres indices) or only the consumption 
patterns of the comparator country (as in Paasche indices), Fisher indices combine the two in 
what can be described as a fairer, more country-invariant measure of price relatives.  
In terms of their interpretation Fisher indices do not provide a completely straightforward 
answer. For example Paasche and Laspeyres indices can be more readily interpreted for 
national-level policy-making – indeed the level at which most health and pharmaceutical 
policies are made in OECD countries.  However, for making international comparisons, 
conducted in an effort to clarify globally-relevant (rather than nationally-relevant) questions—
Fisher indices are both mathematically as well as economically optimal (See section on Index 
Number Theory in Introduction for more detailed discussion of Fisher indices).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Health systems in industrialized OECD countries are complex institutional constructs and 
there are significant variations across countries. Nonetheless it seems possible that 
commonalities across health system types could have a similar influence on national 
pharmaceutical markets. Findings from this study suggest that what seems to matter most for 
both the price and the availability of pharmaceuticals is not the type of health system overall 
or its mechanisms for financing or provision, but rather its governance, i.e., the regulation of 
the relationship between payers, providers, and patients. Of most interest is the apparent lack 
of relationship between financing mechanisms and drug prices and availability given the 
seemingly strong leverage of single payers and their ability to influence the market. Also of 
interest is the finding that competition amongst non-state payers or providers does not 
translate into greater availability of therapeutics compared to state provision. Such findings 
are of particular relevance for state dominated health systems in view of the tendency to 
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decentralize and move towards a plurality in financing and lesser state involvement in the 
provision of health services in the name of greater efficiencies and/or budget constraints.        
Findings also suggest that a Private Health System such as that of the US may lack the ability 
or the motivation to contain prices, resulting in much higher pharmaceutical prices than 
elsewhere. Looked at very bluntly (and disregarding the disconnection between prices and 
R&D) this finding supports the claim that US prices subsidize R&D for the rest of the world 
– or that the rest of the world free-rides on high US prices. However, the picture of very high 
relative US prices does not hold for all sections of the pharmaceutical market.  Indeed the 
price of generic pharmaceuticals in comparator countries are quite close to those in the US, 
many of them even surpassing US prices.  The aforementioned claim of the quasi-unique role 
of the US in financing pharmaceutical R&D thus needs to be nuanced. National 
pharmaceutical policies should clearly take into account the differences between the different 
sectors of the market. 
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CONCLUSION  
  
The various parts of this dissertation explore the differences in pharmaceutical prices across 
countries, rich and poor, the likely determinants of these price differences, and their 
consequences in terms of fairness and efficiency. This concluding chapter brings together the 
key findings of the individual papers to provide a synoptic and coherent view of the topic. 
The first section highlights the principal results from the quantitative analyses of price 
differences amongst countries and their evolution over time, focusing primarily on high-
income countries.  The second section synthesizes the key results from the papers analysing 
the determinants of pharmaceutical prices, including the development characteristics of 
countries (economic, social and demographic), external factors (competition and 
globalization) and the characteristics of the health system.   The issue of fairness in 
pharmaceutical pricing is addressed in the next two sections, first from the perspective of 
relative affordability and access to pharmaceuticals and then from the perspective of relative 
contribution to global R&D. 
The methodological advances that undergird the quantitative analyses presented in this 
dissertation are then presented and followed by a discussion of the limitations of the work.  
Both are related in large part to the intrinsic difficulty in measuring price differences, a classic 
and long-standing problem in economics, which is further complicated by the dizzying variety 
of presentation, dosage and composition of pharmaceutical products that vary from country 
to country. The final section discusses the possible policy implications of this thesis focusing 
on the question of fairness in the pricing of pharmaceuticals amongst countries in different 
stages of economic development.   
TRENDS IN PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING ACROSS COUNTRIES 
The work presented in this dissertation shows that, with few exceptions, prices in the United 
States are higher than in any other country in the world.  This result, which has been 
previously published for a more limited number of countries and time periods, was 
consistently borne out in each of the papers presented, Papers 1, 2, 3 and 4.  However, 
although pharmaceutical prices in comparator countries were lower than in the US, they 
became more similar over the 10 years of the study.  In addition, as discussed in the next 
section, the results from these chapters confirm intuitive notions that, ceteris paribus, richer 
countries generally pay higher prices than poorer ones, more open and competitive markets 
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pay lower prices, and pharmaceuticals that are newer to the global marketplace are more 
expensive.  
The magnitude of the difference in prices amongst countries was found to depend on the 
methods used in sampling pharmaceuticals across markets, in particular on the consumption 
pattern used to weight individual pharmaceutical prices and on the number of products 
included in the sample.  As explained below, when the comparator country’s consumption 
pattern was used to weight pharmaceutical prices (Paasche index, P) the overall difference 
with the US was larger than when the prices were weighted according to the US’s 
consumption pattern (Laspeyres index, L), as demonstrated by the systematic difference 
between the indices: L > P.  This difference was further increased when the sample contained 
a larger number of products matched bilaterally between the US and the comparator country 
(PB and LB based on a mean sample size of 1250 products) instead of a smaller number 
matched across all of the countries multilaterally (PM and LM based on a mean sample size of 
about 150 products) and thereby limited to only globally-available products: LB > LM > PM > 
PB. This study exploited the range of values calculated by these various price indices to obtain 
a more thorough understanding of price differences in pharmaceuticals between countries 
than is possible with a single index. A mean value of the various indices provided a 
dependable quantifier of price differences when the indices were close to each other.  Vice-
versa, large differences amongst indices indicated unusual features of particular 
pharmaceutical markets that could often be determined by a detailed analysis of the various 
indices and the underlying data. 
For eight countries, the range of values for the Laspeyres and Fisher indices was found to be 
relatively narrow (LB - PB < 0.25). In this situation, the bilateral Fisher index, FB, which is the 
geometric mean of LB and PB, provided a useful single number approximation of relative 
prices of pharmaceuticals between these countries and the US.  According to the results, over 
the ten years of the study, the manufacturer-level prices of pharmaceuticals were on average 
between 40% and 50% of US prices in Finland, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and the 
Netherlands and somewhat lower in Korea (34%).  This result applied to a large fraction of 
the pharmaceutical markets in these countries, on average 85% of the products in a given 
country in any given year (ranging from 65% for France to 99% for Australia). 
When limiting the comparison to “global molecules” included in the multilaterally matched 
sample, the results showed a similar difference (a factor of 2 to 2.5) in average pharmaceutical 
prices between the US and a much larger number of countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
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Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Korea, Netherlands, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  This result 
was based on the Fisher index FM, when the average difference between LM and PM was small 
(LM - PM < 0.15).  In the case of Taiwan, the difference in the price of these common 
pharmaceuticals compared to the US was somewhat larger (a factor of 2.7).  Because these 
price differences for global molecules are nearly independent (within a few percent) of 
whether they are weighted by US or domestic consumption patterns, they are useful to guide 
policy decisions.   
In contrast, for Japan, Singapore and Switzerland the relatively large difference observed 
between price indices calculated with US or domestic consumption patterns made it 
impossible to robustly quantify price differences with a single number (although that 
difference was undoubtedly best approximated by the Fischer index).  This was particularly 
true of Japan for which pharmaceutical prices showed a very large mean difference between 
LM and PM (LM-PM = 0.49). This is most likely due to large differences in the patterns of 
pharmaceutical consumption between Japan and the US.  This explanation is consistent with 
the very low fraction (16%) of the Japanese pharmaceutical market that was included in the 
multilaterally-matched samples, likely reflecting geographical barriers and the predominantly 
domestic nature of the Japanese market. Dissimilarities in the pattern of pharmaceutical usage 
between comparator countries and the US resulting from cultural differences is also likely 
responsible for large numerical differences between the Paasche price indices calculated for 
multilaterally and bilaterally matched pharmaceutical samples for Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia 
and Taiwan.  
The narrowing of differences in pharmaceutical prices between comparator countries and the 
US over time was quantified by the evolution of both the Laspeyres and Paasche indices.  For 
example, in most high income countries these indices increased between 2001 and 2008 with 
a mean increase of about 50% for the Laspeyres indices and of 30% for the Paasche indices.  
The two exceptions were Saudi Arabia for which all the indices decreased systematically and 
the United Kingdom for which all the indices remained approximately constant. In other 
words, whilst pharmaceutical prices in most wealthy countries increased compared to the US 
between 2001 and 2008, they decreased in Saudi Arabia and remained relatively constant in 
the UK. In the case of the UK this result suggests a containment of pharmaceutical prices 
resulting from specific policy tools (e.g., health technology assessments and the 
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Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme36), as well as policies to promote the use of generic 
pharmaceuticals.  
As explained below, the generally larger relative increase over time in the Laspeyres indices 
compared to the Paasche indices is expected as a result of the negative relationship between 
price and consumption. In some countries, however, the relative increases in L and P, based 
either on bilaterally or multilaterally matched samples, were similar.  For these countries, the 
increases in the corresponding Fisher indices provide good measures of the changes in 
pharmaceutical prices relative to the US:  a range from zero increase (Taiwan) to a near 
doubling for the bilaterally matched samples (FB going from 0.36 to 0.69 in Sweden), and a 
narrower range for the multilaterally matched sample, going from 23% in Taiwan (FM = 0.35 
to 0.43) to 46% in Sweden (FM = 0.39 to 0.57).   
DETERMINANTS OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRICES 
Once the differences in pharmaceutical prices amongst countries have been quantified, the 
obvious question becomes that of the main drivers responsible for these price differences. 
This question is addressed in detail in the dissertation, focusing first on social, demographic, 
economic and product-related factors (Paper 3) and then on the effect of the characteristics 
of the health systems (Paper 4). 
The results suggest that the prices of pharmaceuticals in middle-income countries are 
particularly dependent on several socio-demographic variables rather than purely economic 
ones. The percentage of old people living in middle-income countries was found to be the 
strongest determinant of pharmaceutical prices, most probably reflecting a rapid increase in 
demand.  The length of time since launch of a pharmaceutical was also strongly positively 
related with its price, likely a result of product recognition, associated marketing strategy and 
ensuing purchaser behaviour. Notably, pharmaceutical prices in middle-income countries 
were found to be more sensitive to certain demographic trends such as population growth 
and death rate than they were in high-income countries. Overall, the results suggest that 
prices offered to purchasers in middle-income and high-income countries are affected 
differently by globalization and competition.  Social and demographic particularities in 
middle-income countries give them a notably different negotiation predisposition that may 
                                                 
36 The PPRS in its previous form is referred to here. 
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deserve attention in global discussions surrounding fairer pricing and better access to 
pharmaceuticals (see below).  
 A potentially important determinant of differences in pharmaceutical prices is the type of the 
health system in use in a particular country.  Variations amongst health systems that may 
affect pharmaceutical prices include the extent of coverage, the mode of financing and 
delivery of care and the public or private actors that control these: state, corporatist (private 
non-profit), or private (for-profit). The quantitative tests performed in this thesis suggest, 
perhaps surprisingly, that health system type is not in itself a clear determinant of prices. 
However, a fairly strong relationship was detected between the type of actor who maintains 
the greatest role in regulation and pharmaceutical prices. Interestingly it was the control over 
regulation, not financing or provision, that had the greater impact on the pharmaceutical price 
levels ultimately negotiated within the market. Indeed state dominance of governance 
structures (i.e., the regulation of the relationship between payers, providers, and patients) was 
found to help reduce overall pharmaceutical prices. Of particular interest was the apparent 
lack of relationship between financing mechanisms and pharmaceutical prices despite the 
seemingly strong leverage of single payers and their ability to influence the market. Perhaps 
more intuitively, state dominance over regulation was also found to lead to a slightly reduced 
scope in pharmaceuticals available within the system.  State regulation appears to in some way 
inhibit the variety of therapeutics coming onto the country market. This may be a reflection 
of the more discriminatory approach to market entrees when the state is heavily invested in 
regulation—in particular when it takes a stance on what is “appropriate” or “inappropriate” 
for the national market on cost-effectiveness grounds.  Indeed state activity in establishing, 
adhering to, and standardizing norms of quality may exist under any system structure but 
when the state controls the relationship between payers, providers, and patients it may have 
greater opportunity to push the market towards products it deems to offer greater value-for-
money (the obvious example here is NICE in the UK). Also of interest is the finding that 
competition amongst non-state payers or providers does not translate into greater availability 
of therapeutics compared to state provision. Such findings may be of particular relevance to 
state dominated health systems given the tendency to decentralize and move towards a 
plurality in financing and lesser state involvement in the provision of health services in the 
name of greater efficiencies and/or budget constraints.  
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Overall the findings from this dissertation are interesting in view of the increasing pressure to 
legitimize public involvement in health care, which is being perceived to run counter to the 
present norm of free enterprise and the interests of rent-seeking private actors. This leads to 
democratic governments having to justify any state intervention using reasons of market 
failure or in the name of achieving distributive goals (Bohm 2013). The result is that state 
dominance in any sector is increasingly hard to justify—although it is arguably less difficult to 
justify in health care as a result of the numerous market failures that exist and the emotive 
nature of redistribution (or rather lack thereof) when it concerns health.  Yet even in health 
care there is increasing political pressure to devolve power in each of these areas—regulation, 
financing, and provision—as soon as budget concerns or perceived inefficiency arise (these 
being, of course, easily manipulated according to the ideological orientations of those in 
power and in the media). The findings of the work presented help debunk some of the 
underlying assumptions used to argue for or against devolvement and privatization. First, 
contrary to arguments made in phases of retrenchment, the privatization of health services 
does not necessarily lead to overall greater opportunity for competition amongst health 
commodities that will drive down prices.  According to the study results, the type of actor in 
control of provision had little or no influence on pharmaceutical prices. Second, contrary to 
arguments made in defence of state controlled financing (i.e. state as single payer) towards 
more pluralistic arrangements in the name of greater choice, efficiency, etc., such a move does 
not translate into a loss of monopsonistic leverage.  Indeed the findings suggest that very little 
changes in the pricing of pharmaceuticals occur when control over financing is less 
concentrated.    
FAIRNESS IN PRICING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF RELATIVE 
AFFORDABILITY AND ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS GLOBALLY  
An important aspect of price relatives calculated on the basis of indices lays in how they are 
or are not perceived to be “fair”.  Fairness here pertains for the most part to notions of 
vertical equity—the idea that people of different means should pay amounts based on their 
respective means.  In the case of pharmaceuticals the basic idea of vertical equity is that 
patients should be able to access the products they need at prices they can afford.  The 
normative economic perspective of this argument is effectively based on a value judgement: 
this is the direction that public policy ought to favour.  However, the differential pricing of 
pharmaceuticals according to means is also supported from the point of view of positive (or 
quasi-positive) economics.   It can, for example, be argued for on the grounds of static 
efficiency according to which social surplus—the sum of consumer surplus and producer 
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surplus—is maximized at a given point in time as a result of the greater number of consumers 
who are able to afford the product and the greater number of sales that ensue. In theory 
differential pricing allows for the expansion of sales to the full extent that the market can 
bear; in other words, demand can be fully exploited out to the equilibrium point, shown in 
traditional economics as the crossing of the supply and demand curve assuming no other 
changes. Differential pricing also helps achieve dynamic efficiency where sufficient earnings 
flow back into R&D to sustain innovation and improve production over the longer term, 
thereby helping to bring down average costs over the long-run. Of great importance to 
traditional IP-driven firms (which continues to characterize most large pharmaceutical 
companies), differential pricing can also potentially help enforce patents by lowering the 
chances of involuntary licensing.  If indeed the product is available in less wealthy areas at a 
price more suited to affordability then manufacturers will be less likely to want to 
manufacturer the product legally or illegally37.  
Despite the many arguments in favour of differential pricing of pharmaceuticals, it is unclear 
whether differential pricing strategies are what actually drive pharmaceutical prices across the 
world. In reality very little is known about what drives pharmaceutical prices in either their 
absolute or relative measure. Indeed one economist is reported to have recently dryly 
remarked in a closed-door session of pricing experts in the US that she could find no 
economic theory to explain how pharmaceutical companies price their products (Economist 
2015). This dissertation has sought to help fill this critical gap in the health economic and 
policy literature. 
Overall the work suggests that national income does not have consistent influence on prices 
across countries. Paper 1 first highlighted this inconsistency, showing that the prices of 
pharmaceuticals from 1999 through 2008 were not systematically related to per capita income 
or gross domestic product. Indeed it also pointed to a few major perversions in relative 
pricing across income categories: some middle-income countries pay more for 
pharmaceuticals than high-income countries and some pay less than low-income countries. 
For example prices in Mexico were high compared to the United States, prices in Morocco 
were high compared to France, and prices in Egypt and India (two middle-income countries) 
were found to be very low, even compared to prices in western Africa.  When this 
inconsistent relationship between price and per capita national income is examined in greater 
                                                 
37 The notion of illegality of such practices is of course debatable here given flexibilities provided 
under agreements such as TRIPS and TRIPS Plus.  This is consciously ignored by the Candidate here.   
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depth in Paper 3 it becomes clear that it is really in middle-income countries that the 
relationship is very weak. The relationship is stronger in high-income countries, although 
even there the influence of national income is trumped by other factors as discussed above.  
FAIRNESS IN PRICING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF RELATIVE 
CONTRIBUTION TO GLOBAL R&D 
The topic of relative pharmaceutical prices also brings with it the issue of fairness from the 
perspective of relative contribution to global R&D, the latter being considered a public good. 
This issue is largely unavoidable as soon as one compares prices across more than a few high-
income countries.  The basic notion is that of horizontal equity, interpreted in this context as 
the idea that populations with similar means should pay their “fair share” towards global 
public goods. This issue is often brought up in a provocative manner to stress the 
disproportionate burden of R&D costs falling on the American consumer (patients or payers) 
through the high prices of pharmaceuticals charged in the US compared to other countries. It 
is used in contexts such as political races where the vote of older, poorly covered, populations 
is sought, discussions over potential price controls in the US Congress (these are of course 
very “light touch” versions debated in the US compared to their European counterparts), and 
lobbying efforts by pharmaceutical companies attempting to achieve higher prices for their 
products in Europe. The international price comparisons conducted in the past have indeed 
been motivated by this question of “free riding” more than any other.   However, with the 
studies by Danzon and colleagues in 1999-2000 much light was shed on important technical 
limitations of the earlier comparisons and thus also brought into question their policy 
implications. The Danzon studies demonstrated the bias in limiting the sample to originator 
pharmaceuticals, prescription pharmaceuticals, those defined according only to US 
preferences, etc. The authors emphasized that the perception of price differences depends to 
a great extent on the framing of the comparison, in particular the choice of country used to 
determine consumption patterns to weight prices and appropriate sampling methods. The 
Danzon studies are however limited by the number of countries and the time frame they 
covered cross-sectionally (1992 and 1999 individually), precluding any insight into price 
evolution; they are also now relatively out-dated. The studies presented in this doctoral work 
bring the price comparison closer to modern times, include many more countries, and delve 
into greater depth into the question of whether the cost of pharmaceutical R&D really falls 
disproportionally on US consumers.  For example, the work presented in Paper 2 goes into 
depth on the effect of using different price indices on the overall interpretation of price 
relatives—so on the extent to which US pharmaceutical prices are really higher than those of 
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other high-income countries. The detected difference between US prices and those of the 
comparator high-income country are relatively small when looking at Laspeyres indices, which 
use the consumption pattern of the US to weight prices.  But the political relevance of this is 
questionable in that the calculations are biased toward pharmaceuticals that are important for 
US consumers not for those of the comparator country. Importantly Paper 2 introduces the 
use of Fisher indices in such comparisons (the geometric average of the Laspeyres and 
Paasche indices) which helps to remove this dependence on single country preferences and, in 
so doing, allows for greater policy relevance of the price comparison at the global level.  
On the whole, the price comparisons presented in Paper 2 do confirm that prices in the US 
tend to be higher than other countries when looking across the entire pharmaceutical 
markets. However, the results of Paper 4, which uses Fisher indices constructed for OECD 
countries, show that this result does not apply for all pharmaceutical products. Paper 4 shows 
that prices of pharmaceuticals for which patents have expired are not higher in the US than in 
other wealthy countries. Indeed prices of such products are higher in several other countries 
than in the US. By 2008 all OECD countries included in the analysis had prices higher than 
US prices except for Korea and Poland. In many ways this finding highlights the success of 
the US approach to price control through competition (here the support for faster and 
multiple market entry by competitors post patent expiry on the originator) rather than 
through more direct price controls as applied in, for example, many European countries. 
Regarding the question of unfairness in relative contribution to global R&D the cumulative 
findings of this work suggest that the answer must be nuanced. US prices for new products 
are higher than in other countries but as soon as the main patent protection is removed US 
prices fall below almost all wealthy countries. The critical question of course then becomes to 
what extent R&D resources come from different sectors within the market or derive 
exclusively from sales on originator products. This is a more complex issue than it may appear 
at first glance or what the industry lobbyists would lead one to believe. Firstly, the connection 
between price and R&D investment is at best tenuous and certainly indirect.  As Scherer and 
colleagues stress, pharmaceutical prices are a function of demand, not how much has been 
invested in producing the product. Also, much of the revenues from pharmaceutical sales go 
into other activities such as marketing or are (rather notoriously) passed on as profits rather 
than being absorbed back into novel research and development. So, in practice, the high 
prices of pharmaceuticals in the US do not necessarily translate to greater American 
contribution to global R&D. Stronger arguments for how the US may be contributing more 
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than other countries lie in the generally industry-friendly environment, tax breaks, public 
funding of basic and translational research, good universities preparing skilled personnel for 
industry, etc.  These factors are likely to contribute as much or more to the success of global 
R&D efforts than high US pharmaceutical prices by themselves.            
METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN CALCULATING AND 
COMPARING PRICE DIFFERENCES 
Previous studies of differences in the prices of pharmaceuticals amongst countries 
encountered two major obstacles: the available data were limited in scope and the data 
analysis faced the fundamental (and irresolvable) problem of quantifying the price differences 
with a single number despite heterogeneity in preferences amongst countries --the classic and 
long-standing problem of Index Number Theory. 
The most comprehensive previous cross-national comparisons of pharmaceutical prices, that 
of Danzon and colleagues, were limited to only a few countries (seven in Danzon and Chao 
2000 and eight in Danzon and Furukawa 2004) with only one study comparing prices over 
time (between 1992 and 1999 in Danzon and Furukawa). Danzon and Furukawa also 
demonstrated the need for a large, representative sample, one not limited to molecules 
matched by form, strength or usage, to obtain accurate measures of relative prices.  The first 
major methodological contribution of the work presented in this dissertation is very simply 
the scale and scope of the data utilized in constructing a representative picture of national 
pharmaceutical markets for use in Papers 1, 2, 3, and 4.  The work builds on previous cross-
national price analyses but includes a much more comprehensive set of data both in terms of 
the number of countries and the time frame covered. Together the papers in this dissertation 
explore pharmaceutical prices in over 30 countries over a period of 10 years.  Two different 
types of comparisons were made, one based on about 150 samples matched each year for all 
countries, and another based on a many more samples (~ 1000 to 2500) matched each year 
for any two countries being compared.  This dual approach allows for a rich description of 
the price differences amongst countries. The sample of 150 “global” pharmaceuticals allowed 
comparison of prices amongst all countries simultaneously, but the conclusions that could be 
reached were necessarily limited by the small fraction of individual markets that were 
represented. In contrast, the much larger bilaterally matched samples provided a much more 
complete representation of individual pharmaceutical markets, albeit at the cost of generality. 
Pharmaceuticals were defined by molecule name and indication, according to the third 
Anatomic Therapeutic Category (ATC 3) with all other characteristics allowed to vary (e.g. 
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brand name, pack-size, strength, form, etc.). The pharmaceutical prices analysed represented 
deflated manufacturer prices for pharmaceuticals sold in the retail market, except in the case 
of a few countries for which distribution pathways were not delineated between retail and 
other outlets.   Such an extensive data set made possible a high level of comprehensiveness 
and a lack of bias that was not achieved in previous studies. 
Comparing prices of similar goods in different places or at different times is a fundamental 
activity in economics and there is an extensive literature dealing with this question.  To make 
such comparisons, economists rely on indices that summarize into one number a vast amount 
of price and sales volume information.  The difficulty is that different indices can give widely 
diverging estimations of price differences, a much-discussed problem in economic theory that 
can be shown to have no absolute, objective solution.  The fundamental problem of 
quantifying price differences is particularly acute in the case of pharmaceuticals, the 
presentation, dosage, composition, availability and consumption of which vary widely 
amongst countries. The second methodological contribution of the work presented in this 
dissertation is to use simultaneously several indices that respond differently to consumption 
patterns and to the variations in the prices of individual products. A total of six indices were 
used, the Laspeyres and Paasche indices (L and P, calculated respectively by weighting prices 
according to the consumption patterns of the US and the comparator country) and their 
geometric mean, known as the Fisher index (F), all calculated for both the multilaterally and 
bilaterally matched samples: LM, LB, PM, PB, FM and FB.   
This pragmatic approach obviates many of the fundamental difficulties inherent with the use 
of a single index and provides a much deeper quantitative understanding of cross-national 
differences in pharmaceutical prices and their causes.  Using multiple indices provides useful 
information not only from the numerical values of these indices and their evolution over 
time, but also from their differences. As a result of the inverse relationship between usage and 
price, the Laspeyres indices (which use weights based on consumption in the base country) 
are always larger than the Paasche indices (which use own-weights based on consumption in 
the comparator country) and this effect is magnified when the sample size is larger such that 
LB > LM > PM > PB.  When the differences between the Laspeyres and Paasche indices are 
small, the corresponding Fisher indices (which are the geometric means of L and P) provide a 
robust quantification of price differences between countries and of the evolution of these 
differences over time.   
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In a number of cases, however, the data showed large differences between the values of 
Laspeyres and Paasche indices based on the same sample, or between the same index based 
on multilaterally or bilaterally matched samples, or in the relative evolution of these four 
indices over time.  In such cases, price differences amongst pharmaceuticals cannot be well 
captured by a single number, although the Fisher index still provides the best rough 
estimation of these differences. Importantly, large differences between indices served as flags 
indicating unusual features of the pharmaceutical market in individual countries during the 
period of the study. In several instances, a detailed examination of the indices led to a likely 
explanation in terms of differences or changes in pricing or consumption patterns between 
the comparator country and the US. Of particular interest in this context is the sensitivity of 
the respective indices to preferences in different countries (base country or comparator 
country), and how this helps explain the reasons for difference or relative differences between 
the index values. As Laspeyres indices weight prices according to US preferences, the increase 
from LM to LB must be particularly sensitive to the negative relation between price and 
volume in the US. Vice-versa because Paasche indices use own-weighting for the comparative 
country, the decrease from PM to PB must depend chiefly on the negative relationship between 
price and volume in that country. The by and large greater difference that was observed 
between LM and LB than between PM and PB therefore reflected in part the greater level of 
price elasticity in the free pricing US than in other countries. This result was apparently 
falsified in countries where price regulations are particularly effective at controlling the prices 
of highly used pharmaceuticals.  
Overall the methodological exploration performed in the context of Paper 2 helped provide a 
richer interpretation of the findings of Papers 1, 3 and 4.  
LIMITATIONS OF THE WORK 
Measuring price relatives across thousands of different products is not simple and requires 
making a number of trade-offs. To meaningfully compare prices amongst goods requires that 
the comparison be made on like-for-like products. In this sense price comparisons of 
pharmaceuticals should utilize samples that are defined according to clear criteria for 
matching products across countries and common units for measuring both price and volume.  
In reality however, the immense diversity in available pharmaceuticals makes defining a 
sample for comparison very challenging.   
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Pharmaceutical products sold throughout the world come in a plethora of different names, 
product type, levels of patent protection and license status, therapeutic purpose, packaging, 
formulations/combinations, and strengths. The level of intellectual property protection 
accorded to a pharmaceutical also varies from country to country as does time-on-market 
(which depends on launching time) both of which have important implications for price.  In 
addition, variation in societal preferences has led to different products and strengths being 
dispensed as well as to different approaches to dispensing (e.g. pack-splitting) which also 
impact unit price and makes standardization difficult. Currency conversion poses further 
challenges for international price comparison.  Whilst exchange rates are a common method 
of converting from one currency to another, as they are affected by often volatile financial 
market conditions, they too can fluctuate significantly. Purchasing power parities are meant to 
smooth out fluctuations in exchange rates since they are independent of financial market 
conditions, however, they are not actual transaction prices.  
Even within a single country, a given pharmaceutical can be available with a variety of names 
reflecting significant variation in licensing status and marketing strategies.  For example, it 
may have a known brand name, a generic brand name, or just a generic international non-
proprietary name. Also, the same molecule may be used in many different products and be 
sold in a variety of different forms. For example, a given molecule may come as a traditional 
tablet, a slow-release tablet, a capsule, a suppository, an injection, etc. Often the different 
forms are launched by the same manufacturer, but this is not always the case.  In addition, 
different technologies used to produce the different forms as well as the marketing strategies 
behind their sales can create significant variations in price amongst products with the same 
molecule.  Within a single country pharmaceutical prices can also vary by batch, and thus be 
affected by the scale of purchasing, pharmaceutical policies, and sales sector (e.g. retail, 
hospital, prescription, over-the-counter).  
Given this immense diversity in product mix both within and across countries, 
standardization across samples imposes poses significant challenges.  Whilst standard physical 
units such as grams, kilograms, litres, tablets, etc. as well as packs and prescriptions are 
common ways to measure volume of pharmaceuticals, these units are only useful if the 
pharmaceuticals being studied are uniform. Comparison involving pharmaceuticals with even 
slightly different characteristics requires other units for standardization. If volume is 
standardized in terms of grams of active ingredient, pharmaceuticals with low potency will 
comprise a larger fraction of the total than pharmaceuticals with higher potency.  The use of 
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tablets as the unit of standardized measurement also presents problems due to their differing 
strengths. The price per pill or “standard unit” is often used but leads to bias if the relation 
between unit price and volume is non-linear because of economies of scale in packaging or 
high-volume discounts. 
To allow meaningful comparisons despite these complications, the studies presented in this 
dissertation define pharmaceuticals using an aggregate measure of molecule and therapeutic 
category. This attempts to capture price differences amongst pharmaceuticals used for the 
same purpose. However, it also may capture differences in products that are actually used 
somewhat differently within their therapeutic category and that are therefore not real 
treatment alternatives. Use of the aggregate measure also means that there can exist much 
variation across other characteristics of the product such as strength, branding, packaging, 
time-on-local market, etc.  So whilst there is the desire to compare like-for-like products, the 
more narrowly the sample is defined to ensure similarity of products, the more the sample is 
restricted and thus less representative of the country’s pharmaceutical market as a whole.  
This can be seen as a significant limitation of the product definition used throughout this 
work.  
The inability to make exact like-for-like comparison across products is also worsened as the 
number of countries included in the comparison increases. Identifying products that match 
across country markets becomes increasingly difficult as more countries (especially those with 
very different underlying cultures and related preferences) are included in the comparison. As 
a result, the number of products included in the comparison decreases, thereby reducing the 
representativeness of the sample relative to the markets of the individual countries.  The 
studies presented here made all possible attempts to capture representative samples of 
pharmaceuticals in calculating relative prices. The sample size of the pharmaceutical products 
matched multilaterally across several markets is relatively small, however, weakening the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the simultaneous comparisons of several countries. 
Whilst efforts were made to put the sample sizes into perspective by mentioning the 
corresponding relative market volume sizes where appropriate, the limited number of 
pharmaceuticals captured in the comparisons is certainly a limitation.    
The aggregation of price also relies on the use of indices and, as discussed above, index 
number theory does not provide a single, straightforward formula for how to aggregate 
prices. Due to variation in preferences across spatial entities (here in terms of countries) that 
are used to weight prices there is no one perfect index. This is one of the obvious and 
  161 
 
 
 
 
unavoidable weaknesses of previous studies. This work presented here has strived to improve 
on this fundamental limitation by taking a practical approach and using simultaneously several 
price indices. Depending on the policy context, different indices are more appropriate (e.g. in 
terms of population preferences for weighting, time-frame, etc.).  Using an index weighted 
according to country preferences allows for the index to help draw findings for policy-making 
within that country context. This attribute of indices such as the Laspeyres index—which uses 
preferences of the base country--and Paasche index—which uses preferences of the 
comparator country—explains why these are the two most commonly used indices within 
countries, Laspeyres being by far the most popular (see Intro section for other useful 
attributes of these indices).  However, the predominance of one country in the calculation of 
these indices also limits them in terms of their ability to answer policy questions posed 
specifically at the global level. Averaging these two indices offers one way around this 
problem.  As the geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche indices, Fisher indices allow 
for a more neutral calculation of price relatives. This is the general approach taken in this 
work. However, in being a mix of two indices that use different consumption patterns to 
weight prices make Fisher indices also less easy to interpret.  
In sum, given the inherent differences in and between pharmaceutical markets, there is no 
single ideal measure of price differences. However, whilst none are perfect, certain methods 
are more appropriate than others. The methods chosen for the studies presented here 
purposefully tackle pharmaceutical price comparison from multiple angles in order to mitigate 
these problems and provide robust estimates for relative differences across as many products 
and countries as possible. Perhaps the most significant advantage of the multi-index approach 
taken in this work is that the differences in the values of the individual indices make 
particularly obvious the inherent limitation of the price comparisons, and they provide in 
some way a measure of that limitation. 
WHERE TO FROM HERE?  
One of the primary policy implications of this dissertation comes out of its findings on 
pharmaceutical pricing and the inability of current strategies to achieve acceptable levels of 
vertical equity. The international pharmaceutical industry can in principle choose either to be 
constrained by national or private payer price negotiations, or simply to refrain from entering 
national markets completely.  This industry could in principle be maximizing sales and 
improving efficiency by pricing their products differentially in different countries in line with 
affordability yet it doesn’t appear to be doing so. The findings presented in Papers 1 and 3 
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suggest that this is a particular concern for middle-income countries, some of which appear to 
pay higher prices than those offered in high-income countries and some of which seem to pay 
extremely low prices, even when compared to very poor countries.   Looking to the future, 
one might predict that despite strong economic growth in several middle-income countries, 
prices may not follow suit. Indeed pharmaceutical prices in richer middle-income countries 
may not evolve like those of high-income countries as a consequence of the numerous price-
confounding effects of demographics and social development identified in Paper 3. The call 
for fairer pricing in pharmaceuticals in middle-income countries requires a nuanced response. 
These countries should be expected to pay more as they grow richer, in line with notions of 
vertical equity, but their ability to adapt to the competitive global marketplace shouldn’t be 
assumed to be on par with that of high-income countries.  Conversely, normal market price 
movements are hindered by unpredictability, including the possibility of price regulation by 
new governments, thus decreasing the ability of middle-income countries to negotiate prices 
for pharmaceuticals over the longer-term. This can be disastrous in countries facing 
particularly difficult health challenges resulting from fast population growth, an aging 
population, or some particular epidemic or environment-related disease. Economies of scale 
are badly needed in negotiating price in such situations.  
Findings of this dissertation suggest that there are other attributes, particularly social and 
demographic, that harm the ability of countries to negotiate prices and to obtain the needed 
volumes of pharmaceuticals for the most disadvantaged and least healthy populations. As a 
consequence, a discriminate approach is necessary if the international community is 
committed to fairer pricing of pharmaceuticals.  The difficulty is to simultaneously improve 
the negotiating power of middle-income countries in price discussions whilst also ensuring 
their greater contribution relative to lesser developed countries, where normal market 
functioning is rare due to limited resources and insufficient infrastructure. Further, as stressed 
in Paper 1, to make any real headway on this issue the question of differential access to 
pharmaceuticals within countries must also be addressed.  Indeed levels of financial inequality 
and related inequity of access are sometimes worse in some regions of middle-income 
countries than anywhere in the world. If a uniform price existed for each country based on 
national income, some poorer populations would simply fall out of the market. This is now 
occurring in some middle-income countries where pharmaceuticals tend to be sold at uniform 
prices aimed at the richer parts of the population. Even when existing natural barriers 
between markets (e.g., the separation of rich urban classes from poor rural areas utilizing 
different dispensing outlets) make them potentially feasible, local pricing strategies in line with 
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affordability for the benefit of the poor are rarely enacted. This results partly from a number 
of perceived difficulties on the part of pharmaceutical companies and political expediency on 
the part of governments.   
Ultimately the difficulty is to incentivize pharmaceutical companies to sell their products into 
less certain, less familiar, or simply poorer markets.  One possibility is to use external, pooled 
price negotiations through international tendering.  This is being done, for example, to 
improve access to malaria, TB, and HIV pharmaceuticals in poor countries. Such external 
price negotiation can help pool resources to improve monopsonistic leverage and achieve 
prices more in line with affordability.  As has been demonstrated in the case of HIV 
pharmaceuticals, the use of even broad classification of countries by income category can do 
much to alleviate notions of unfairness amongst company negotiators. Crucially, pooled 
procurement initiatives have not tried to push prices down to levels of marginal costs. This 
balanced approach is a necessary condition to build a constructive dialogue that ultimately 
helps smooth the way for badly needed pharmaceuticals to be sold at reasonable prices in 
developing markets. From the viewpoint of pharmaceutical companies, external, pooled price 
negotiation can also help streamline registration processes, for example through WHO 
prequalification.   The resulting knock-on effects improve the perceived quality of the 
product and thereby increase uptake (Danzon, Mulcahy, Towse 2011) towards more statically 
efficient levels.  It can also help lower the financial risk to pharmaceutical companies by 
increasing the certainty of present and future sale volumes—an important factor for 
pharmaceuticals and a critical one for vaccines. The benefits of external, pooled price 
negotiation are numerous and, in addition to facilitating access in low-income countries, they 
may be an important option for overcoming the inherently poor negotiating position of 
countries with particular social or demographic weaknesses such as those identified in Paper 
3.  For these countries, internationally-supported institutions could be used to help improve 
the availability of the most needed pharmaceuticals at affordable prices.  
 Even when countries do not want to relinquish price negotiations to external parties, more 
can be done to encourage pharmaceutical companies to sell into under-served or negotiation-
disadvantaged markets. The key is to convince them that, if they sell at different price 
points—either across countries or within countries—they will be able to adequately segment 
the different markets and thereby maintain differential prices according to means (for 
example so that richer middle-income countries will not end up paying prices offered for 
“compassionate” purposes to poorer populations). In other words pharmaceutical companies 
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need to receive greater assurances that their efforts to improve access on the grounds of 
vertical equity will not erode what they perceive as horizontal equity. This is a difficult 
proposition for several reasons. A common worry is that, if companies make their products 
available to poorer countries at low prices in line with national affordability, richer countries 
that can afford to pay more may simply demand similar low prices. This is particularly the 
case if procurement is sufficiently centralized as in the case of a sole public payer or powerful 
large private payers which have strong bargaining power.  Such “external price referencing” 
pushes prices down toward marginal costs, a very unattractive situation for companies which 
may, as a result, choose to simply exit some markets or refrain from registering their product 
in some countries.  The use of external price referencing, which has expanded considerably 
over the past two decades as a means of price control (Espin et al., 2010), hinders differential 
pricing that could simultaneously improve efficiencies for companies and increase access for 
poorer populations.  Nonetheless it is widely practiced amongst countries claiming to be 
supportive of industry and of better global access to pharmaceuticals. Some countries are 
becoming increasingly aware of the negative implications that their own prices are being used 
as references (Ruggeri and Nolte 2013).  But the situation is unlikely to change unless there is 
more transparency in terms of which countries use external price referencing and its 
consequences in terms of shortages or disproportionate prices in lower income countries.  An 
approach of more publicized country stratification and an explicit process of naming-and-
shaming could be a starting point.  
More could also be done to address the physical hindrances to segmenting markets. For 
example, pharmaceutical companies could be helped in marketing their products to different 
populations in a way that would prevent leakage between poorer and richer markets.  This 
could be achieved through packaging differences to demarcate specific sales streams, coupled 
with quality stamps (e.g. WHO pre-approval stamps) to help uptake and prevent 
stigmatization of products intended for sales in poorer markets.  In addition steps could be 
taken to alleviate the fears of parallel importing—the re-importation of lower priced products 
from poorer into richer markets.  Whilst experts have found little evidence that this practice is 
very common across income categories, there does seem to be a stronger possible role for the 
international community in preventing such practice, particularly through better use of border 
controls. Finally, and perhaps most difficult to tackle, is the problem of mark-ups.  
Companies fear that if they are to make their products available at lower cost to under-served 
and poorer populations, the lack of infrastructure and regulation will allow middlemen to 
exploit price differences and effectively undermine the intended increase in availability and 
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affordability. This is a problem that needs to be solved by national agencies, possibly with 
support from the international community.      
In sum, improving universal access to pharmaceuticals by pricing them in line with national or 
regional affordability is an endeavour in which pharmaceutical companies, national 
governments and, in some instances, the international community should all play a role. 
Critically, there needs to be a more constructive two-way exchange between companies and 
governments.  Companies can offer pharmaceuticals at an affordable price in exchange for a 
better understanding on how they can optimally segment markets across and within-countries. 
In turn, governments are well placed to provide information regarding local income patterns 
and ensure that markets remain segmented. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SUPPORT MATERIAL FOR PAPER 1 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 Additional technical specifications 
 Additional study limitations 
 Description of sample representativeness 
 Additional results (30 additional sets of indices) 
Additional indices were constructed based on the following samples: 
1. Prices relative to United States based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, 
price per standard unit standard unit 
2. Prices relative to United States based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, 
price per standard unit 
3. Prices relative to United States based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, 
price per standard unit standard unit (graph) 
4. Prices relative to United States based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, 
price per standard unit (graph) 
5. Prices relative to United States based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, 
price per kilogram  
6. Prices relative to United States based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, 
price per kilogram 
7. Prices relative to discounted US prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per standard unit 
8. Prices relative to discounted US based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per standard unit 
9. Prices relative to discounted US prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per kilogram 
10. Prices relative to discounted US based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per kilogram 
11. Prices relative to United States based on multilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per standard unit 
12. Prices relative to United States based on multilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per standard unit 
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13. Prices relative to United States based on multilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per kilogram 
14. Prices relative to United States based on multilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per kilograms 
15. Prices relative to United Kingdom based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per standard unit 
16. Prices relative to UK based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, price per 
standard unit 
17. Prices relative to United Kingdom based on multilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per standard unit 
18. Prices relative to United Kingdom based on multilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per standard unit 
19. Prices relative to United Kingdom based on multilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per kilogram 
20. Prices relative to United Kingdom based on multilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per kilogram 
21. Prices relative to France based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, price 
per standard unit 
22. Prices relative to France based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, price 
per standard unit 
23. Prices relative to France based on multilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, price 
per standard unit 
24. Prices relative to France based on multilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, 
price per standard unit 
25. Prices relative to France based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, price 
per kilogram 
26. Prices relative to France based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, price 
per kilogram 
27. Prices relative to France based on multilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, price 
per kilogram 
28. Prices relative to France based on multilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, 
price per kilogram 
29. Prices relative to western Africa based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, 
price per standard unit  
30. Prices relative to western Africa based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per standard unit (table) 
31. Prices relative to western Africa based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, 
price per standard unit (graph) 
32. Prices relative to western Africa based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per standard unit (graph) 
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33. Prices relative to western Africa based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, 
price per kilogram  
Prices relative to western Africa based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per kilogram 
 Brief summary of findings from Additional results 
 
ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS  
As stated in the text, prices generally correspond to those placed on a product as it leaves the 
manufacturer, headed for the retail pharmacy. Exceptions were: 1. Indonesia and Malaysia, which 
included aggregate prices for medicines destined for retail, hospitals, and dispensing doctors and 2. 
The United States where prices were based on drugstore, food store and mail service distribution 
channels, excluding discounts. As stated in the text prices were based on year-on-year comparison. 
Multi-molecule products as well as those with very small sales volumes (the lowest 3 percent of 
sales) were excluded to avoid double counting, small number and entry (negative numbers) errors. 
The hypothesis behind Exhibit 5 was that drug prices could vary in line with other medical-related 
costs, even those that tend to be largely affected by within-country non-tradeables. Drug costs are 
not part of these hospital costs. Indeed the cost per beddday estimates “represent only the hotel 
component of hospital costs, i.e., excluding the cost of drugs and diagnostic tests but including costs 
such as personnel, capital and food costs.” (WHO Choice database, Unit cost estimates) 
ADDITIONAL STUDY LIMITATIONS 
We recognise that relative prices may be very sensitive to other elements of study design.  For 
example, although we do not present prices per kilogram, it is known that the unit of measurement 
will affect results7. Formulations with smaller amounts of active ingredient may require more doses 
to achieve the same therapeutic levels.  
We also recognise that the prices used in the estimation may not reflect those faced by the patient 
and related levels of access or issues surrounding parallel trade. Indeed, as has been suggested in 
previous studies, post-landing mark-ups can have a significant impact on eventual sale prices, 
especially in countries where there is poor infrastructure and governance.  In an examination of 
prices of 14 medicines for chronic diseases in 36 country settings, Gelders et al. found that taxes and 
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duties levied on medicines, as well as the mark-ups applied, frequently contributed more to 
pharmaceutical end price than manufacturer price. If fairer prices are ever to become a reality for 
patients these issues must be addressed on a national/regional level. Finally, this study also ignores 
the issues of parallel trade and external referencing, which could in theory cause differential pricing 
policies to fail.  The risk that low prices granted in low-income countries will lead richer countries to 
demand similar prices or acquire them through imports from low-price countries is sometimes 
argued to be the most important obstacle to attaining lower prices in lower-income countries.  
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DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE REPRESENTATIVENESS 
 
Market description by country (average across years) 
 % OB 
in 
sample 
% OB in 
overall 
database 
% any 
brand 
in 
sample 
% in 
overall 
database 
% 
OTC 
in 
sample 
% OTC 
in 
overall 
database 
BRAZIL  9% 9% 76% 74% 23% 26% 
EGYPT  9% 10% 78% 76%   
INDIA        
INDONESIA  9% 10% 81% 79% 12% 13% 
MALAYSIA  13% 14% 73% 71% 23% 25% 
MEXICO  12% 13% 76% 76% 12% 14% 
MOROCCO  16% 17% 85% 82%   
PHILIPPINES  10% 11% 70% 69% 10% 12% 
POLAND  14% 15% 69% 68% 23% 24% 
SOUTH 
AFRICA  
17% 17% 70% 68% 35% 38% 
THAILAND  6% 6% 79% 75%   
TUNISIA  20% 22% 79% 77%   
TURKEY  13% 14% 85% 82%   
WESTERN 
AFRICA  
14% 14% 65% 63%   
 
The table above describes the data sample described in Paper 1. Missing values in tables represent 
non-availability in the database. For countries for which full market structure data were available and 
products prices were available in all years, the average deviation of the sample composition from the 
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overall market (here the database as a whole) was -138, +2, and - 2 percentage points for capturing all 
branded products, original brands, and over the counter medications respectively. In other words, 
the make-up of our sample matched the broader market very closely. For products available in only 
5 out of 10 years the deviation was –9, 0, and 8 percentage points respectively.  
ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
Note that Exhibit 2 in Paper 1 in the text presents the price comparison based on samples bilaterally 
matched with the United States and weighted according to that country’s consumption patterns using 
Laspeyres indices. Exhibit 3 presents the price comparison based on samples bilaterally matched with the 
United States and weighted according to the foreign country’s consumption pattern using Paasche index 
calculation methods. In order to see how results differed by country sample, by base country, by unit of 
physical measurement, by type of index used, by matched sample, and by the effects of discounting, 
several additional analyses to those in Paper 1 were undertaken.  
  
                                                 
38 (+) signifies that the number of products in the sample that had this characteristic was greater than the 
number within the overall database with that characteristic. (-) signifies that there were fewer in the sample. 
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1. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.19 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 
BRAZIL  0.51 0.49 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.39 
EGYPT  0.13 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 
INDIA  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
INDONESIA  0.19 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.04 
MALAYSIA  0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.18 
MEXICO  0.26 0.26 0.74 0.71 0.64 0.62 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.65 
MOROCCO  0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.30 
PHILIPPINES  0.36 0.27 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.16 
POLAND  0.18 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.27 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.48 0.40 0.30 0.25 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.27 0.24 0.20 
THAILAND  0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 
TUNISIA  0.21 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 
TURKEY  1.09 0.69 0.44 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.25 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 
 
2. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.44 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.41 
BRAZIL  0.91 0.88 0.61 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.56 0.62 0.71 0.82 
EGYPT  0.63 0.55 0.46 0.38 0.30 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
INDIA  0.18 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 
INDONESIA  0.63 0.56 0.47 0.57 0.61 0.53 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.53 
MALAYSIA  0.52 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.47 
MEXICO  1.07 1.05 1.08 1.06 0.96 0.93 0.95 0.97 1.01 1.08 
MOROCCO  0.52 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.49 0.54 
PHILIPPINES  1.06 0.84 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.60 0.60 0.65 0.76 0.82 
POLAND  0.42 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.53 0.65 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.80 0.62 0.48 0.39 0.55 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.47 0.42 
THAILAND  0.45 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.38 0.46 0.48 
TUNISIA  0.47 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.40 0.46 
TURKEY  2.12 1.27 0.69 0.58 0.54 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.44 0.45 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.55 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.55 
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3. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     0.12 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.05 
BRAZIL  0.53 0.50 0.37 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.39 0.30 
EGYPT  0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.03 0.05 
INDIA  0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 
INDONESIA  0.23 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.07 
MALAYSIA  0.15 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 
MEXICO  0.66 0.61 0.69 0.64 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.49 0.27 
MOROCCO  0.22 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 
PHILIPPINES  0.47 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.17 
POLAND  0.18 0.18 0.21 0.20 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.28 0.02 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.15 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.20 0.08 
THAILAND  0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.06 
TUNISIA  0.20 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.10 
TURKEY  1.08 0.18 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.09 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.20 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 
 
4. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     0.50 0.54 0.54 0.80 0.74 0.48 0.50 
BRAZIL  1.39 1.48 0.63 0.51 0.52 0.53 1.37 0.84 2.95 1.43 
EGYPT  0.48 0.45 0.43 0.72 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 
INDIA  0.16 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.37 
INDONESIA  0.74 0.69 0.52 0.63 0.72 0.68 0.53 0.61 0.86 2.69 
MALAYSIA  0.48 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.60 
MEXICO  4.04 4.25 4.34 8.48 7.13 6.54 21.1 1.06 1.15 1.22 
MOROCCO  0.87 0.47 0.45 0.46 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.56 0.63 
PHILIPPINES  1.65 1.31 1.05 1.04 0.97 0.66 0.73 0.75 0.92 0.96 
POLAND  0.96 0.80 0.99 1.20 2.78 0.47 0.50 19.2 6.12 0.71 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.83 0.69 1.38 2.98 1.87 1.42 0.69 0.55 0.52 0.46 
THAILAND  0.46 0.44 0.48 0.58 0.64 0.55 0.53 0.66 3.50 0.86 
TUNISIA  0.54 0.43 2.95 0.44 0.49 0.52 0.44 0.43 0.63 5.32 
TURKEY  1.93 1.26 0.69 0.61 0.59 3.58 0.51 0.41 0.50 0.59 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.73 0.56 0.52 0.55 0.58 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.62 
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5. PRICES RELATIVE TO DISCOUNTED US PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.21 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 
BRAZIL  0.56 0.54 0.41 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.42 
EGYPT  0.14 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 
INDIA  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
INDONESIA  0.21 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.04 
MALAYSIA  0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.19 
MEXICO  0.29 0.28 0.81 0.77 0.70 0.67 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.70 
MOROCCO  0.28 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.33 
PHILIPPINES  0.39 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.17 0.17 
POLAND  0.20 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.30 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.52 0.43 0.33 0.27 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.22 
THAILAND  0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 
TUNISIA  0.22 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 
TURKEY  1.19 0.75 0.48 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.29 0.29 0.28 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 
 
6. PRICES RELATIVE TO DISCOUNTED US BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.45 
BRAZIL  0.99 0.96 0.66 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.60 0.68 0.78 0.89 
EGYPT  0.69 0.59 0.49 0.41 0.33 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
INDIA  0.20 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 
INDONESIA  0.68 0.61 0.52 0.62 0.67 0.58 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.57 
MALAYSIA  0.56 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.52 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.51 
MEXICO  1.17 1.14 1.17 1.15 1.04 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.10 1.18 
MOROCCO  0.56 0.49 0.44 0.44 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.59 
PHILIPPINES  1.15 0.91 0.79 0.74 0.74 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.82 0.89 
POLAND  0.46 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.58 0.70 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.87 0.68 0.53 0.42 0.60 0.64 0.58 0.52 0.51 0.46 
THAILAND  0.49 0.42 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.49 0.52 
TUNISIA  0.51 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.50 
TURKEY  2.31 1.39 0.75 0.64 0.59 0.50 0.47 0.41 0.48 0.49 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.60 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.60 
 
  
  183 
 
 
 
 
7. PRICES RELATIVE TO DISCOUNTED US PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     0.13 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.05 
BRAZIL  0.57 0.55 0.40 0.31 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.42 0.33 
EGYPT  0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.03 0.05 
INDIA  0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.04 
INDONESIA  0.25 0.18 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.10 0.08 
MALAYSIA  0.17 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 
MEXICO  0.72 0.67 0.76 0.70 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.53 0.29 
MOROCCO  0.24 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.04 
PHILIPPINES  0.51 0.34 0.36 0.32 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.23 0.25 0.19 
POLAND  0.20 0.20 0.23 0.21 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.31 0.02 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.16 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.22 0.08 
THAILAND  0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.07 
TUNISIA  0.22 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.10 
TURKEY  1.17 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.30 0.10 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.05 
 
8. PRICES RELATIVE TO DISCOUNTED US BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     0.54 0.59 0.59 0.87 0.81 0.52 0.55 
BRAZIL  1.51 1.61 0.69 0.55 0.56 0.58 1.49 0.91 3.21 1.56 
EGYPT  0.52 0.49 0.47 0.78 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.31 
INDIA  0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.40 
INDONESIA  0.80 0.75 0.56 0.68 0.78 0.74 0.58 0.66 0.93 2.92 
MALAYSIA  0.53 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.65 
MEXICO  4.39 4.62 4.72 9.22 7.75 7.10 22.94 1.15 1.25 1.33 
MOROCCO  0.95 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.58 0.61 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.68 
PHILIPPINES  1.79 1.42 1.14 1.13 1.06 0.72 0.79 0.81 1.00 1.05 
POLAND  1.05 0.87 1.08 1.31 3.02 0.51 0.55 20.87 6.65 0.77 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.90 0.75 1.50 3.24 2.03 1.54 0.75 0.60 0.57 0.50 
THAILAND  0.50 0.48 0.52 0.63 0.70 0.60 0.58 0.72 3.80 0.94 
TUNISIA  0.59 0.47 3.21 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.48 0.47 0.68 5.78 
TURKEY  2.09 1.37 0.75 0.66 0.64 3.89 0.56 0.45 0.54 0.64 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.79 0.61 0.56 0.59 0.63 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.67 
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9. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.34 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.26 0.27 
BRAZIL  0.38 0.36 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.47 
EGYPT  0.18 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.15 
FRANCE  0.32 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.46 
INDIA  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
INDONESIA  0.29 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.15 0.12 0.05 
MALAYSIA  0.19 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.13 
MEXICO  1.04 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.79 0.73 
MOROCCO  0.33 0.37 0.43 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.47 
PHILIPPINES  0.21 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.13 
POLAND  0.19 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.26 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.33 0.44 0.42 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.20 
THAILAND  0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04 
TUNISIA  0.28 0.30 0.32 0.34 0.25 0.23 0.23 
TURKEY  0.40 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.27 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.40 0.42 0.45 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.40 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.30 
 
10. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.41 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.37 
BRAZIL  0.40 0.37 0.38 0.46 0.55 0.61 0.78 
EGYPT  0.41 0.32 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.35 
FRANCE  0.39 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.54 0.66 
INDIA  0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 
INDONESIA  0.37 0.46 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.41 
MALAYSIA  0.41 0.42 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.46 
MEXICO  1.06 0.98 0.93 1.01 1.06 1.14 1.33 
MOROCCO  0.40 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.59 
PHILIPPINES  0.60 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.74 0.83 
POLAND  0.27 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.40 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.37 0.49 0.51 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.41 
THAILAND  0.29 0.32 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.46 0.52 
TUNISIA  0.33 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.41 0.49 
TURKEY  0.44 0.39 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.32 0.36 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.52 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.38 0.37 0.45 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.55 
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11. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.37 0.35 0.36 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.36 
BRAZIL  0.38 0.36 0.37 0.46 0.49 0.35 0.22 
EGYPT  0.21 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.06 
FRANCE  0.27 0.34 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.06 
INDIA  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 
INDONESIA  0.33 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.12 0.09 0.07 
MALAYSIA  0.22 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.15 0.13 0.06 
MEXICO  1.15 0.90 0.82 0.87 0.74 0.47 0.16 
MOROCCO  0.29 0.34 0.40 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.07 
PHILIPPINES  0.47 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.33 0.35 0.23 
POLAND  0.21 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.01 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.12 0.19 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.04 
THAILAND  0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
TUNISIA  0.28 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.12 
TURKEY  0.41 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.27 0.04 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.09 
 
12. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.45 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.46 0.48 
BRAZIL  0.42 0.42 0.43 0.53 0.64 0.69 0.87 
EGYPT  0.27 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.26 
FRANCE  0.42 0.51 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.64 0.77 
INDIA  0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.14 
INDONESIA  0.46 0.58 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.51 
MALAYSIA  0.35 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.42 0.65 
MEXICO  1.10 1.07 1.02 1.09 1.17 1.28 1.48 
MOROCCO  0.43 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.67 
PHILIPPINES  0.71 0.69 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.91 0.99 
POLAND  0.31 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.45 
SOUTH AFRICA  7.59 2.42 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.45 
THAILAND  0.30 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.53 0.58 
TUNISIA  0.36 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.59 
TURKEY  0.48 0.46 7.62 0.39 0.34 0.37 0.39 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.43 0.44 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.70 
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13. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 200
0 
2001 200
2 
200
3 
2004 200
5 
2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.41 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.37 
BRAZIL  0.70 0.74 0.60 0.47 0.46 0.41 0.58 0.66 0.66 0.81 
EGYPT  0.26 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.15 
INDIA  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
INDONESIA  0.33 0.33 0.30 0.32 0.39 0.32 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.21 
MALAYSIA  0.37 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.39 0.46 
MEXICO  0.94 1.08 1.37 1.34 1.17 0.98 1.09 1.10 1.03 1.14 
MOROCCO  0.47 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.74 
PHILIPPINES  1.02 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.81 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.87 
POLAND  0.17 0.17 0.23 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.56 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.84 0.80 0.66 0.47 0.60 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.41 0.38 
THAILAND  0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.22 
TUNISIA  0.40 0.40 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.46 
TURKEY  1.76 1.32 0.79 0.65 0.59 0.49 0.51 0.45 0.46 0.48 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.34 0.36 0.39 
 
14. PRICES RELATIVE TO UK BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, 
LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.91 0.83 0.85 0.92 0.90 0.87 0.92 
BRAZIL  1.77 1.76 1.33 1.02 0.95 0.89 1.20 1.40 1.52 1.92 
EGYPT  1.09 1.03 0.93 0.76 0.55 0.41 0.55 0.59 0.55 0.60 
INDIA  0.31 0.32 0.28 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.28 
INDONESIA  0.97 0.95 0.85 1.20 1.10 0.96 1.12 1.00 1.05 1.16 
MALAYSIA  0.76 0.82 0.94 0.86 0.77 0.77 0.88 0.89 0.90 1.05 
MEXICO  2.06 2.19 2.52 2.44 2.20 2.17 2.70 2.86 2.35 2.73 
MOROCCO  0.91 0.94 0.95 0.92 0.98 1.01 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.31 
PHILIPPINES  1.66 1.54 1.48 1.43 1.28 1.14 1.28 1.43 1.61 1.90 
POLAND  0.59 0.60 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.63 0.76 0.82 0.82 1.08 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.57 1.41 1.19 0.91 1.16 1.14 1.07 0.97 0.86 0.84 
THAILAND  0.71 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.68 0.77 0.87 1.00 1.16 
TUNISIA  0.79 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.74 0.85 0.89 0.94 1.15 
TURKEY  3.22 2.23 1.29 1.08 0.93 0.76 0.82 0.73 0.75 0.80 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.93 0.82 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.93 1.02 1.04 1.07 1.21 
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15. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.71 0.64 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.62 
BRAZIL  0.82 0.70 0.69 0.90 0.96 0.99 1.32 
EGYPT  0.35 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.30 
FRANCE  0.77 0.85 0.89 1.02 0.97 0.95 1.13 
INDIA  0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 
INDONESIA  0.40 0.41 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.25 
MALAYSIA  0.45 0.44 0.41 0.45 0.48 0.44 0.56 
MEXICO  2.21 1.79 1.56 1.77 1.70 1.60 1.77 
MOROCCO  0.76 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.79 0.85 1.09 
PHILIPPINES  0.97 0.86 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.79 1.00 
POLAND  0.35 0.35 0.34 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.72 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.79 0.96 0.87 0.86 0.77 0.67 0.67 
THAILAND  0.18 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.23 
TUNISIA  0.61 0.61 0.57 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.68 
TURKEY  0.92 0.72 0.64 0.65 0.56 0.59 0.60 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.70 0.74 0.76 0.73 0.63 0.64 0.78 
 
16. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.91 0.84 0.85 0.98 0.88 0.86 0.95 
BRAZIL  1.06 0.96 0.92 1.32 1.50 1.57 2.18 
EGYPT  0.76 0.57 0.48 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.77 
FRANCE  1.00 1.06 1.10 1.30 1.23 1.28 1.64 
INDIA  0.19 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.29 
INDONESIA  0.88 1.01 0.85 1.32 0.95 0.82 0.90 
MALAYSIA  0.69 0.67 0.60 0.73 0.77 0.76 0.92 
MEXICO  2.70 2.31 2.07 2.70 2.80 2.80 3.55 
MOROCCO  0.88 0.92 0.92 1.12 1.13 1.12 1.38 
PHILIPPINES  1.53 1.35 1.14 1.39 1.54 1.69 2.07 
POLAND  0.56 0.59 0.52 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.97 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.82 0.99 0.96 1.00 0.93 0.84 0.87 
THAILAND  0.54 0.62 0.61 0.78 0.86 0.98 1.15 
TUNISIA  0.72 0.75 0.74 0.87 0.88 0.95 1.23 
TURKEY  1.11 0.88 0.75 0.87 0.71 0.74 0.86 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.89 0.83 0.92 1.05 1.09 1.12 1.33 
 
  
  188 
 
 
 
 
17. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.76 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.61 0.61 0.70 
BRAZIL  0.80 0.69 0.68 0.87 0.94 0.68 0.93 
EGYPT  0.39 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.27 
FRANCE  0.55 0.64 0.87 1.00 0.95 0.95 1.11 
INDIA  0.13 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 
INDONESIA  0.46 0.48 0.39 0.36 0.29 0.26 0.33 
MALAYSIA  0.44 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.39 0.42 
MEXICO  2.05 1.36 1.04 1.11 1.00 0.82 0.86 
MOROCCO  0.66 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.73 0.93 
PHILIPPINES  1.03 0.88 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.84 1.08 
POLAND  0.38 0.38 0.36 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.77 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.40 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.49 0.45 0.48 
THAILAND  0.21 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21 
TUNISIA  0.58 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.75 
TURKEY  0.78 0.62 0.55 0.56 0.48 0.51 0.54 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.60 0.61 0.76 
 
18. PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.85 0.89 0.91 1.09 0.99 0.98 1.08 
BRAZIL  0.86 0.80 0.81 1.22 1.42 1.51 2.08 
EGYPT  0.54 0.46 0.41 0.60 0.62 0.59 0.65 
FRANCE  0.90 0.99 1.07 1.29 1.22 1.32 1.67 
INDIA  0.22 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.37 
INDONESIA  0.95 1.09 0.98 1.12 1.09 0.93 1.03 
MALAYSIA  0.75 0.70 0.63 0.78 0.81 0.81 1.22 
MEXICO  2.41 2.09 1.91 2.56 2.80 2.93 3.70 
MOROCCO  0.86 0.95 0.99 1.27 1.29 1.24 1.52 
PHILIPPINES  1.48 1.34 1.14 1.34 1.46 1.62 1.99 
POLAND  0.62 0.63 0.56 0.68 0.70 0.71 1.00 
SOUTH AFRICA  30.48 8.50 1.02 1.08 1.00 0.92 0.93 
THAILAND  0.61 0.70 0.69 0.85 0.94 1.03 1.22 
TUNISIA  0.70 0.81 0.82 1.02 1.01 1.08 1.35 
TURKEY  1.00 0.87 6.88 0.77 0.68 0.71 0.80 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.89 0.88 1.02 1.23 1.33 1.35 1.55 
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19. PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, 
PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA   0.77 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.47 
BRAZIL  0.61 0.52 0.42 0.36 0.36 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.58 
EGYPT  0.34 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.15 
INDIA  0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 
INDONESIA  0.39 0.36 0.43 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.22 
MALAYSIA  0.45 0.52 0.50 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.35 
MEXICO  1.83 2.09 2.03 1.56 1.40 1.48 1.56 1.46 1.39 
MOROCCO  0.75 0.76 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.65 0.71 0.70 
PHILIPPINES  1.04 1.04 1.01 0.80 0.68 0.67 0.72 0.75 0.75 
POLAND  0.35 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.39 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.46 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.11 0.90 0.64 0.73 0.65 0.60 0.53 0.45 0.36 
THAILAND  0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.22 
TUNISIA  0.58 0.57 0.56 0.49 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.37 
TURKEY  1.95 1.15 0.97 0.79 0.68 0.62 0.56 0.57 0.53 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.66 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.57 0.52 
 
20. PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, 
LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA   1.03 0.88 0.83 0.76 0.81 0.78 0.68 
BRAZIL  2.78 2.04 1.39 1.12 1.06 1.21 1.39 1.43 1.50 
EGYPT  1.30 1.08 0.87 0.57 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.41 
INDIA  0.58 0.48 0.42 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.27 
INDONESIA  1.53 1.46 1.48 1.60 1.26 1.16 1.13 0.97 1.06 
MALAYSIA  1.59 1.75 1.65 1.33 1.16 1.03 0.99 0.88 0.87 
MEXICO  3.05 3.29 3.16 2.39 2.29 2.18 2.23 2.05 1.97 
MOROCCO  1.12 1.06 1.04 1.01 0.97 0.97 1.01 0.98 0.98 
PHILIPPINES  4.13 3.65 3.25 2.62 2.17 2.02 1.80 1.80 1.84 
POLAND  1.01 1.02 1.01 0.93 0.87 0.93 1.02 0.99 1.08 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.94 1.58 1.20 1.43 1.40 1.17 1.04 0.87 0.70 
THAILAND  0.93 0.89 0.93 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.90 1.00 0.96 
TUNISIA  0.86 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.77 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.83 
TURKEY  6.02 3.14 2.47 1.82 1.33 1.11 0.93 0.86 0.81 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.89 1.13 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.02 
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21. PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.77 0.65 0.59 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.49 
BRAZIL  0.86 0.70 0.65 0.76 0.91 0.91 0.94 
EGYPT  0.40 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.24 
FRANCE  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
INDIA  0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
INDONESIA  0.41 0.40 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.20 
MALAYSIA  0.42 0.39 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.36 
MEXICO  2.07 1.59 1.41 1.47 1.59 1.50 1.41 
MOROCCO  0.87 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.82 
PHILIPPINES  0.88 0.72 0.61 0.65 0.75 0.79 0.80 
POLAND  0.38 0.37 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.49 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.82 0.94 0.81 0.70 0.69 0.59 0.47 
THAILAND  0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.19 
TUNISIA  0.70 0.65 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.62 
TURKEY  1.06 0.79 0.68 0.62 0.56 0.58 0.52 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.78 0.73 0.70 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.58 
 
22. PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.94 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.59 
BRAZIL  1.12 0.89 0.86 1.04 1.26 1.31 1.36 
EGYPT  0.66 0.48 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.44 0.35 
FRANCE  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
INDIA  0.26 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.19 
INDONESIA  0.97 1.23 0.88 0.98 0.89 0.85 0.71 
MALAYSIA  1.02 0.83 0.62 0.65 0.73 0.72 0.69 
MEXICO  2.88 2.26 1.91 2.07 2.23 2.14 2.03 
MOROCCO  0.93 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.99 0.94 0.85 
PHILIPPINES  1.65 1.34 1.14 1.15 1.32 1.56 1.39 
POLAND  0.71 0.67 0.60 0.64 0.68 0.66 0.71 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.03 1.15 1.09 0.98 0.92 0.78 0.61 
THAILAND  0.71 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.82 0.98 0.83 
TUNISIA  0.79 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.76 0.72 
TURKEY  1.14 0.89 0.77 0.74 0.64 0.65 0.56 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.89 0.79 0.90 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.79 
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23. PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, 
PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.93 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.56 
BRAZIL  1.65 1.24 0.89 0.70 0.64 0.74 0.74 0.83 0.84 
EGYPT  0.52 0.35 0.29 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.17 
INDIA  0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 
INDONESIA  0.49 0.42 0.49 0.46 0.39 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.24 
MALAYSIA  0.54 0.61 0.57 0.48 0.19 0.21 0.04 0.05 0.04 
MEXICO  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MOROCCO  0.81 0.79 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.73 
PHILIPPINES  1.40 1.25 1.19 0.92 0.77 0.69 0.64 0.73 0.66 
POLAND  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.86 0.75 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.58 0.48 0.41 0.33 
THAILAND  0.28 0.25 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.16 
TUNISIA  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.58 0.65 0.64 0.64 
TURKEY  0.93 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.40 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.75 0.80 0.81 0.75 0.68 0.58 0.20 0.53 0.40 
 
24. PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, 
LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    1.27 1.10 1.01 1.55 0.90 0.85 0.74 
BRAZIL  11.26 2.14 1.61 1.93 1.27 92.35 1.65 12.55 2.62 
EGYPT  1.19 1.08 0.89 0.61 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.51 0.46 
INDIA  0.68 0.62 1.41 0.47 0.44 0.44 1.11 1.31 2.97 
INDONESIA  3.83 2.58 2.74 3.29 2.64 2.25 2.10 1.66 1.83 
MALAYSIA  2.87 3.05 2.68 2.06 2.58 2.22 2.36 1.83 1.92 
MEXICO  5.65 5.66 5.04 3.50 5.08 4.06 3.48 2.60 2.71 
MOROCCO  1.43 1.37 1.27 1.17 1.12 1.13 1.15 1.10 1.07 
PHILIPPINES  7.36 6.59 6.16 4.52 3.79 4.19 5.22 4.16 5.20 
POLAND  1.62 1.33 1.26 1.13 1.00 1.08 47.89 220.5 1.23 
SOUTH AFRICA  3.62 3.90 8.40 3.75 2.19 1.66 1.39 1.30 1.10 
THAILAND  1.53 1.48 1.53 1.18 1.11 1.14 1.19 1.73 1.19 
TUNISIA  1.05 26.38 1.02 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.93 1.25 23.74 
TURKEY  24.91 11.89 9.44 6.62 9.75 3.74 2.44 1.89 2.14 
WESTERN AFRICA 1.14 1.11 1.10 1.01 1.10 1.07 1.06 1.04 0.96 
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25. PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  0.87 0.72 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.56 
BRAZIL  0.91 0.74 0.68 0.79 0.93 0.66 0.71 
EGYPT  0.49 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.20 
FRANCE  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
INDIA  0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 
INDONESIA  0.50 0.46 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.24 0.24 
MALAYSIA  0.48 0.44 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.35 0.34 
MEXICO  2.31 1.33 0.96 0.92 0.86 0.68 0.60 
MOROCCO  0.80 0.75 0.69 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.73 
PHILIPPINES  1.23 0.98 0.85 0.85 0.94 0.99 0.97 
POLAND  0.46 0.43 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.50 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.59 0.69 0.68 0.59 0.57 0.51 0.42 
THAILAND  0.23 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.12 
TUNISIA  0.74 0.68 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.67 0.66 
TURKEY  0.92 0.70 0.58 0.52 0.47 0.48 0.44 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.81 0.74 0.70 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.58 
 
26. PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA  1.19 1.04 0.91 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.68 
BRAZIL  1.32 1.07 0.90 1.10 1.37 1.38 1.50 
EGYPT  0.67 0.51 0.42 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.36 
FRANCE  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
INDIA  0.32 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.23 
INDONESIA  1.27 1.31 1.03 1.14 1.01 0.86 0.74 
MALAYSIA  0.98 0.84 0.69 0.69 0.76 0.73 0.75 
MEXICO  3.05 2.44 2.01 2.18 2.43 2.38 2.25 
MOROCCO  1.06 1.05 0.98 1.02 1.09 1.01 0.92 
PHILIPPINES  1.90 1.60 1.28 1.28 1.45 1.72 1.53 
POLAND  1.13 0.97 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.72 0.78 
SOUTH AFRICA  17.91 5.11 1.10 0.97 0.92 0.81 0.65 
THAILAND  0.79 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.91 0.91 0.83 
TUNISIA  0.90 0.89 0.80 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.78 
TURKEY  1.27 1.04 12.42 0.77 0.68 0.68 0.59 
WESTERN AFRICA 1.09 0.96 1.01 1.00 1.07 1.04 0.93 
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27. PRICES RELATIVE TO WESTERN AFRICA BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.88 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.43 0.41 0.44 
BRAZIL  1.12 1.19 0.89 0.72 0.67 0.56 0.70 0.87 0.94 1.08 
EGYPT  0.46 0.55 0.47 0.39 0.27 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.27 
INDIA  0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 
INDONESIA  0.37 0.44 0.41 0.48 0.44 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.31 0.33 
MALAYSIA  0.44 0.50 0.57 0.54 0.49 0.39 0.43 0.50 0.47 0.51 
MEXICO  1.71 2.07 2.20 2.18 1.78 1.48 1.69 1.88 1.83 1.91 
MOROCCO  0.74 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.87 0.79 0.86 0.93 0.95 1.03 
PHILIPPINES  1.14 1.26 1.19 1.15 0.94 0.79 0.88 0.99 1.04 1.11 
POLAND  0.31 0.34 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.57 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.36 1.24 0.97 0.71 0.89 0.72 0.68 0.64 0.52 0.45 
THAILAND  0.21 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.33 
TUNISIA  0.76 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.66 0.70 0.76 0.76 0.81 
TURKEY  2.30 1.97 1.13 0.96 0.81 0.62 0.62 0.56 0.60 0.60 
UNITED STATES 1.80 2.35 2.50 2.55 2.41 1.92 2.05 2.15 1.97 1.81 
 
28. PRICES RELATIVE TO WESTERN AFRICA BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    1.23 1.07 0.93 0.88 0.92 0.89 0.84 
BRAZIL  3.64 4.47 3.34 2.10 1.71 1.71 2.09 2.48 2.57 2.97 
EGYPT  0.82 1.20 1.17 0.72 0.50 0.39 0.47 0.51 0.48 0.48 
INDIA  0.58 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.79 0.74 0.83 
INDONESIA  2.01 2.34 2.07 2.48 2.47 2.08 1.90 2.38 1.86 1.83 
MALAYSIA  2.19 2.83 3.44 3.46 2.72 3.36 3.13 3.26 2.42 2.44 
MEXICO  3.99 5.01 5.63 5.66 4.19 6.33 4.80 5.32 4.17 4.61 
MOROCCO  1.00 1.93 1.15 1.12 1.15 1.18 1.29 1.36 1.39 1.49 
PHILIPPINES  5.78 8.30 8.30 8.94 6.91 6.48 5.81 6.91 6.88 7.71 
POLAND  1.03 1.63 1.52 2.06 1.95 2.01 1.96 2.17 2.11 2.53 
SOUTH AFRICA  2.80 3.26 2.94 2.51 3.03 2.71 2.27 1.90 1.61 1.40 
THAILAND  1.29 1.97 1.88 1.95 1.72 2.13 2.23 2.31 2.40 1.98 
TUNISIA  0.84 0.92 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.92 0.98 1.02 1.10 
TURKEY  22.45 21.6 13.9 13.5 10.0 6.45 5.11 4.18 3.31 3.41 
UNITED STATES 6.92 9.62 9.40 10.8 10.0 7.92 8.44 8.66 7.82 7.52 
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29. PRICES RELATIVE TO WESTERN AFRICA BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     0.99 0.83 0.72 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.64 
BRAZIL  1.51 1.77 1.32 1.01 0.79 0.69 0.83 0.94 0.98 1.07 
EGYPT  0.29 0.34 0.25 0.21 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.24 
UNITED STATES 1.37 1.79 1.93 1.83 1.73 1.75 1.88 1.89 1.75 1.62 
INDIA  0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15 
INDONESIA  0.54 0.59 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.27 0.24 
MALAYSIA  0.35 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.51 0.27 0.24 0.03 0.04 0.05 
MEXICO  1.71 2.16 2.32 2.25 1.83 1.49 1.63 1.81 1.11 1.66 
MOROCCO  0.81 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.91 0.97 0.99 1.06 
PHILIPPINES  1.57 1.73 1.52 1.14 0.97 0.78 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.86 
POLAND  0.23 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.52 0.56 0.68 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.05 1.19 0.95 0.75 0.93 0.85 0.75 0.67 0.48 0.40 
THAILAND  0.27 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.26 
TUNISIA  0.72 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.72 0.66 0.66 0.75 0.76 0.82 
TURKEY  2.06 1.76 1.10 0.84 0.59 0.40 0.44 0.42 0.47 0.47 
 
30. PRICES RELATIVE TO WESTERN AFRICA BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER KILOGRAM 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     1.40 3.79 1.03 3.28 1.24 1.01 16.8 
BRAZIL  4.37 60.6 4.01 3.36 2.51 2.49 31.3 3.62 8.68 8.19 
EGYPT  3.82 1.72 1.44 0.82 1.16 0.50 0.58 0.63 0.58 0.53 
UNITED STATES 5.10 16.7 16.7 22.3 25.0 15.6 131. 19.8 53.8 21.5 
INDIA  1.26 1.64 1.78 2.53 1.82 1.63 1.74 1.72 1.58 2.51 
INDONESIA  7.27 8.70 7.73 10.3 10.4 8.39 7.38 7.02 4.11 4.69 
MALAYSIA  6.28 9.55 12.2 13.4 10.6 16.2 14.7 17.6 11.5 10.5 
MEXICO  13.28 16.69 18.79 19.55 13.01 30.39 19.83 16.80 7.81 9.35 
MOROCCO  1.07 1.44 1.34 1.14 1.15 1.17 1.31 1.34 1.41 1.48 
PHILIPPINES  31.92 37.54 39.73 45.19 35.83 31.17 29.40 36.89 23.20 30.34 
POLAND  4.00 6.80 4.94 4.72 16.34 5.32 2.95 2.16 4.84 1.95 
SOUTH AFRICA  6.26 7.65 14.13 68.20 23.29 7.33 4.32 2.61 2.05 1.74 
THAILAND  3.05 3.17 4.29 7.34 2.78 2.54 2.53 2.65 2.02 2.27 
TUNISIA  0.88 0.96 3.87 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.91 0.95 1.04 7.32 
TURKEY  130.0 115.4 68.19 70.31 52.84 34.18 24.59 20.76 12.73 13.43 
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BRIEF SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
The publication of Paper 1 limited the number of countries that could be presented together in 
the price comparison. In these additional comparisons presented here all MICs for which data 
was available were included.   
In order to make the MIC price comparisons fairer, numerous additional indices were constructed 
using alternative pharmaceutical sampling methods, base countries, and a greater number of MIC. 
On the whole, expanding the selection of countries to include all of the middle-income countries 
(14 countries) for which data was available did not substantially alter findings (the Health Affairs 
papers shows results for only a short selection of countries).  Overall the findings suggest that 
many MIC have prices below those attained in LIC. Beyond Egypt and India which were 
mentioned the published version of Paper 1, US-based results suggest that Algeria and Tunisia 
were consistently far below those in western Africa over several years of the study, irrespective of 
the consumption patterns or sample used. This is further highlighted in the additional indices 
using western Africa as the base country and maximizing the sample size through bilaterally-
matched sampling.  Indeed when using consumption patterns from western Africa itself, Egypt, 
India, and Tunisia have prices below western Africa in over half of the study period.  When 
focussing on a sample weighted according to the comparator MIC, results estimate that in many 
of the MIC countries had prices inferior to those in western Africa over the decade. Overall these 
findings reinforce the message that the relative price of pharmaceuticals in lesser developed parts 
of the world is not consistently related to relative income.  
When comparing US to MIC, generally (when matching molecule-indications across all MIC--
rather than bilaterally with the US as in Paper 1) results did not change significantly.  Except for 
the case of Mexico (and Turkey during the banking and currency crisis of 1999-2000) all MICs 
had prices less than half of US prices throughout the study period.   
Irrespective of the sample of comparison prices in MIC were consistently below UK prices when using 
UK as the base country (although much closer to UK prices than US prices), with the exceptions of 
Mexico and Philippines. When looking exclusively at prices calculated using UK-specific consumption 
patterns, a number of MIC had prices higher than UK prices in several years. These included South 
Africa, Tunisia, Brazil, Indonesia, and even western Africa in some years. Broadly speaking, 
pharmaceuticals the UK had prices similar to several lesser (relative to the UK) developed countries.  
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When focussing on MIC prices relative to France findings were similar, with a few more MIC, such as 
Poland and Morocco, having prices above French prices over several years when basing prices on 
French consumption patterns. 
Overall the effect of discounting US prices has a minor effect on price relatives.  The overall average 
effect on individual index values across Paasche indices was 0.02 whilst for the Laspeyres indices it was 
0.04. 
Technical notes: Paper 1 referred to western Africa using IMS categorization of “French West Africa”, 
a 10-country aggregation made by IMS Health -- covering the formal pharmaceutical market in Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, and 
Togo.  This is the sole source of pharmaceutical prices in low-income countries available and, as such, 
was used here to represent low-income countries generally.  
By definition index calculations based on multilaterally-matched samples were limited to the years for 
which data were available from all of the countries included in the comparison. In the case the 
multilateral comparisons the years were limited by France (missing data for 1999) and Algeria (missing 
data for 1999-2001). As a result the MIC multilateral comparisons were limited to 2002 through 2008.   
It should be noted that—when it came to analysis of findings--more weight was given to calculations 
based on prices per standard unit than prices per kilogram. Comparison to price indices based on price 
per kilogram unit unfortunately did not provide a meaningful comparison due to data errors across 
many countries in the years 2003-2005.  Outliers were also estimated for several countries in 2007. 
After many discussions with IMS about data entries in this form, it was made clear that indeed they had 
some errors within their database. Results from samples based on price per kilogram are therefore 
reflected upon very little in this appendix and not at all in Paper 1.  
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ASSUMED PRICE EVOLUTION THROUGH PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION 
IMS collects pharmaceutical price data a different points in the distribution chain, depending 
on practicalities within each country.  Prices are then brought into line (converted to 
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retail level) using a set of assumptions.  These assumptions are 
outlined for each country here-below. 
 
 Manufacturer  Wholesaler Retailer 
Algeria    100 122 146 
Australia  100 108 134 
Austria  100 118 251 
Belgium  100 115 177 
Brazil       100 118 160 
Canada       100 105 139 
Egypt        100 116 142 
Finland      100 104 154 
France       100 111 168 
Germany      100 109 163 
Greece       100 108 146 
India        100 109 130 
Indonesia* 100 120 154 
Italy        100 110 167 
Japan        100 109 121 
Korea        100 104 113 
Malaysia* 100 115 153 
Mexico       100 118 142 
Morocco      100 111 159 
Netherlands  100 115 160 
Philippines  100 110 119 
Poland       100 110 137 
Portugal     100 109 140 
South Africa 100 111 140 
Saudi Arabia    100 112 129 
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Singapore* 100 115 153 
Spain        100 108 156 
Sweden   100 103 123 
Switzerland  100 123 186 
Taiwan       100 105 124 
Thailand     100 116 134 
Tunisia      100 109 149 
Turkey       100 108 144 
United Kingdom 100 114 152 
United States 100 105 139 
western Africa   100 139 184 
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APPENDIX 2 
SUPPORT MATERIAL FOR PAPER 2 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Sample descriptions 
1. Unique ATCMOLs in each sample bilaterally-matched with US by year 
2. Proportion of total country market captured (by SU volume) in multilaterally-matched 
sample 
3. Description of sample bilaterally-matched with US (averages across all years) 
4. Unique ATCMOLs in sample multilaterally-matched across all HIC by year 
5. Proportion of total country market captured (by SU volume) in bilaterally-matched samples 
6. Proportion of bilaterally-matched sample (by SU volume) that is captured in multilaterally-
matched sample 
 
 Rebased indices for analysis of trend over time 
7. LM 2001base: Prices relative to discounted United States prices based on multilaterally-matched 
sample, Laspeyres price indices, price per standard unit (US=1) 
8. PM 2001base: Prices relative to discounted United States prices based on multilaterally-matched 
sample, Paasche price indices, price per standard unit (US=1) 
9. LB 2001base: Prices relative to discounted US based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres 
price indices, price per standard unit (US=1) 
10. PB 2001base: Prices relative to discounted US prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, 
Paasche price indices, price per standard unit (US=1) 
 
 Sensitivity analysis 
11. LM DISC: Prices relative to discounted United States prices based on multilaterally-matched 
sample, Laspeyres price indices, price per standard unit (US=1) 
12. PM DISC: Prices relative to discounted United States prices based on multilaterally-matched 
sample, Paasche price indices, price per standard unit (US=1) 
13. LB DISC: Prices relative to discounted US based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per standard unit (US=1) 
14. PB DISC: Prices relative to discounted US prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche 
price indices, price per standard unit (US=1) 
15. LM UK: Prices relative to United Kingdom based on multilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres 
price indices, price per standard unit 
16. PM UK: Prices relative to United Kingdom based on multilaterally-matched sample, Paasche 
price indices, price per standard unit 
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17. LB UK: Prices relative to United Kingdom based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres 
price indices, price per standard unit 
18. PB UK: Prices relative to United Kingdom based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per standard unit 
19. LM FR: Prices relative to France based on multilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price 
indices, price per standard unit 
20. PM FR: Prices relative to France based on multilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price 
indices, price per standard unit 
21. LB FR: Prices relative to France based on bilaterally-matched sample, Laspeyres price indices, 
price per standard unit 
22. PB FR: Prices relative to France based on bilaterally-matched sample, Paasche price indices, 
price per standard unit 
 
 
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
1. UNIQUE ATCMOLS PER BILATERALLY-MATCHED (WITH US) SAMPLE PER 
YEAR 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1382 1401 1427 1477 1482 1495 1452 1448 1477 1471 
AUSTRIA  1171 1192 1187 1195 1204 1210 1207 1212 1217 1194 
BELGIUM  1120 1133 1146 1149 1139 1138 1083 1090 1074 1038 
CANADA  1395 1374 1430 1411 1406 1400 1460 1502 1526 1513 
FINLAND  760 763 767 772 773 777 785 788 785 777 
FRANCE   1395 1378 1373 1371 1378 1384 1374 1372 1359 
GERMANY  2398 2438 2548 2541 2521 2420 2404 2384 2397 2390 
GREECE  972 981 1006 1058 1049 1059 1074 1081 1079 1092 
ITALY  1321 1348 1336 1354 1326 1313 1296 1272 1263 1263 
JAPAN  1701 1697 1705 1709 1690 1681 1668 1681 1670 1669 
KOREA  995 1313 1314 1464 1427 1464 1442 1446 1459 1427 
NETHERLANDS  962 981 985 967 944 952 960 953 960 953 
PORTUGAL  903 927 933 937 942 967 915 913 906 899 
SAUDI ARABIA 792 802 825 822 804 791 750 747 751 745 
SINGAPORE  1101 1102 1064 1058 1029 1077 1085 1094 1057 1030 
SPAIN  1165 1196 1190 1186 1170 1174 1170 1139 1133 1132 
SWEDEN  769 796 827 867 867 876 885 899 909 910 
SWITZERLAND  1923 1917 1902 1894 1846 1789 1769 1724 1718 1676 
TAIWAN  846 863 880 882 896 912 921 918 918 891 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1309 1323 1346 1335 1341 1343 1337 1331 1323 1294 
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2. PROPORTION OF TOTAL COUNTRY MARKET CAPTURED (BY SU VOLUME) IN 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  36 36 36 36 35 35 33 35 34 
AUSTRIA  28 27 29 30 30 30 31 34 34 
BELGIUM  31 31 33 33 33 33 34 37 37 
CANADA  39 38 38 38 38 37 38 38 37 
FINLAND  43 44 45 45 45 44 44 45 44 
FRANCE  26 25 26 27 26 27 29 31 32 
GERMANY  27 27 29 30 31 30 31 35 36 
GREECE  28 27 28 28 28 27 28 31 33 
ITALY  31 30 30 30 29 30 31 34 35 
JAPAN  18 16 15 16 17 16 16 17 16 
KOREA  22 23 21 20 21 20 20 21 21 
NETHERLANDS  37 38 40 40 41 40 41 43 42 
PORTUGAL  33 32 33 34 33 34 35 37 38 
SAUDI ARABIA  32 31 34 34 32 33 33 38 38 
SINGAPORE  34 33 34 35 36 34 36 36 36 
SPAIN  31 30 32 33 32 33 34 37 38 
SWEDEN  43 39 39 39 39 39 39 42 41 
SWITZERLAND  23 23 25 25 25 26 27 31 31 
TAIWAN  51 50 47 42 43 41 40 42 40 
UNITED KINGDOM 33 33 34 34 35 35 36 39 38 
UNITED STATES 34 34 34 34 34 36 38 39 39 
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3. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE BILATERALLY-MATCHED WITH US (AVERAGES 
ACROSS ALL YEARS) 
 % originator brand % any brand % OTC 
AUSTRALIA  13 54 47 
AUSTRIA  25 71 15 
BELGIUM  27 72 22 
CANADA  11 53 11 
FINLAND  29 73 11 
FRANCE  14 50 25 
GERMANY  19 60 28 
GREECE  20 87 0 
ITALY  14 66 15 
JAPAN  8 66 7 
KOREA  5 68 28 
NETHERLANDS  33 55 9 
PORTUGAL  18 58 6 
SAUDI ARABIA 23 86 0 
SINGAPORE  19 71 24 
SPAIN  15 57 11 
SWEDEN  37 72 8 
SWITZERLAND  18 62 39 
TAIWAN  8 73 0 
UNITED KINGDOM 19 57 25 
UNITED STATES 10 47 34 
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4. UNIQUE ATCMOLS IN SAMPLE MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED ACROSS ALL 
HIC 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
140 142 148 147 146 141 144 158 151 
 
5. PROPORTION OF TOTAL COUNTRY MARKET (BY SU VOLUME) CAPTURED IN 
BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLES 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
AUSTRIA  71 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 74 74 
BELGIUM  80 80 80 80 81 81 81 80 82 82 
CANADA  97 97 97 97 97 98 98 95 95 95 
FINLAND  85 85 85 85 84 85 85 86 86 87 
FRANCE   62 63 63 62 63 65 68 70 71 
GERMANY  79 80 80 79 79 80 80 76 79 80 
GREECE  98 98 98 98 98 98 97 97 98 98 
ITALY  67 68 69 70 70 72 72 73 75 77 
JAPAN  72 72 72 72 71 70 69 67 66 65 
KOREA  99 99 98 98 98 97 97 97 97 97 
NETHERLANDS  92 93 93 93 93 93 93 92 92 92 
PORTUGAL  88 88 89 90 90 91 92 92 93 94 
SAUDI ARABIA  92 92 91 90 87 86 86 80 82 81 
SINGAPORE  81 81 85 85 82 82 81 83 83 84 
SPAIN  75 76 75 75 75 77 77 76 78 78 
SWEDEN  94 94 94 93 93 93 93 92 92 92 
SWITZERLAND 79 79 79 78 78 78 78 75 78 78 
TAIWAN 80 81 83 82 82 81 82 81 82 82 
UNITED 
KINGDOM  
86 86 86 87 87 87 87 86 85 85 
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6. PROPORTION OF BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE (BY SU VOLUME) THAT 
IS CAPTURED IN MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  62 61 62 61 61 62 62 63 63 
AUSTRIA  47 46 49 49 48 48 57 56 56 
BELGIUM  61 58 61 61 60 60 63 63 60 
CANADA  29 27 23 22 21 21 22 22 20 
FINLAND  57 58 61 61 61 62 67 68 68 
FRANCE  50 48 50 49 46 46 51 51 51 
GERMANY  57 57 57 55 50 47 52 50 48 
GREECE  42 41 43 44 45 45 50 49 52 
ITALY  45 43 43 42 40 41 52 52 52 
JAPAN  14 12 12 13 14 14 16 17 18 
KOREA  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
NETHERLANDS  80 80 81 80 80 79 80 76 74 
PORTUGAL  82 82 82 81 82 81 83 83 84 
SAUDI ARABIA 22 25 30 30 28 28 34 37 39 
SINGAPORE 50 48 50 53 52 50 50 49 50 
SPAIN  41 40 43 43 42 43 48 50 51 
SWEDEN 37 37 40 42 43 44 48 50 51 
SWITZERLAND  54 52 52 45 45 45 53 53 52 
TAIWAN  60 58 54 48 50 46 47 47 44 
UNITED KINGDOM 37 37 38 38 39 39 43 46 45 
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7. LM 2001BASE: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1.16 1.00 1.01 1.23 1.36 1.42 1.40 1.71 1.94 
AUSTRIA  1.09 1.00 1.02 1.16 1.23 1.20 1.26 1.49 1.72 
BELGIUM  1.14 1.00 1.07 1.23 1.31 1.22 1.20 1.40 1.61 
CANADA  1.08 1.00 0.97 1.07 1.18 1.26 1.38 1.64 1.80 
FINLAND  1.08 1.00 1.03 1.18 1.24 1.18 1.16 1.45 1.67 
FRANCE  1.08 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.34 1.30 1.29 1.52 1.72 
GERMANY  1.06 1.00 1.01 1.18 1.30 1.27 1.30 1.50 1.70 
GREECE  1.07 1.00 1.03 1.28 1.48 1.40 1.52 1.91 2.27 
ITALY  1.07 1.00 1.01 1.14 1.20 1.13 1.14 1.33 1.47 
JAPAN  5.11 1.00 0.98 1.06 1.13 1.13 1.07 1.24 1.54 
KOREA  1.19 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.05 1.19 1.41 1.65 1.63 
NETHERLANDS  1.11 1.00 0.99 1.13 1.13 1.06 1.08 1.29 1.37 
PORTUGAL  1.10 1.00 0.99 1.13 1.22 1.19 1.21 1.39 1.61 
SAUDI ARABIA  1.04 1.00 0.91 0.82 0.77 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.76 
SINGAPORE  1.27 1.00 0.97 1.02 0.99 0.98 1.08 1.28 1.46 
SPAIN  1.09 1.00 1.02 1.22 1.27 1.23 1.31 1.66 1.90 
SWEDEN  1.19 1.00 1.03 1.12 1.16 1.14 1.12 1.37 1.53 
SWITZERLAND  1.05 1.00 1.05 1.19 1.27 1.21 1.11 1.18 1.40 
TAIWAN  1.10 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.96 1.04 1.11 1.20 
UNITED KINGDOM  1.11 1.00 0.98 1.05 1.12 0.97 1.01 1.17 1.14 
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8. PM 2001BASE: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1.15 1.00 1.02 1.27 1.42 1.44 1.38 1.57 1.65 
AUSTRIA  1.10 1.00 1.01 1.20 1.25 1.19 1.23 1.09 1.46 
BELGIUM  1.16 1.00 1.04 1.21 1.31 1.22 1.21 1.43 1.75 
CANADA  2.04 1.00 1.62 2.01 2.21 2.27 2.55 2.78 2.47 
FINLAND  1.07 1.00 1.03 1.18 1.23 1.15 1.07 1.26 1.37 
FRANCE  1.06 1.00 0.99 1.20 1.34 1.33 1.33 1.36 1.55 
GERMANY  1.01 1.00 1.00 1.17 1.27 1.18 1.28 1.02 1.47 
GREECE  1.02 1.00 1.05 1.25 1.43 1.48 1.57 1.48 2.07 
ITALY  1.09 1.00 1.02 1.14 1.21 1.15 1.17 1.01 1.15 
JAPAN  1.06 1.00 1.04 1.11 1.09 1.07 1.05 1.15 1.55 
KOREA  1.03 1.00 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.44 1.71 2.05 1.41 
NETHERLANDS  1.09 1.00 0.99 1.13 1.10 1.03 1.05 1.28 1.30 
PORTUGAL  1.07 1.00 0.96 1.10 1.20 1.17 1.17 1.20 1.52 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.97 1.00 0.93 0.83 0.77 0.80 0.90 0.50 0.58 
SINGAPORE  1.01 1.00 0.91 0.86 0.69 0.82 0.84 1.22 1.14 
SPAIN  1.10 1.00 0.98 1.17 1.28 1.25 1.31 1.25 1.53 
SWEDEN  1.21 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.11 1.29 1.43 
SWITZERLAND  1.00 1.00 1.08 1.23 1.33 1.25 1.13 0.87 1.27 
TAIWAN  0.98 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.11 1.30 1.22 1.14 1.26 
UNITED KINGDOM  1.11 1.00 1.02 1.11 1.17 1.00 0.97 1.10 1.02 
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9. LB 2001BASE: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON 
BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1.55 1.26 1.00 1.00 1.17 1.33 2.15 1.88 2.04 2.06 
AUSTRIA  1.86 1.18 1.00 0.99 0.81 0.85 0.74 0.77 1.03 1.40 
BELGIUM  1.39 1.09 1.00 1.03 1.24 1.30 1.31 1.34 1.68 2.37 
CANADA  1.18 1.09 1.00 1.82 9.65 7.80 2.57 2.70 2.28 2.19 
FINLAND  1.30 1.07 1.00 1.06 1.26 1.34 1.30 1.27 1.61 2.19 
FRANCE   1.11 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.42 1.58 
GERMANY  1.63 1.17 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.13 1.14 1.08 1.29 2.06 
GREECE  1.28 1.01 1.00 1.08 1.32 1.47 1.47 1.53 1.78 1.95 
ITALY  1.27 1.08 1.00 0.99 1.12 1.14 1.07 1.14 1.52 2.14 
JAPAN  2.35 2.39 1.00 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.88 0.81 0.92 1.26 
KOREA  1.38 1.18 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.05 1.18 1.29 1.40 1.32 
NETHERLANDS  1.36 1.11 1.00 1.04 1.21 1.27 1.18 1.16 1.31 1.39 
PORTUGAL  1.38 1.09 1.00 1.02 1.15 1.24 1.19 1.16 1.24 1.35 
SAUDI ARABIA  1.14 1.02 1.00 0.97 0.86 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.76 
SINGAPORE  1.17 1.13 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.92 0.81 0.86 0.92 1.02 
SPAIN  1.33 1.09 1.00 1.04 1.20 1.25 1.21 1.22 1.41 1.56 
SWEDEN  1.36 1.18 1.00 1.07 1.23 1.30 1.30 1.37 1.79 2.49 
SWITZERLAND  1.30 1.02 1.00 1.06 1.19 1.25 1.07 0.99 1.04 1.17 
TAIWAN  1.05 1.11 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.98 1.03 
UNITED KINGDOM  1.39 1.14 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.13 1.03 1.01 1.13 1.08 
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10. PB 2001BASE: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON 
BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES (US=1) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1.29 1.08 1.00 0.92 1.09 1.26 1.26 1.18 1.23 1.20 
AUSTRIA  1.12 0.77 1.00 1.03 1.23 1.32 1.27 1.23 1.15 1.31 
BELGIUM  1.08 0.94 1.00 1.03 1.23 1.36 1.31 1.25 0.76 1.41 
CANADA  0.85 0.96 1.00 1.29 1.48 1.64 1.72 1.79 1.59 1.62 
FINLAND  0.79 0.76 1.00 1.09 1.23 1.41 1.46 1.35 1.48 1.59 
FRANCE   0.72 1.00 0.99 1.14 1.33 1.35 1.33 1.38 1.45 
GERMANY  0.83 0.67 1.00 0.94 1.20 1.37 1.34 1.35 1.27 1.55 
GREECE  0.84 0.76 1.00 1.07 1.30 1.56 1.66 1.72 1.78 2.09 
ITALY  1.16 1.03 1.00 1.01 1.14 1.20 1.14 1.11 1.04 1.07 
JAPAN  0.97 1.04 1.00 0.94 1.01 1.08 1.05 0.97 0.94 1.02 
KOREA  0.95 0.72 1.00 1.21 1.31 1.48 1.78 2.04 2.32 1.74 
NETHERLANDS  1.14 0.89 1.00 1.01 1.17 1.22 1.20 1.18 1.32 1.30 
PORTUGAL  1.15 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.21 1.37 1.32 1.27 1.29 1.41 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.57 0.73 1.00 0.88 0.88 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.56 0.51 
SINGAPORE  1.00 0.97 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.01 1.10 1.13 1.23 1.23 
SPAIN  1.11 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.25 1.37 1.37 1.36 1.34 1.47 
SWEDEN  0.94 0.83 1.00 1.07 1.25 1.37 1.40 1.39 0.91 1.50 
SWITZERLAND  1.15 0.99 1.00 1.09 1.26 1.39 1.37 1.23 1.13 1.33 
TAIWAN  0.98 1.01 1.00 0.85 0.90 1.09 1.07 1.09 0.93 0.94 
UNITED 
KINGDOM  
1.03 0.97 1.00 1.05 1.11 1.22 1.14 1.09 1.19 1.10 
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11. LM DISC: PRICES RELATIVE TO DISCOUNTED UNITED STATES PRICES BASED 
ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, 
PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (US=1) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.49 0.42 0.42 0.52 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.72 0.81 
AUSTRIA  0.48 0.44 0.45 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.65 0.76 
BELGIUM  0.57 0.50 0.54 0.62 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.71 0.81 
CANADA  0.60 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.66 0.70 0.77 0.91 1.00 
FINLAND  0.50 0.46 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.67 0.77 
FRANCE  0.46 0.43 0.42 0.51 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.73 
GERMANY  0.49 0.46 0.47 0.55 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.70 0.79 
GREECE  0.38 0.36 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.68 0.81 
ITALY  0.57 0.54 0.54 0.61 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.71 0.79 
JAPAN  3.32 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.69 0.81 1.00 
KOREA  0.49 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.58 0.67 0.67 
NETHERLANDS  0.59 0.53 0.53 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.68 0.73 
PORTUGAL  0.54 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.69 0.79 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.77 0.75 0.68 0.61 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.57 
SINGAPORE  0.56 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.48 0.57 0.65 
SPAIN  0.43 0.40 0.41 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.52 0.66 0.75 
SWEDEN  0.56 0.48 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.66 0.73 
SWITZERLAND  0.81 0.77 0.80 0.91 0.97 0.93 0.85 0.91 1.07 
TAIWAN  0.53 0.48 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.58 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.59 0.53 0.52 0.56 0.60 0.52 0.54 0.62 0.61 
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12. LB DISC: PRICES RELATIVE TO DISCOUNTED US BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
(US=1) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.94 0.77 0.61 0.61 0.71 0.81 1.31 1.14 1.24 1.26 
AUSTRIA  1.53 0.97 0.82 0.81 0.66 0.70 0.60 0.63 0.84 1.15 
BELGIUM  0.78 0.61 0.56 0.58 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.94 1.32 
CANADA  0.78 0.72 0.66 1.20 6.40 5.18 1.70 1.79 1.51 1.45 
FINLAND  0.60 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.75 1.02 
FRANCE   0.49 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.63 0.70 
GERMANY  1.29 0.92 0.79 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.85 1.02 1.63 
GREECE  0.50 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.70 0.76 
ITALY  0.69 0.59 0.55 0.54 0.61 0.62 0.59 0.62 0.83 1.17 
JAPAN  2.50 2.55 1.07 1.00 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.86 0.99 1.34 
KOREA  0.60 0.52 0.44 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.58 
NETHERLANDS  0.73 0.60 0.54 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.70 0.74 
PORTUGAL  0.68 0.54 0.49 0.50 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.61 0.67 
SAUDI ARABIA 0.89 0.80 0.79 0.76 0.68 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.59 
SINGAPORE  0.67 0.65 0.58 0.56 0.57 0.53 0.47 0.49 0.53 0.58 
SPAIN  0.56 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.60 0.66 
SWEDEN  0.66 0.57 0.48 0.52 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.86 1.20 
SWITZERLAND  1.10 0.86 0.84 0.90 1.00 1.05 0.90 0.84 0.88 0.99 
TAIWAN  0.52 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.51 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.86 0.71 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.70 0.64 0.63 0.70 0.67 
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13. PB DISC: PRICES RELATIVE TO DISCOUNTED US PRICES BASED ON 
BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER 
STANDARD UNIT (US=1) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.36 0.30 0.28 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.34 
AUSTRIA  0.40 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.47 
BELGIUM  0.41 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.29 0.53 
CANADA  0.26 0.30 0.31 0.40 0.46 0.51 0.53 0.55 0.49 0.50 
FINLAND  0.25 0.24 0.31 0.34 0.38 0.44 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.49 
FRANCE   0.21 0.29 0.28 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.41 
GERMANY  0.32 0.26 0.38 0.36 0.46 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.60 
GREECE  0.21 0.19 0.25 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.53 
ITALY  0.47 0.42 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.43 
JAPAN  0.35 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.37 
KOREA  0.18 0.13 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.32 
NETHERLANDS  0.46 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.53 0.52 
PORTUGAL  0.42 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.44 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.51 
SAUDI ARABIA 0.32 0.41 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.31 0.29 
SINGAPORE  0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 
SPAIN  0.33 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.44 
SWEDEN  0.29 0.26 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.47 
SWITZERLAND  0.53 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.64 0.63 0.57 0.52 0.61 
TAIWAN  0.16 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.40 
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14. PM DISC: PRICES RELATIVE TO DISCOUNTED UNITED STATES PRICES BASED 
ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE 
PER STANDARD UNIT (US=1) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.36 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.43 0.49 0.51 
AUSTRIA  0.41 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.40 0.54 
BELGIUM  0.49 0.42 0.44 0.51 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.60 0.74 
CANADA  0.53 0.26 0.42 0.52 0.57 0.59 0.66 0.72 0.64 
FINLAND  0.43 0.40 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.50 0.54 
FRANCE  0.38 0.36 0.36 0.43 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.55 
GERMANY  0.40 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.40 0.58 
GREECE  0.34 0.34 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.70 
ITALY  0.49 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.53 0.46 0.52 
JAPAN  0.47 0.44 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.68 
KOREA  0.31 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.43 0.51 0.61 0.42 
NETHERLANDS  0.48 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.57 0.57 
PORTUGAL  0.48 0.45 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.54 0.68 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.74 0.76 0.70 0.63 0.58 0.61 0.68 0.38 0.44 
SINGAPORE  0.31 0.31 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.37 0.35 
SPAIN  0.39 0.35 0.34 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.54 
SWEDEN  0.44 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.48 0.53 
SWITZERLAND  0.59 0.59 0.63 0.72 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.51 0.75 
TAIWAN  0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.36 0.34 0.38 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.48 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.44 0.42 0.48 0.44 
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15. LM UK: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE 
PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.84 0.79 0.83 0.93 0.99 1.23 1.21 1.35 1.64 
AUSTRIA  0.87 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.90 1.01 1.07 1.21 1.49 
BELGIUM  1.11 1.04 1.10 1.15 1.13 1.26 1.23 1.29 1.54 
CANADA  1.19 1.26 1.20 1.20 1.26 1.62 1.79 1.99 2.35 
FINLAND  0.94 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.97 1.07 1.02 1.12 1.38 
FRANCE  0.91 0.93 0.92 1.01 1.05 1.20 1.18 1.28 1.52 
GERMANY  0.92 0.93 0.92 0.99 1.01 1.14 1.15 1.21 1.49 
GREECE  0.72 0.75 0.77 0.87 0.92 1.12 1.25 1.38 1.79 
ITALY  1.12 1.15 1.14 1.16 1.16 1.30 1.35 1.50 1.55 
JAPAN  2.70 1.42 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.62 1.52 1.65 2.18 
KOREA  0.97 0.90 0.89 0.80 0.78 1.06 1.27 1.33 1.41 
NETHERLANDS  1.02 1.02 1.01 1.05 0.95 1.04 1.06 1.19 1.30 
PORTUGAL  1.05 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.24 1.28 1.31 1.64 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.60 1.73 1.53 1.23 1.06 1.40 1.43 1.30 1.28 
SINGAPORE  0.94 0.83 0.76 0.69 0.59 0.69 0.78 0.83 0.99 
SPAIN  0.82 0.82 0.81 0.89 0.84 0.95 1.00 1.07 1.29 
SWEDEN  0.98 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.83 0.97 0.97 1.08 1.29 
SWITZERLAND  1.32 1.41 1.47 1.53 1.53 1.69 1.58 1.59 2.00 
TAIWAN  0.98 0.96 0.88 0.82 0.78 1.04 1.07 1.03 1.17 
UNITED STATES 2.25 2.49 2.45 2.25 2.13 2.48 2.57 2.27 2.44 
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16. PM UK: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER 
STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.77 0.73 0.75 0.85 0.91 1.06 0.99 1.01 1.16 
AUSTRIA  0.74 0.75 0.75 0.83 0.82 0.95 1.02 1.06 1.27 
BELGIUM  0.90 0.89 0.90 0.96 0.94 1.05 1.05 1.12 1.34 
CANADA  1.03 1.02 1.01 1.05 1.07 1.28 1.33 1.32 1.45 
FINLAND  0.77 0.78 0.79 0.84 0.82 0.91 0.86 0.93 1.13 
FRANCE  0.77 0.79 0.78 0.89 0.92 1.05 1.01 1.01 1.16 
GERMANY  0.76 0.82 0.80 0.86 0.88 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.25 
GREECE  0.50 0.52 0.60 0.70 0.74 0.87 0.94 1.01 1.25 
ITALY  0.95 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.95 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.19 
JAPAN  0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.80 0.98 1.03 1.07 1.33 
KOREA  0.44 0.49 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.70 0.84 0.89 0.91 
NETHERLANDS  0.99 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.01 1.07 1.15 
PORTUGAL  0.84 0.87 0.88 0.94 0.97 1.14 1.17 1.21 1.46 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.32 1.49 1.39 1.15 0.96 1.04 0.97 0.84 0.80 
SINGAPORE  0.59 0.66 0.58 0.50 0.39 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.69 
SPAIN  0.67 0.67 0.69 0.76 0.74 0.83 0.87 0.87 1.08 
SWEDEN  0.90 0.81 0.82 0.80 0.75 0.85 0.83 0.87 1.01 
SWITZERLAND  1.14 1.20 1.29 1.35 1.34 1.54 1.39 1.33 1.65 
TAIWAN  0.42 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.64 
UNITED STATES 1.84 2.04 2.09 1.95 1.82 2.10 2.02 1.74 1.79 
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17. LB UK: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.99 0.93 0.87 0.90 1.00 1.06 1.23 1.20 1.26 1.46 
AUSTRIA  1.06 0.93 0.96 0.96 1.00 0.97 1.08 1.14 1.19 1.45 
BELGIUM  1.15 1.02 1.05 1.05 1.13 1.10 1.20 1.25 1.22 1.48 
CANADA  1.39 1.98 1.44 1.33 1.60 2.11 2.37 2.49 1.83 2.08 
FINLAND  1.03 0.98 1.03 1.07 1.20 1.17 1.24 1.15 1.18 1.45 
FRANCE   0.91 0.95 0.93 1.02 1.03 1.18 1.18 1.20 1.46 
GERMANY  1.72 1.12 1.17 1.15 1.24 1.33 1.34 1.30 1.25 1.53 
GREECE  0.82 0.76 0.77 0.84 0.97 0.96 1.11 1.21 1.31 1.58 
ITALY  1.14 1.07 1.11 1.10 1.15 1.11 1.21 1.25 1.30 1.50 
JAPAN  1.96 2.28 1.47 1.38 1.41 1.39 1.62 1.55 1.52 1.90 
KOREA  1.00 0.99 0.92 0.90 0.86 0.82 1.08 1.22 1.23 1.25 
NETHERLANDS  1.16 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.10 1.02 1.10 1.10 1.17 1.29 
PORTUGAL  1.13 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.08 1.07 1.20 1.21 1.21 1.44 
SPAIN  0.87 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.89 0.85 0.95 0.98 0.98 1.17 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.48 1.45 1.60 1.44 1.15 0.98 1.22 1.26 1.35 1.37 
SINGAPORE  0.78 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.74 0.64 0.76 0.83 0.83 1.00 
SWEDEN  1.10 1.06 0.99 1.01 1.05 1.01 1.12 1.12 1.15 1.36 
SWITZERLAND  1.45 9.41 1.40 1.43 1.50 1.46 1.63 1.57 1.52 1.81 
TAIWAN  0.86 1.00 0.99 0.87 0.82 0.79 0.99 1.02 0.95 1.08 
UNITED STATES 2.92 3.09 3.00 2.86 2.70 2.46 2.63 2.75 2.51 2.73 
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18. PB UK: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.73 0.71 0.67 0.64 0.68 0.71 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.77 
AUSTRIA  0.53 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.71 
BELGIUM  0.73 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.85 0.85 0.96 
CANADA  0.75 0.89 0.90 0.86 0.91 0.92 1.07 1.14 1.06 1.08 
FINLAND  0.63 0.59 0.65 0.67 0.77 0.75 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.88 
FRANCE   0.53 0.58 0.62 0.71 0.73 0.81 0.80 0.78 0.88 
GERMANY  0.53 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.68 0.70 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.94 
GREECE  0.44 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.58 0.59 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.83 
ITALY  0.69 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.80 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.91 
JAPAN  0.65 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.76 0.73 0.82 0.80 0.76 0.88 
KOREA  0.40 0.45 0.46 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.59 0.68 0.68 0.68 
NETHERLANDS  0.68 0.60 0.65 0.65 0.83 0.74 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.85 
PORTUGAL  0.57 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.67 0.71 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.85 
SPAIN  0.59 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.69 0.68 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.81 
SAUDI ARABIA 0.84 0.88 1.01 0.98 0.83 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.62 0.56 
SINGAPORE  0.51 0.52 0.57 0.55 0.50 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.55 
SWEDEN  0.52 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.58 0.50 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.66 
SWITZERLAND  0.53 0.55 0.62 0.69 0.76 0.75 0.84 0.77 0.73 0.82 
TAIWAN  0.35 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.39 0.41 0.48 0.48 0.42 0.51 
UNITED STATES 1.26 1.53 1.75 1.74 1.70 1.54 1.70 1.73 1.55 1.63 
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19. LM FR: PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1.67 1.49 1.10 1.19 1.03 1.11 1.08 1.13 1.15 
AUSTRIA  1.10 1.11 1.16 1.04 0.99 0.97 1.05 1.16 1.20 
BELGIUM  1.32 1.24 1.32 1.26 1.22 1.16 1.14 1.17 1.20 
CANADA  1.57 1.47 1.40 1.24 1.23 1.37 1.50 1.54 1.46 
FINLAND  1.19 1.19 1.23 1.17 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.13 1.17 
GERMANY  1.22 1.17 1.17 1.12 1.11 1.09 1.13 1.12 1.15 
GREECE  0.88 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.95 1.00 1.08 1.09 1.14 
ITALY  1.38 1.38 1.38 1.28 1.22 1.19 1.21 1.28 1.17 
JAPAN  3.80 1.78 1.74 1.56 1.46 1.49 1.40 1.37 1.45 
KOREA  1.14 0.99 0.96 0.80 0.77 0.90 1.07 1.07 0.93 
NETHERLANDS  1.31 1.27 1.25 1.16 1.02 0.98 1.02 1.14 1.09 
PORTUGAL  1.23 1.19 1.16 1.08 1.06 1.08 1.09 1.06 1.09 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.92 2.00 1.74 1.26 1.05 1.19 1.23 1.04 0.84 
SINGAPORE  1.30 1.07 1.04 0.84 0.67 0.70 0.81 0.81 0.83 
SPAIN  0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.90 0.96 1.10 1.11 
SWEDEN  1.54 1.39 1.39 1.14 1.03 1.06 1.05 1.13 1.14 
SWITZERLAND  1.62 1.68 1.79 1.71 1.63 1.61 1.49 1.43 1.48 
TAIWAN  1.14 1.10 1.00 0.82 0.78 0.87 0.92 0.82 0.76 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.30 1.27 1.28 1.13 1.09 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.86 
UNITED STATES 2.85 3.03 3.05 2.52 2.26 2.27 2.28 2.22 1.96 
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20. PM FR: PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.85 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.92 0.97 0.98 1.01 0.99 
AUSTRIA  0.95 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.85 0.83 0.89 0.87 0.90 
BELGIUM  1.17 1.13 1.14 1.07 1.01 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.00 
CANADA  1.20 1.17 1.19 1.09 1.09 1.17 1.30 1.30 1.24 
FINLAND  0.89 0.92 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.85 0.87 
GERMANY  0.89 0.91 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.92 0.89 0.87 
GREECE  0.73 0.74 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.94 0.97 1.04 
ITALY  1.18 1.17 1.18 1.08 1.03 0.99 1.02 0.95 0.94 
JAPAN  1.21 1.16 1.15 1.04 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.11 
KOREA  0.50 0.54 0.66 0.61 0.58 0.73 0.89 0.87 0.78 
NETHERLANDS  1.17 1.14 1.12 1.03 0.89 0.86 0.91 0.93 0.84 
PORTUGAL  1.10 1.09 1.07 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.04 1.01 1.05 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.47 1.56 1.44 1.10 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.81 0.67 
SINGAPORE  0.68 0.71 0.64 0.50 0.36 0.41 0.47 0.48 0.47 
SPAIN  0.84 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.73 0.73 0.80 0.76 0.79 
SWEDEN  0.92 0.86 0.90 0.79 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.76 
SWITZERLAND  1.37 1.44 1.55 1.45 1.40 1.37 1.27 1.22 1.31 
TAIWAN  0.44 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.51 0.57 0.51 0.55 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.10 1.07 1.09 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.85 0.78 0.66 
UNITED STATES 2.36 2.55 2.56 2.12 1.91 1.96 1.98 1.68 1.49 
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21. LB FR: PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, LASPEYRES PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1.69 1.57 1.43 1.57 1.48 2.73 2.53 2.49 2.31 
AUSTRIA  1.18 1.19 1.21 1.17 1.15 1.13 1.17 1.24 1.26 
BELGIUM  2.17 2.04 1.98 1.99 1.80 1.57 1.22 1.20 1.22 
CANADA  3.13 2.88 3.06 2.94 7.34 3.71 3.29 4.00 4.25 
FINLAND  1.26 1.31 1.38 1.29 1.26 1.25 1.19 1.17 1.22 
GERMANY  1.33 1.31 1.30 1.28 1.27 1.25 1.26 1.25 1.28 
GREECE  1.01 1.08 1.54 1.34 1.43 1.42 1.39 1.33 1.37 
ITALY  1.35 1.36 1.37 1.31 1.26 1.20 1.20 1.22 1.18 
JAPAN  2.98 1.86 1.77 1.61 1.52 1.48 1.38 1.26 1.28 
KOREA  2.07 1.02 1.17 0.88 0.82 1.17 1.04 1.01 0.87 
NETHERLANDS  1.35 1.31 1.31 1.25 1.17 1.12 1.13 1.18 1.14 
PORTUGAL  1.24 1.24 1.23 1.18 1.16 1.66 1.12 1.09 1.09 
SPAIN  1.47 1.68 1.95 2.00 1.74 1.45 0.95 1.01 1.01 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.92 2.02 1.82 1.36 1.12 1.29 1.28 1.09 0.86 
SINGAPORE  1.65 1.29 1.26 1.05 0.87 0.92 0.94 0.90 0.91 
SWEDEN  2.34 2.05 2.04 1.83 1.70 1.62 1.56 1.39 1.54 
SWITZERLAND  2.68 1.81 1.82 1.70 1.64 1.60 1.52 1.46 1.49 
TAIWAN  1.28 1.17 1.06 1.02 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.89 0.83 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.88 1.73 1.62 1.41 1.37 1.23 1.26 1.28 1.14 
UNITED STATES 5.28 3.81 3.84 3.35 2.87 2.83 2.87 2.76 2.63 
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22. PB FR: PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, PAASCHE PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.82 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.84 0.86 0.63 
AUSTRIA  0.71 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.75 
BELGIUM  0.99 1.00 1.02 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.95 0.96 
CANADA  1.07 1.10 1.09 1.02 1.03 1.10 1.22 1.15 1.05 
FINLAND  0.85 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.86 0.87 0.88 
GERMANY  0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 
GREECE  0.63 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.81 0.85 0.88 
ITALY  1.03 1.04 1.04 0.99 0.95 0.92 0.84 0.81 0.81 
JAPAN  1.17 1.16 1.10 1.02 0.93 0.84 0.79 0.78 0.84 
KOREA  0.35 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.59 0.78 0.75 0.64 
NETHERLANDS  1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.92 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.88 
PORTUGAL  0.92 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.91 0.89 0.93 
SPAIN  0.81 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.79 0.81 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.25 1.37 1.30 0.96 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.70 0.55 
SINGAPORE  0.68 0.72 0.69 0.55 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.44 
SWEDEN  0.74 0.69 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.70 
SWITZERLAND  1.10 1.19 1.28 1.23 1.23 1.25 1.13 1.10 1.12 
TAIWAN  0.50 0.49 0.47 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.46 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.09 1.06 1.07 0.98 0.97 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.68 
UNITED STATES 2.22 2.46 2.46 2.03 1.86 1.86 1.87 1.73 1.55 
 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are described in Paper 2.  Using the Paasche indices, 
discounting led to an average increase of 0.03 in index values across all years and all countries. Using 
Laspeyres indices led to an average increase of 0.063. Whilst these changes are not entirely 
insignificant, they pale in comparison to range provided by the different types of indices themselves. 
This is discussed to a greater extent in the text. In general, it highlights that, whilst potentially 
important to account for the various types of discounts, this may be secondary concern coming after 
gaining a clearer picture of the indices themselves. 
The relative changes in the rebased indices over time provide insight into the underlying evolution 
of consumption patterns and individual drug prices.  It is thus convenient to normalize the indices 
to their value in a given reference year to study the change of drug prices relative to the US over 
time.  Because 2001 is generally the year in which the indices were lowest, it was chosen as the 
reference year for our calculations. This choice avoids the complication posed by very large (and 
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possibly wrong) values of indices for Japan and Canada in 1999 and 2000.  The four indices, LB, LM, 
PM and PB, normalized to their 2001 values are given in Tables 7-10.  For most countries, all four 
indices increase over time between 2001 and 2008 with a mean increase of about 50% for the 
Laspeyres indices and of 30% for the Paasche indices.  The two exceptions are Saudi Arabia and the 
United Kingdom.  In Saudi Arabia, all four indices decrease systematically over time whilst in the 
UK, all the indices remain approximately constant. In other words, whilst the drug prices in most 
high income countries increased compared to the US between 2001 and 2008, they decreased in 
Saudi Arabia and remained relatively constant in the UK. As mentioned in the text, in the case of the 
UK this would be suggestive of an overall containment pressure from the combination of policy 
tools in place at the time, including health technology assessments and the Pharmaceutical Price 
Regulation Scheme (previous model), as well as policies promoting generic prescription and 
dispensing.  
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 Summary statistics for samples 1-13 
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS - SAMPLE 1 
*signifies that variable is time-invariant  
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
Price wtd(ln) 1756134 -21.23062 -20.95811 2.945369 8.675198 -64.49702 -10.02197 
Global penetration (ln) 2782980 3.183688 3.401197 .5190588 .2694221 .6931472 3.465736 
Strength (ln)* 1692900 4.008496 4.094345 1.668212 2.782932 .0953102 6.898715 
Form count (ln) 2292250 1.501842 1.386294 .6310742 .3982546 .6931472 3.332205 
Manufacturer count (ln) 2457700 2.497889 2.484907 1.081841 1.17038 .6931472 5.062595 
Therapeutic alternatives 
(ln) 
2741850 2.429366 2.484907 .7219274 .5211792 .6931472 4.934474 
Time-since-global-
launch (ln)* 
2404840 5.910278 5.968708 .6572496 .4319771 1.791759 7.156956 
Time-since-incountry-
launch (ln)* 
2340220 4.814804 4.927254 1.005194 1.010414 .6931472 7.17549 
Entry lag (ln)* 2327860 6.49298 6.719013 .6749448 .4555504 .6931472 7.154615 
Older population 2512605 11.63002 12.3647 5.515276 30.41827 2.6661 20.7631 
GNI per capita (ln) 2512605 9.253956 10.04238 1.46466 2.14523 6.086775 11.0001 
population growth 2512605 .8701814 .863316 .606995 .3684429 -.1313045 2.583598 
rural population 2512605 33.05606 26.72 17.89445 320.2115 2.66 72.52 
Trade 2281425 66.13367 59.55613 39.43946 1555.471 18.96887 228.8752 
Death rate 2008145 8.41447 8.5 2.234812 4.994384 3.6896 21.77128 
Year 2808680 2003.5 2003.5 2.872282 8.250003 1999 2008 
Countrycode 2808680 17.74127 20 11.51821 132.6692 1 37 
N 2808680       
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS - SAMPLE 2 
     
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
Price wtd(ln) 578244 -20.46381 -20.19951 2.808055 7.885173 -30.92904 -11.97883 
Global penetration (ln) 969650 2.378876 2.564949 .3531762 .1247335 .6931472 2.564949 
Strength (ln) 598240 4.184541 4.60517 1.68388 2.835452 .1823216 6.898715 
Form count (ln) 833820 1.573754 1.609438 .6196328 .3839448 .6931472 3.258096 
Manufacturer count (ln) 879070 2.81669 2.833213 1.179744 1.391795 .6931472 5.062595 
Therapeutic alternatives 
(ln) 
952740 2.29552 2.397895 .6978719 .4870252 .6931472 3.637586 
Time-since-global-
launch (ln) 
864930 5.932373 6.008813 .6359174 .4043909 2.639057 7.156956 
Time-since-incountry-
launch (ln) 
733000 4.577637 4.65396 .913402 .8343033 .6931472 7.166266 
Entry lag (ln) 724960 6.462282 6.572282 .621976 .3868541 .6931472 7.154615 
Older population 875922 5.150692 4.9766 .9881426 .9764257 3.4482 8.1544 
GNI per capita (ln) 875922 7.432131 7.408531 .8774175 .7698615 6.086775 9.028818 
population growth 875922 1.427417 1.407728 .3925453 .1540918 .4138161 2.477053 
rural population 875922 49.30685 49.66 19.55823 382.5244 14.88 72.52 
trade 870652 68.54445 54.69402 48.91105 2392.291 20.22726 228.8752 
Death rate 567223 7.571139 7.5 3.322725 11.0405 4.4764 21.77128 
Year 982030 2003.5 2003.5 2.872283 8.250008 1999 2008 
Countrycode 982030 8.089407 6 4.973471 24.73541 2 25 
N 982030       
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS - SAMPLE 3 
 
 
    
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
Price wtd(ln) 1177890 -20.6244 -20.36437 2.951387 8.710682 -64.21597 -9.75285 
Global penetration (ln) 1798050 2.678114 2.890372 .491886 .2419518 .6931472 2.944439 
Strength (ln) 1094660 3.912285 3.912023 1.651678 2.728039 .0953102 6.887553 
Form count (ln) 1458430 1.460728 1.386294 .6338684 .4017892 .6931472 3.332205 
Manufacturer count (ln) 1578630 2.320362 2.397895 .979272 .9589736 .6931472 4.59512 
Therapeutic alternatives 
(ln) 
1789110 2.500642 2.564949 .7243942 .5247469 .6931472 4.934474 
Time-since-global-launch 
(ln) 
1539910 5.897867 5.953243 .6686132 .4470436 1.791759 7.156956 
Time-since-incountry-
launch (ln) 
1607220 4.922968 5.068904 1.026343 1.053381 .6931472 7.17549 
Entry lag (ln) 1597040 6.450512 6.682108 .7087528 .5023305 .6931472 7.154615 
Older population 1636683 15.09763 16.0507 3.418018 11.68285 2.6661 20.7631 
GNI per capita (ln) 1636683 10.22896 10.31923 .3929025 .1543724 8.961879 11.0001 
population growth 1636683 .5719593 .5028359 .4775386 .2280431 -.1313045 2.583598 
rural population 1636683 24.35894 23.3 8.359893 69.88781 2.66 46.26 
trade 1410773 64.64587 66.40145 32.14394 1033.233 18.96887 172.7742 
Death rate 1440922 8.74645 8.8 1.491355 2.22414 3.6896 11.1 
Year 1826650 2003.5 2003.5 2.872282 8.250005 1999 2008 
Countrycode 1826650 22.93024 26 10.66242 113.6872 1 37 
N 1826650       
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TABLE 4. SUMMARY STATISTICS - SAMPLE 4 
 
     
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
lnpricesuregrD 1761832 -5.805162 -6.114752 2.120089 4.494775 -41.05474 32.58273 
Global penetration (ln) 2782980 3.183688 3.401197 .5190588 .2694221 .6931472 3.465736 
Strength (ln) 1692900 4.008496 4.094345 1.668212 2.782932 .0953102 6.898715 
Form count (ln) 2292250 1.501842 1.386294 .6310742 .3982546 .6931472 3.332205 
Manufacturer count (ln) 2457700 2.497889 2.484907 1.081841 1.17038 .6931472 5.062595 
Therapeutic alternatives 
(ln) 
2741850 2.429366 2.484907 .7219274 .5211792 .6931472 4.934474 
Time-since-global-launch 
(ln) 
2404840 5.910278 5.968708 .6572496 .4319771 1.791759 7.156956 
Time-since-incountry-
launch (ln) 
2340220 4.814804 4.927254 1.005194 1.010414 .6931472 7.17549 
Entry lag (ln) 2327860 6.49298 6.719013 .6749448 .4555504 .6931472 7.154615 
Older population 2512605 11.63002 12.3647 5.515276 30.41827 2.6661 20.7631 
GNI per capita (ln) 2512605 9.253956 10.04238 1.46466 2.14523 6.086775 11.0001 
population growth 2512605 .8701814 .863316 .606995 .3684429 -.1313045 2.583598 
rural population 2512605 33.05606 26.72 17.89445 320.2115 2.66 72.52 
trade 2281425 66.13367 59.55613 39.43946 1555.471 18.96887 228.8752 
Death rate 2008145 8.41447 8.5 2.234812 4.994384 3.6896 21.77128 
Year 2808680 2003.5 2003.5 2.872282 8.250003 1999 2008 
Countrycode 2808680 17.74127 20 11.51821 132.6692 1 37 
N 2808680       
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TABLE 5. SUMMARY STATISTICS - SAMPLE 5 
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
lnpricesuregrD 568430 -6.193923 -6.331256 1.704947 2.906845 -41.05474 28.16475 
Strength (ln) 646920 4.121017 4.382027 1.660847 2.758413 .1823216 6.882438 
Form count (ln) 821750 1.651143 1.609438 .5853108 .3425888 .6931472 3.091043 
Manufacturer count (ln) 895440 2.821801 2.833213 1.0117 1.023537 .6931472 5.056246 
Therapeutic alternatives 
(ln) 
731120 1.190945 1.386294 .4121921 .1699023 .6931472 1.94591 
Time-since-global-launch 
(ln) 
876600 5.983136 6.025866 .5917638 .3501844 4.343805 7.118826 
Time-since-incountry-
launch (ln) 
744990 4.761928 4.890349 1.003971 1.007959 .6931472 7.17549 
Entry lag (ln) 717440 5.710104 5.888878 .909806 .8277469 .6931472 7.116394 
Older population 815756 11.1592 12.3077 5.550833 30.81174 2.6661 20.7631 
GNI per capita (ln) 815756 9.122021 9.891415 1.48294 2.199111 6.086775 11.0001 
population growth 815756 .9157726 .9290047 .61089 .3731866 -.1313045 2.583598 
rural population 815756 33.82889 26.72 18.35819 337.0232 2.66 72.52 
trade 747701 68.83116 61.5735 40.24016 1619.271 18.96887 228.8752 
Death rate 638456 8.39149 8.5 2.342234 5.486059 3.6896 21.77128 
Year 913680 2003.5 2003.5 2.872283 8.250009 1999 2008 
Countrycode 913680 17.58133 18 11.37751 129.4476 1 37 
N 913680        
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TABLE 6. SUMMARY STATISTICS - SAMPLE 6 
     
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
Price wtd(ln) 566737 -20.20571 -19.94178 2.954671 8.730079 -46.98684 -9.003541 
Strength (ln) 646920 4.121017 4.382027 1.660847 2.758413 .1823216 6.882438 
Form count (ln) 821750 1.651143 1.609438 .5853108 .3425888 .6931472 3.091043 
Manufacturer count (ln) 895440 2.821801 2.833213 1.0117 1.023537 .6931472 5.056246 
Therapeutic alternatives 
(ln) 
731120 1.190945 1.386294 .4121921 .1699023 .6931472 1.94591 
Time-since-global-launch 
(ln) 
876600 5.983136 6.025866 .5917638 .3501844 4.343805 7.118826 
Time-since-incountry-
launch (ln) 
744990 4.761928 4.890349 1.003971 1.007959 .6931472 7.17549 
Entry lag (ln) 717440 5.710104 5.888878 .909806 .8277469 .6931472 7.116394 
Older population 815756 11.1592 12.3077 5.550833 30.81174 2.6661 20.7631 
GNI per capita (ln) 815756 9.122021 9.891415 1.48294 2.199111 6.086775 11.0001 
population growth 815756 .9157726 .9290047 .61089 .3731866 -.1313045 2.583598 
rural population 815756 33.82889 26.72 18.35819 337.0232 2.66 72.52 
trade 747701 68.83116 61.5735 40.24016 1619.271 18.96887 228.8752 
Death rate 638456 8.39149 8.5 2.342234 5.486059 3.6896 21.77128 
Year 913680 2003.5 2003.5 2.872283 8.250009 1999 2008 
Countrycode 913680 17.58133 18 11.37751 129.4476 1 37 
N 913680       
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TABLE 7. SUMMARY STATISTICS - SAMPLE 7 
     
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
Price wtd(ln) 292372 -19.78657 -19.57155 2.818619 7.944611 -30.2012 -11.2258 
Strength (ln) 322930 4.256916 4.60517 1.677497 2.813997 .4054651 6.856462 
Form count (ln) 452050 1.691861 1.609438 .6080064 .3696718 .6931472 3.258096 
Manufacturer count 
(ln) 
481670 3.1239 3.218876 1.101687 1.213714 .6931472 5.056246 
Therapeutic 
alternatives (ln) 
428010 1.332855 1.386294 .4620242 .2134664 .6931472 1.94591 
Time-since-global-
launch (ln) 
476960 5.99459 6.086775 .5648756 .3190845 4.343805 7.118826 
Time-since-
incountry-launch (ln) 
362350 4.629425 4.718499 .8823354 .7785158 .6931472 7.166266 
Entry lag (ln) 353120 5.898615 6.011267 .6985856 .4880219 1.386294 7.116394 
Older population 438060 5.159214 4.9766 1.026081 1.052843 3.4482 8.1544 
GNI per capita (ln) 438060 7.43365 7.408531 .8644594 .74729 6.086775 9.028818 
population growth 438060 1.425945 1.407728 .399913 .1599304 .4138161 2.477053 
rural population 438060 49.18096 49.66 19.50809 380.5657 14.88 72.52 
trade 434486 70.19077 56.20589 49.16403 2417.102 20.22726 228.8752 
Death rate 279205 7.518441 7.5 3.285774 10.79631 4.4764 21.77128 
Year 492690 2003.5 2003.5 2.872284 8.250017 1999 2008 
Countrycode 492690 8.29682 7 5.177163 26.80302 2 25 
N 492690       
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TABLE 8. SUMMARY STATISTICS - SAMPLE 8 
     
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
Price wtd(ln) 463928 -19.60297 -19.37584 2.927789 8.571946 -46.91167 -8.89033 
Strength (ln) 509680 3.958703 3.912023 1.632863 2.666241 .1823216 6.882438 
Form count (ln) 623660 1.534378 1.386294 .5819112 .3386206 .6931472 3.091043 
Manufacturer count 
(ln) 
690710 2.522176 2.564949 .9267525 .8588701 .6931472 4.59512 
Therapeutic 
alternatives (ln) 
599560 1.438214 1.386294 .4674106 .2184726 .6931472 2.197225 
Time-since-global-
launch (ln) 
692860 5.938188 5.968708 .6091416 .3710535 3.367296 7.118826 
Time-since-
incountry-launch 
(ln) 
632370 4.823988 4.983607 1.040103 1.081815 .6931472 7.17549 
Entry lag (ln) 612890 5.761689 5.958425 .95204 .9063801 .6931472 7.113956 
Older population 646939 15.09681 16.0507 3.364927 11.32274 2.6661 20.7631 
GNI per capita (ln) 646939 10.20944 10.26011 .3966066 .1572968 8.961879 11.0001 
population growth 646939 .5809915 .5038087 .483348 .2336253 -.1313045 2.583598 
rural population 646939 24.24119 23.3 8.633626 74.5395 2.66 46.26 
trade 561273 68.1322 66.89499 32.1571 1034.079 18.96887 172.7742 
Death rate 568818 8.806273 8.917869 1.496649 2.239957 3.6896 11.1 
Year 722130 2003.5 2003.5 2.872283 8.250011 1999 2008 
Countrycode 722130 23.73161 26 10.08705 101.7486 1 37 
N 722130       
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TABLE 9. SUMMARY STATISTICS – SAMPLE 9 
 
        
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
olderpop 2512605 11.63002 12.3647 5.515276 30.41827 2.6661 20.7631 
lngnicap 2512605 9.253956 10.04238 1.46466 2.14523 6.086775 11.0001 
popgrowth 2512605 .8701814 .863316 .606995 .3684429 -.1313045 2.583598 
ruralpop 2512605 33.05606 26.72 17.89445 320.2115 2.66 72.52 
tradepgdp 2281425 66.13367 59.55613 39.43946 1555.471 18.96887 228.8752 
deathrate 2008145 8.41447 8.5 2.234812 4.994384 3.6896 21.77128 
year 2808680 2003.5 2003.5 2.872282 8.250003 1999 2008 
N 2808680       
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TABLE 10. SUMMARY STATISTICS – SAMPLE 10 
 
 
        
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
olderpop 875922 5.150692 4.9766 .9881426 .9764257 3.4482 8.1544 
lngnicap 875922 7.432131 7.408531 .8774175 .7698615 6.086775 9.028818 
popgrowth 875922 1.427417 1.407728 .3925453 .1540918 .4138161 2.477053 
ruralpop 875922 49.30685 49.66 19.55823 382.5244 14.88 72.52 
tradepgdp 870652 68.54445 54.69402 48.91105 2392.291 20.22726 228.8752 
deathrate 567223 7.571139 7.5 3.322725 11.0405 4.4764 21.77128 
year 982030 2003.5 2003.5 2.872283 8.250008 1999 2008 
N 982030       
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TABLE 11. SUMMARY STATISTICS – SAMPLE 11 
 
 
        
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
olderpop 1636683 15.09763 16.0507 3.418018 11.68285 2.6661 20.7631 
lngnicap 1636683 10.22896 10.31923 .3929025 .1543724 8.961879 11.0001 
popgrowth 1636683 .5719593 .5028359 .4775386 .2280431 -.1313045 2.583598 
ruralpop 1636683 24.35894 23.3 8.359893 69.88781 2.66 46.26 
tradepgdp 1410773 64.64587 66.40145 32.14394 1033.233 18.96887 172.7742 
deathrate 1440922 8.74645 8.8 1.491355 2.22414 3.6896 11.1 
year 1826650 2003.5 2003.5 2.872282 8.250005 1999 2008 
N 1826650       
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TABLE 12. SUMMARY STATISTICS – SAMPLE 12 
 
        
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
lnwtpricesuregr
D 
1756134 -21.23062 -20.95811 2.945369 8.675198 -64.49702 -10.02197 
lnpenetration 2782980 3.183688 3.401197 .5190588 .2694221 .6931472 3.465736 
lnstrength1 1692900 4.008496 4.094345 1.668212 2.782932 .0953102 6.898715 
lnformcount 2292250 1.501842 1.386294 .6310742 .3982546 .6931472 3.332205 
lnmnfcount 2457700 2.497889 2.484907 1.081841 1.17038 .6931472 5.062595 
lnthalternatives 2741850 2.429366 2.484907 .7219274 .5211792 .6931472 4.934474 
lnageG 2404840 5.910278 5.968708 .6572496 .4319771 1.791759 7.156956 
lnageL 2340220 4.814804 4.927254 1.005194 1.010414 .6931472 7.17549 
lnentrylag 2327860 6.49298 6.719013 .6749448 .4555504 .6931472 7.154615 
lngnicap 2512605 9.253956 10.04238 1.46466 2.14523 6.086775 11.0001 
tradepgdp 2281425 66.13367 59.55613 39.43946 1555.471 18.96887 228.8752 
deathrate 2008145 8.41447 8.5 2.234812 4.994384 3.6896 21.77128 
year 2808680 2003.5 2003.5 2.872282 8.250003 1999 2008 
Countrycode 2808680 17.74127 20 11.51821 132.6692 1 37 
N 2808680       
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TABLE 13. SUMMARY STATISTICS – SAMPLE 13 
 
 
        
        
 count mean p50 sd variance min max 
lnwtpricesuregr
D 
578244 -20.46381 -20.19951 2.808055 7.885173 -30.92904 -11.97883 
lnpenetration 969650 2.378876 2.564949 .3531762 .1247335 .6931472 2.564949 
lnstrength1 598240 4.184541 4.60517 1.68388 2.835452 .1823216 6.898715 
lnformcount 833820 1.573754 1.609438 .6196328 .3839448 .6931472 3.258096 
lnmnfcount 879070 2.81669 2.833213 1.179744 1.391795 .6931472 5.062595 
lnthalternatives 952740 2.29552 2.397895 .6978719 .4870252 .6931472 3.637586 
lnageG 864930 5.932373 6.008813 .6359174 .4043909 2.639057 7.156956 
lnageL 733000 4.577637 4.65396 .913402 .8343033 .6931472 7.166266 
lnentrylag 724960 6.462282 6.572282 .621976 .3868541 .6931472 7.154615 
olderpop 875922 5.150692 4.9766 .9881426 .9764257 3.4482 8.1544 
lngnicap 875922 7.432131 7.408531 .8774175 .7698615 6.086775 9.028818 
popgrowth 875922 1.427417 1.407728 .3925453 .1540918 .4138161 2.477053 
tradepgdp 870652 68.54445 54.69402 48.91105 2392.291 20.22726 228.8752 
deathrate 567223 7.571139 7.5 3.322725 11.0405 4.4764 21.77128 
year 982030 2003.5 2003.5 2.872283 8.250008 1999 2008 
Countrycode 982030 8.089407 6 4.973471 24.73541 2 25 
N 982030       
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APPENDIX 4 
SUPPORT MATERIAL FOR PAPER 4 
 
CONTENTS 
The material presented here describe the data used in the price index calculations of Paper 4. It 
provides a picture of the relative size of the individual country markets by molecule presentation 
(also a decent proxy for variability) and the degree to which the samples used in calculating the 
indices were representative of the individual country markets. 
1. Number of molecule presentations per OECD country market  
2. Number of unique ATCMOLs on market by country by year 
3. OECD sample representativeness: Proportion of total country market (by SU volume) captured 
in samples bilaterally-matched with United States 
 
1. NUMBER OF MOLECULE PRESENTATIONS PER OECD COUNTRY MARKET 
(THOSE INCLUDED IN THE DATABASE) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  7911 8046 8138 8251 8289 8315 8268 8293 8328 8288 
AUSTRIA  5726 5798 5815 5852 5870 5902 5898 5913 5904 5850 
BELGIUM  4685 4716 4787 4844 4845 4845 4782 4794 4761 4677 
CANADA  10370 10438 10622 10596 10589 10616 10746 10926 11010 10937 
FINLAND  4185 4222 4245 4258 4292 4319 4340 4330 4330 4310 
GERMANY  33291 33634 33970 34105 34196 34146 34139 34128 34027 33936 
GREECE  5585 5611 5715 5816 5818 5829 5864 5897 5876 5892 
ITALY  9061 9165 9203 9396 9379 9358 9322 9272 9254 9231 
JAPAN  17371 17390 17478 17490 17504 17503 17482 17510 17510 17483 
KOREA  11168 12506 12647 12882 12914 12994 12931 12996 13022 12929 
NETHERLANDS  11772 11973 12168 12202 12278 12350 12388 12373 12394 12377 
PORTUGAL  5287 5359 5404 5450 5498 5533 5454 5455 5455 5412 
SPAIN  7773 7849 7885 7912 7916 7926 7950 7879 7874 7840 
SWEDEN 5553 5702 5791 5940 5971 6020 6029 6067 6084 6078 
SWITZERLAND  8320 8342 8356 8367 8311 8236 8202 8139 8106 8021 
UNITED KINGDOM 7504 7573 7627 7643 7666 7677 7655 7660 7655 7592 
UNITED STATES 37904 38057 38260 38602 38669 38764 38751 38220 38230 38195 
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2. NUMBER OF UNIQUE ATCMOLS ON MARKET BY COUNTRY BY YEAR 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1430 1465 1494 1547 1569 1575 1536 1544 1564 1558 
AUSTRIA  1205 1225 1216 1231 1244 1248 1242 1252 1252 1224 
BELGIUM  1147 1156 1172 1182 1176 1173 1120 1129 1109 1067 
CANADA  1447 1436 1495 1458 1461 1457 1509 1608 1640 1618 
FINLAND  784 784 784 790 795 795 800 803 799 792 
GERMANY  2471 2516 2629 2630 2616 2509 2497 2481 2493 2486 
GREECE  996 1002 1035 1088 1080 1087 1103 1120 1111 1118 
ITALY  1348 1375 1367 1392 1369 1345 1330 1312 1304 1305 
JAPAN  1735 1733 1742 1749 1738 1732 1720 1737 1735 1731 
KOREA  1016 1333 1334 1492 1462 1501 1479 1496 1514 1482 
NETHERLANDS  994 1006 1013 996 974 978 990 982 982 974 
PORTUGAL  924 943 953 960 973 990 937 935 929 918 
SPAIN  1193 1219 1221 1220 1215 1208 1211 1181 1174 1171 
SWEDEN 799 824 856 897 892 900 906 919 931 934 
SWITZERLAND  1994 1990 1976 1966 1926 1858 1834 1794 1780 1739 
UNITED KINGDOM 1354 1369 1388 1381 1391 1390 1387 1389 1382 1348 
UNITED STATES 2172 2152 2150 2203 2200 2214 2196 2127 2160 2192 
3. OECD SAMPLE REPRESENTATIVENESS: PROPORTION OF TOTAL COUNTRY 
MARKET (BY SU VOLUME) CAPTURED IN SAMPLES BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
WITH UNITED STATES 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
AUSTRIA  71 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 74 74 
BELGIUM  80 80 80 80 81 81 81 80 82 82 
FINLAND  85 85 85 85 84 85 85 86 86 87 
FRANCE   62 63 63 62 63 65 68 70 71 
GERMANY  79 80 80 79 79 80 80 76 79 80 
ITALY  67 68 69 70 70 72 72 73 75 77 
JAPAN  72 72 72 72 71 70 69 67 66 65 
KOREA  99 99 98 98 98 97 97 97 97 97 
NETHERLANDS  92 93 93 93 93 93 93 92 92 92 
POLAND  67 68 68 69 68 70 70 65 66 67 
PORTUGAL  88 88 89 90 90 91 92 92 93 94 
SPAIN  75 76 75 75 75 77 77 76 78 78 
SWEDEN  94 94 94 93 93 93 93 92 92 92 
SWITZERLAND 79 79 79 78 78 78 78 75 78 78 
UNITED KINGDOM  86 86 86 87 87 87 87 86 85 85 
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APPENDIX 5 
SUPPORT MATERIAL TO OVERALL DISSERTATION AND ADDITIONAL GLOBAL 
INDICES 
 
CONTENTS 
 Impact of political motivations on the technical preferences for calculating price indices 
 Additional indices aggregating global data 
 
1. FM: Prices relative to United States prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, Fisher 
price indices, price per standard unit (Table) 
2. FM Prices relative to United States prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, Fisher 
price indices, price per standard unit (Graph) 
3. FM UK: Prices relative to United Kingdom prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, 
Fisher price indices, price per standard unit (Table) 
4. FM UK: Prices relative to United Kingdom prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, 
Fisher price indices, price per standard unit (Graph) 
5. FM WA: Prices relative to western Africa prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, Fisher 
price indices, price per standard unit (Table) 
6. FMWA: Prices relative to western Africa prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, Fisher 
price indices, price per standard unit (Graph) 
7. FMPH: Prices relative to the Philippines prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, Fisher 
price indices, price per standard unit (Table) 
8. FMPH: Prices relative to the Philippines prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, Fisher 
price indices, price per standard unit (Graph) 
9. FMIND: Prices relative to the India prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Table)  
10. FMIND: Prices relative to the India prices based on multilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Graph) 
11. FB Prices relative to United States prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Table) 
12. FB Prices relative to United States prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Graph) 
13. FB Prices relative to United States prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Additional graph) 
14. FBUK Prices relative to United Kingdom prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher 
price indices, price per standard unit (Table) 
15. FBUK Prices relative to United Kingdom prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher 
price indices, price per standard unit (Graph) 
  240 
 
16. FBFR: Prices relative to France prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Table) 
17. FB FR: Prices relative to France prices based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Graphs) 
18. FBWA: Prices relative to western Africa based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Table) 
19. FBWA: Prices relative to western Africa based on bilaterally-matched sample, Fisher price 
indices, price per standard unit (Graph) 
20. Proportion of total country market (by SU volume) captured in samples bilaterally-matched 
with United States 
21. Number of molecule presentations per country market in the multilaterally-matched sample 
22. Market attributes underpinning multilaterally-matched sample (average across years) 
23. Number of unique ATCMOLs in multilaterally-matched (33-country) sample 
24. Proportion of total country market (by SU volume) captured in multilaterally-matched 
samples 
25. Number of unique ATCMOLs on market by country by year 
26. Brief summary of additional results 
 
IMPACT OF POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS ON THE TECHNICAL PREFERENCES 
FOR CALCULATING PRICE INDICES 
The Introduction lists the various agents who may be interested in understanding price differentials 
for different reasons. Depending on their interest they may prefer to use indices calculated in a 
different manner. Some examples of the potential technical preferences of various agents are 
included here-below. 
Health authorities wanting to predict and manage out-going patient migration (or medical tourism) 
may want price indices based on bilateral matches with the physically-accessible neighbouring 
country using its own country for weighting given that patients would value drugs according to local, 
in-country, patterns (which is determined by exposure to marketing activities such as advertisements, 
habits of local prescribers, general attitudes towards drug consumption, etc.). With such indices and 
an understanding of transport considerations the agency could arguably be in a position to devise 
reasonable policy responses.   
National authorities concerned by the potential for parallel importing to “distort” the in-country 
market may prefer Laspeyres indices based on product-specific (e.g. brand, strength, and 
formulation) multilaterally-matched samples given that an importer may be more likely to look 
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across several neighbouring markets for clear signs of large price differentials to exploit. Such price 
comparisons would likely focus on drugs sold in-country at clearly high prices and in high volumes. 
National-level payors wanting greater leverage in price negotiations with manufacturers may use 
either manufacturer-specific indices across all products sold into the national market (Laspeyres 
indices, possibly unweighted) but matched bilaterally with other countries each in order to maximize 
the representativeness of the products with respect to wider market. However, if manufacturer-
specific arguments to lower prices are based on the notion of “fairness”, then the national-level 
payor may prefer product-by-product price multilateral comparisons to be able to demand, for 
example, the lowest or the median price offered within the list of comparison countries. (Indeed this 
type of external price referencing can be a powerful tool for national payors to use their buying 
power to drive down prices, arguably down lower than their position of relative national wealth 
would accord in a “fairer” system.) 
Patients seeking a bargain are likely to look at relative prices of specific drugs in close neighbouring 
markets if they can access those places cheaply. As only their own consumption needs are of 
relevance (assuming only legal purchase of a single drug and no re-selling), there is no need for 
weighting, or the use of an index. If however they are interested in purchasing numerous drugs for 
own-use, the savvy patient may indeed construct an index to compile all the drugs of interest to see 
if there is an appreciable difference in prices across the national borders in order to see if the trip is 
worthwhile. 
The public and civil society organizations fighting for better and fairer access to pharmaceuticals 
globally may prefer price comparisons for “essential” drugs (those needed for basic survival such as 
antibiotics, antimalarials, ARVs, etc.). Such comparisons may not be consumption-weighted and may 
include generics and brands as needed to make a political message of unfairness regarding price or 
access. With regards to the latter, indices based on availability in high-income markets (e.g. the latest 
treatments) may be chosen to highlight extreme differentials in access.   
ADDITIONAL INDICES AGGREGATING GLOBAL DATA 
The additional indices presented below present different variations of indices constructed for the 
papers in the dissertation itself. They are intended to explore how overall price relatives change 
when a key parameter, for example, the base country or sampling method, changes. In this sense 
they act much like a sensitivity analysis of the overall work.  
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The indices here utilize Fisher calculations, thereby intended to present findings in a manner as 
country independent as possible. It should be noted that some of the indices originally included in 
this appendix have been transformed into an additional paper (Paper 4). The rest have been included 
in this Appendix (5). These results could themselves be used as part of an additional paper. Indeed 
the results presented here offer the widest possible comparison using the available dataset, spanning 
low-, middle-, and high-income countries. However, most of the interesting points deriving from an 
additional analysis of this data (for example, with respect to differential pricing by income category, 
similarities/differences across markets, etc.) may not have a tremendous amount of added value 
given the findings already presented in the papers themselves. Indeed each of the countries here 
have already been included in the analysis of at least one chapter of this dissertation. Also, as 
mentioned in the limitations of this doctoral work, by expanding the price comparison out to so 
many countries, the number of pharmaceuticals (the number going down to about 100 in the 33-
country multilaterally-matched sample, representing between only 20-30% of the market by volume) 
and indeed the like-for-like nature of the comparison is diminished. In sum, whilst the findings of 
these more global comparisons presented in this appendix are interesting, it should be cautioned that 
they derive from a sample that is less robust than those analysed in the main chapters.     
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1. FM: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.40 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.39 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.57 0.63 
AUSTRIA  0.45 0.38 0.36 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.53 
BELGIUM  0.57 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.57 0.67 
BRAZIL  0.74 0.69 0.49 0.36 0.34 0.35 0.42 0.51 0.56 0.64 
CANADA  0.51 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.58 0.62 0.68 0.75 0.78 
EGYPT  0.28 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.24 
FINLAND  0.47 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.47 0.54 
GERMANY  0.46 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.41 0.53 
GREECE  0.34 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.43 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.67 
INDIA  0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 
INDONESIA  0.41 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.16 
ITALY  0.56 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.54 
JAPAN  0.58 0.60 0.52 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.74 
KOREA  0.36 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.58 0.47 
MALAYSIA 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.32 
MEXICO  1.02 0.98 1.06 0.95 0.88 0.87 0.94 0.97 0.97 1.01 
MOROCCO  0.44 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.41 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.56 
NETHERLANDS  0.57 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.46 0.57 0.60 
PHILIPPINES  0.74 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.44 0.33 
POLAND  0.20 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.27 0.34 
PORTUGAL  0.55 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.55 0.66 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.71 0.61 0.46 0.33 0.45 0.46 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.31 
SAUDI ARABIA 0.74 0.64 0.65 0.56 0.51 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.42 0.44 
SINGAPORE 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.40 
SPAIN  0.41 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.51 
SWEDEN 0.45 0.39 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.52 
SWITZERLAND  0.69 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.67 0.72 0.71 0.67 0.57 0.76 
THAILAND  0.19 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.14 
TUNISIA  0.37 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.41 
TURKEY  1.14 0.76 0.44 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.30 
UNITED KINGDOM 0.46 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.44 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.46 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 
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2. FM PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE 
INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (US=1) 
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3. FM UK: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM PRICES BASED ON 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER 
STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.84 0.80 0.75 0.74 0.87 0.95 1.14 1.16 1.26 1.53 
AUSTRIA  0.97 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.97 1.04 1.16 1.40 
BELGIUM  1.15 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.06 1.04 1.16 1.14 1.25 1.53 
BRAZIL  1.64 1.68 1.21 0.88 0.79 0.76 1.01 1.16 1.26 1.71 
CANADA  1.10 1.17 1.16 1.10 1.13 1.20 1.49 1.62 1.68 2.08 
EGYPT  0.50 0.55 0.55 0.46 0.33 0.29 0.39 0.47 0.43 0.50 
FINLAND  1.00 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.95 1.05 0.99 1.04 1.32 
GERMANY  0.93 0.83 0.87 0.86 0.92 0.93 1.05 1.07 1.08 1.32 
GREECE  0.72 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.79 0.85 1.04 1.13 1.28 1.60 
INDIA  0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.20 
INDONESIA  0.66 0.60 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.52 0.60 0.47 0.41 0.48 
ITALY  1.15 1.11 1.09 1.08 1.10 1.11 1.22 1.27 1.37 1.45 
JAPAN  1.14 1.35 1.20 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.30 1.35 1.40 1.83 
KOREA  0.58 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.63 0.62 0.83 1.02 1.10 1.18 
MALAYSIA 0.51 0.53 0.63 0.58 0.54 0.50 0.57 0.63 0.61 0.77 
MEXICO  1.97 2.16 2.43 2.29 1.90 1.73 2.09 2.13 2.15 2.56 
MOROCCO  0.86 0.88 0.88 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.98 0.98 1.01 1.26 
NETHERLANDS  1.21 1.08 1.07 1.04 1.07 0.95 1.02 1.05 1.18 1.28 
PHILIPPINES  1.61 1.35 1.29 1.19 1.05 0.89 1.00 1.05 1.18 1.46 
POLAND  0.34 0.36 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.38 0.50 0.57 0.60 0.84 
PORTUGAL  1.15 1.05 1.05 0.98 0.99 1.02 1.21 1.27 1.34 1.66 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.43 1.33 1.06 0.77 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.76 0.78 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.48 1.45 1.57 1.37 1.12 0.99 1.22 1.20 1.12 1.12 
SINGAPORE 0.64 0.73 0.72 0.61 0.56 0.47 0.58 0.65 0.69 0.84 
SPAIN  0.87 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.79 0.75 0.88 0.92 0.96 1.16 
SWEDEN 1.06 1.01 0.93 0.96 0.91 0.89 1.01 0.99 1.03 1.23 
SWITZERLAND  1.47 1.38 1.37 1.39 1.47 1.47 1.70 1.57 1.54 1.93 
THAILAND  0.36 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.38 0.45 0.55 
TUNISIA  0.73 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.93 
TURKEY  2.57 1.79 1.03 0.90 0.72 0.65 0.69 0.63 0.69 0.77 
UNITED STATES 2.17 2.43 2.42 2.40 2.28 2.14 2.43 2.40 2.16 2.26 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.86 0.76 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.86 1.04 
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4. FM UK: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE 
INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (UK=1) 
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5. FM WA: PRICES RELATIVE TO WESTERN AFRICA PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.98 1.12 1.03 1.01 1.15 1.15 1.26 1.31 1.54 1.62 
AUSTRIA  1.47 1.55 1.45 1.93 1.40 1.29 1.31 1.44 2.19 1.64 
BELGIUM  1.48 1.54 1.45 1.48 1.60 1.49 1.51 1.55 1.68 1.85 
BRAZIL  1.96 2.39 1.64 1.26 1.05 1.00 1.27 1.55 1.66 1.83 
CANADA  1.14 1.37 1.38 1.43 1.42 1.34 1.55 1.79 1.92 2.00 
EGYPT  0.55 0.65 0.57 0.53 0.34 0.29 0.36 0.45 0.43 0.42 
FINLAND  1.51 1.65 1.60 1.45 1.54 1.43 1.47 1.47 1.52 1.66 
GERMANY  1.19 1.25 1.25 1.35 1.27 1.17 1.18 1.25 1.46 1.29 
GREECE  0.82 0.81 0.82 0.89 1.04 1.11 1.30 1.46 1.52 1.64 
INDIA  0.18 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.23 
INDONESIA  0.58 0.61 0.53 0.61 0.59 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.71 0.45 
ITALY  1.46 1.63 1.54 1.55 1.61 1.57 1.67 1.80 1.82 1.83 
JAPAN  1.36 1.79 1.52 1.48 1.46 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.56 1.75 
KOREA  0.56 0.77 0.73 0.83 0.72 0.68 0.87 1.09 1.11 1.03 
MALAYSIA 0.62 0.72 0.85 0.83 0.71 0.44 0.50 0.61 0.61 0.68 
MEXICO  2.18 2.69 2.87 2.83 2.25 1.99 2.33 2.59 2.63 2.65 
MOROCCO  1.05 1.25 1.17 1.16 1.14 1.11 1.21 1.31 1.35 1.43 
NETHERLANDS  1.47 1.64 1.57 1.57 1.56 1.27 1.25 1.33 2.45 1.38 
PHILIPPINES  1.62 1.53 1.43 1.55 1.14 0.99 1.12 1.27 1.93 1.57 
POLAND  0.41 0.50 0.55 0.66 0.56 0.52 0.63 0.74 0.79 0.96 
PORTUGAL  1.43 1.52 1.44 1.41 1.44 1.40 1.46 1.58 1.60 1.73 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.61 1.66 1.32 1.04 1.28 1.05 0.93 0.87 0.82 0.72 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.64 1.85 1.92 1.78 1.42 1.21 1.32 1.38 1.33 1.14 
SINGAPORE 0.70 0.85 0.86 0.83 0.74 0.54 0.62 0.67 0.75 0.75 
SPAIN  0.99 1.03 0.97 1.02 1.06 0.93 0.99 1.10 1.12 1.18 
SWEDEN 1.30 1.45 1.31 2.13 1.25 1.11 1.15 1.19 2.07 1.32 
SWITZERLAND  1.90 2.05 1.99 2.15 2.27 2.16 2.26 2.15 2.17 2.28 
THAILAND  0.34 0.34 0.33 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.40 0.69 0.43 
TUNISIA  0.90 0.94 0.93 0.85 0.83 0.77 0.83 0.89 0.91 0.97 
TURKEY  2.91 2.41 1.34 1.13 0.93 0.85 0.85 0.79 0.88 0.84 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.16 1.32 1.23 1.21 1.23 1.15 1.12 1.16 1.16 0.96 
UNITED STATES 2.20 2.98 3.01 2.97 3.02 2.49 2.55 2.51 2.50 2.49 
   248 
 
6. FM WA: PRICES RELATIVE TO WESTERN AFRICA PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE 
INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (WESTERN AFRICA =1) 
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7. FM PH: PRICES RELATIVE TO THE PHILIPPINES PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  0.53 0.79 0.75 0.63 0.85 1.02 1.01 0.94 0.89 0.92 
AUSTRIA  0.77 0.86 0.87 0.90 1.13 1.28 1.21 1.16 1.13 1.15 
BELGIUM  0.86 0.85 0.91 1.01 1.26 1.44 1.36 1.22 1.16 1.22 
BRAZIL  1.18 1.47 1.13 0.87 0.89 0.96 1.08 1.13 1.06 1.19 
CANADA  0.65 0.79 0.88 0.93 1.06 1.30 1.39 1.39 1.27 1.29 
EGYPT  0.34 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.27 
FINLAND  0.76 0.88 0.94 0.99 1.21 1.40 1.33 1.18 1.14 1.17 
GERMANY  0.67 0.81 0.85 0.88 1.09 1.27 1.19 1.10 0.97 0.95 
GREECE  0.48 0.48 0.56 0.63 1.09 1.57 2.00 2.12 1.62 1.57 
INDIA  0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 
INDONESIA  0.39 0.47 0.42 0.47 0.58 0.53 0.44 0.38 0.31 0.32 
ITALY  0.86 0.98 1.05 1.10 1.32 1.50 1.41 1.26 1.09 1.10 
JAPAN  0.79 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.18 1.34 1.33 1.20 1.06 1.17 
KOREA  0.34 0.44 0.48 0.51 0.58 0.68 0.78 0.86 0.81 0.77 
MALAYSIA 0.31 0.37 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.42 0.45 
MEXICO  1.27 1.56 1.86 1.85 1.79 1.84 1.91 1.82 1.54 1.60 
MOROCCO  0.60 0.70 0.72 0.73 0.87 0.99 0.96 0.88 0.76 0.84 
NETHERLANDS  0.80 1.24 1.21 1.23 1.42 1.52 1.31 1.14 1.13 1.02 
POLAND  0.25 0.31 0.38 0.43 0.49 0.52 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.65 
PORTUGAL  0.79 0.86 0.90 0.92 1.10 1.27 1.24 1.14 1.01 1.07 
SOUTH AFRICA  0.92 0.97 0.86 0.70 1.00 1.08 0.91 0.81 0.64 0.55 
SAUDI ARABIA 0.95 1.07 1.22 1.14 1.12 1.10 1.08 0.98 0.73 0.71 
SINGAPORE 0.37 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.53 0.54 
SPAIN  0.61 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.94 1.01 0.99 0.95 0.87 0.89 
SWEDEN 0.68 0.86 0.84 0.91 1.03 1.12 1.05 0.95 0.86 0.83 
SWITZERLAND  1.05 1.08 1.18 1.31 1.68 2.00 1.94 1.62 1.42 1.49 
THAILAND  0.21 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.34 0.36 
TUNISIA  0.50 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.61 0.67 0.65 0.61 0.49 0.53 
TURKEY  1.88 1.60 0.97 0.81 0.81 0.86 0.77 0.63 0.54 0.55 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
0.62 0.74 0.78 0.84 0.96 1.12 1.00 0.95 0.85 0.68 
UNITED STATES 1.34 2.56 2.71 2.97 3.26 3.70 3.31 2.71 2.27 3.02 
WESTERN AFRICA 0.62 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.88 1.01 0.89 0.79 0.52 0.64 
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8. FM PH: PRICES RELATIVE TO THE PHILIPPINES PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE 
INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (PHILIPPINES = 1) 
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9. FM IND: PRICES RELATIVE TO THE INDIA PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  6.94 6.65 6.20 6.11 7.61 8.67 7.98 8.39 8.14 8.46 
AUSTRIA  7.71 6.98 6.89 7.62 8.48 8.73 7.92 8.52 7.98 6.96 
BELGIUM  7.61 6.59 6.40 7.37 8.80 9.25 8.19 8.34 8.34 8.86 
BRAZIL  11.36 11.22 7.72 6.15 5.56 5.71 6.39 7.76 7.60 8.26 
CANADA  7.70 8.18 8.45 8.71 9.69 10.52 10.23 11.43 10.69 10.65 
EGYPT  3.29 3.28 3.10 2.98 2.24 2.06 2.20 2.58 2.17 1.89 
FINLAND  6.68 6.16 6.37 6.95 7.98 8.20 7.31 7.11 7.02 6.88 
GERMANY  6.90 6.16 6.49 6.70 7.88 8.53 7.43 7.81 6.92 6.25 
GREECE  4.72 3.96 4.16 5.03 6.39 7.21 7.31 8.27 7.73 8.53 
INDONESIA  3.42 3.17 2.74 3.30 4.01 3.58 3.07 2.91 2.43 2.33 
ITALY  7.05 6.74 6.93 7.83 8.88 9.15 8.62 8.85 8.40 7.34 
JAPAN  8.14 9.51 8.20 8.45 8.91 9.65 9.29 9.22 8.19 9.28 
KOREA  4.30 4.16 3.92 4.47 4.59 4.94 5.56 7.05 6.38 5.96 
MALAYSIA 3.82 3.81 4.36 4.46 4.19 3.71 3.47 4.12 3.52 3.63 
MEXICO  12.26 12.96 14.57 15.33 13.42 13.24 13.03 14.18 12.84 13.01 
MOROCCO  5.31 5.18 5.14 5.50 6.32 6.79 6.19 6.55 5.93 6.01 
NETHERLANDS  8.93 8.68 8.35 8.62 9.57 8.84 7.77 8.12 8.56 7.64 
PHILIPPINES  9.42 8.29 7.72 8.20 7.50 6.90 6.42 7.25 7.26 6.80 
POLAND  2.23 2.30 2.60 3.06 3.10 3.09 3.26 3.64 3.50 3.95 
PORTUGAL  7.96 7.25 7.04 7.45 8.39 9.11 8.49 9.07 8.20 8.45 
SOUTH AFRICA  9.93 8.92 7.24 6.13 7.96 7.20 5.52 6.40 5.32 4.66 
SAUDI ARABIA 10.05 9.24 10.02 9.64 8.15 7.37 6.89 7.16 6.00 5.13 
SINGAPORE 4.58 5.02 4.79 4.92 4.48 4.07 4.16 4.76 4.59 4.44 
SPAIN  6.09 5.35 5.04 5.47 6.39 6.19 5.88 6.43 6.19 5.98 
SWEDEN 7.57 7.18 6.72 7.72 7.64 7.39 6.76 6.69 6.95 6.28 
SWITZERLAND  11.60 10.81 10.58 11.63 13.01 13.75 12.75 11.66 9.95 10.55 
THAILAND  1.89 1.91 1.84 1.95 1.92 2.03 1.83 2.48 2.67 2.54 
TUNISIA  4.41 3.79 4.02 4.29 4.79 4.65 4.38 4.59 4.14 3.99 
TURKEY  13.93 10.20 6.08 5.48 5.03 4.99 4.23 3.88 3.67 3.58 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
7.57 7.41 7.30 7.68 8.24 8.46 6.81 6.91 6.43 5.04 
UNITED STATES 13.53 16.22 16.25 18.47 19.11 19.38 17.89 17.41 15.16 13.41 
WESTERN AFRICA 5.45 4.67 4.87 5.11 5.86 6.69 5.36 5.30 4.71 4.41 
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10. FM IND: PRICES RELATIVE TO THE INDIA PRICES BASED ON MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE 
INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (INDIA=1) 
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11. FB PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     0.29 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.23 
AUSTRALIA  0.54 0.44 0.38 0.36 0.43 0.49 0.63 0.56 0.60 0.60 
AUSTRIA  0.72 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.53 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.67 
BELGIUM  0.52 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.48 0.77 
BRAZIL  0.68 0.66 0.48 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.47 0.49 0.57 
CANADA  0.42 0.43 0.42 0.64 1.58 1.49 0.88 0.92 0.79 0.79 
EGYPT  0.29 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.16 
FINLAND  0.35 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.54 0.65 
FRANCE   0.29 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.49 
GERMANY  0.59 0.45 0.51 0.49 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.65 0.91 
GREECE  0.30 0.25 0.29 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.58 
INDIA  0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 
INDONESIA  0.35 0.29 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.23 0.16 0.15 0.14 
ITALY  0.52 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.65 
JAPAN  0.86 0.90 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.53 0.65 
KOREA  0.30 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.40 
MALAYSIA  0.30 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.29 
MEXICO  0.53 0.52 0.89 0.87 0.78 0.76 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.84 
MOROCCO  0.37 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.40 
NETHERLANDS  0.53 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.57 
PHILIPPINES  0.61 0.48 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.36 
POLAND  0.28 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.42 
PORTUGAL  0.49 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.54 
SAUDI ARABIA  0.49 0.53 0.61 0.56 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.42 0.38 
SINGAPORE  0.38 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.40 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.62 0.50 0.38 0.31 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.29 
SPAIN  0.40 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.50 
SWEDEN  0.40 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.44 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.69 
SWITZERLAND  0.70 0.58 0.57 0.62 0.70 0.75 0.69 0.63 0.62 0.71 
TAIWAN  0.27 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.26 
THAILAND  0.17 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.16 
TUNISIA  0.31 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.27 
TURKEY  1.52 0.94 0.55 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.37 0.32 0.34 0.34 
UNITED KINGDOM  0.52 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.51 0.47 
WESTERN AFRICA  0.28 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.27 
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12. FB PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, 
PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (US=1)
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13. FB PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED STATES PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, 
PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (US=1, EXCLUDES CANADA) 
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14. FB UK: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     0.71 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.64 0.61 0.65 
AUSTRALIA  0.86 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.84 0.87 1.01 0.95 0.97 1.08 
AUSTRIA  0.77 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.83 0.86 0.87 1.03 
BELGIUM  0.94 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.98 0.97 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.28 
BRAZIL  1.18 1.22 0.94 0.73 0.69 0.64 0.85 0.97 1.02 1.28 
CANADA  1.03 1.17 1.13 1.08 1.12 1.40 1.61 1.70 1.41 1.52 
EGYPT  0.55 0.55 0.51 0.40 0.32 0.24 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.31 
FINLAND  0.83 0.78 0.84 0.86 0.97 0.94 1.02 0.96 0.97 1.15 
FRANCE   0.72 0.76 0.78 0.87 0.89 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.15 
GERMANY  1.00 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.94 0.94 1.06 1.06 1.03 1.23 
GREECE  0.63 0.58 0.61 0.67 0.77 0.78 0.89 0.95 1.00 1.20 
INDIA  0.18 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 
INDONESIA  0.58 0.58 0.52 0.64 0.66 0.56 0.55 0.50 0.46 0.51 
ITALY  0.91 0.87 0.91 0.92 0.97 0.97 1.04 1.07 1.08 1.21 
JAPAN  1.18 1.36 1.09 1.02 1.07 1.05 1.20 1.17 1.13 1.35 
KOREA  0.64 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.84 0.96 0.97 0.97 
MALAYSIA  0.55 0.59 0.69 0.63 0.57 0.55 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.72 
MEXICO  1.58 1.76 2.04 1.91 1.69 1.54 1.82 1.89 1.74 1.88 
MOROCCO  0.75 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.90 0.89 0.90 1.06 
NETHERLANDS  0.89 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.96 0.87 0.97 0.99 1.02 1.09 
PHILIPPINES  1.45 1.32 1.30 1.24 1.10 0.95 1.04 1.10 1.18 1.39 
POLAND  0.31 0.32 0.40 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.54 0.59 0.60 0.79 
PORTUGAL  0.81 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.86 0.88 0.97 0.96 0.95 1.12 
PUERTO RICO  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SAUDI ARABIA  1.16 1.18 1.34 1.24 1.02 0.87 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.92 
SINGAPORE  0.65 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.55 0.65 0.70 0.68 0.79 
SOUTH AFRICA 1.06 0.99 0.83 0.61 0.78 0.72 0.74 0.67 0.58 0.55 
SPAIN  0.73 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.80 0.77 0.86 0.88 0.87 1.03 
SWEDEN  0.76 0.74 0.71 0.73 0.79 0.72 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.97 
SWITZERLAND  0.88 0.87 0.95 1.01 1.08 1.06 1.19 1.12 1.07 1.24 
TAIWAN  0.57 0.67 0.69 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.70 0.72 0.65 0.76 
THAILAND  0.36 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.48 0.55 
TUNISIA  0.63 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.79 
TURKEY  2.70 1.92 1.11 0.93 0.82 0.68 0.71 0.62 0.64 0.67 
WESTERN AFRICA  0.66 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.64 0.68 0.75 
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15. FB UK: PRICES RELATIVE TO UNITED KINGDOM PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE 
INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (UK=1) 
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16. FB FR: PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    0.90 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.58 
AUSTRALIA  1.24 1.15 1.12 1.18 1.16 1.62 1.55 1.56 1.48 
AUSTRIA  1.01 1.01 1.03 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.99 1.01 1.04 
BELGIUM  1.20 1.18 1.19 1.15 1.13 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.12 
BRAZIL  1.87 1.38 1.05 0.86 0.82 0.95 1.08 1.12 1.17 
CANADA  1.82 1.88 1.76 1.67 1.70 1.71 1.77 1.67 1.56 
EGYPT  0.70 0.60 0.49 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.26 
FINLAND  1.04 1.09 1.14 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.04 1.04 1.07 
FRANCE  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GERMANY  1.12 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.12 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.16 
GREECE  0.88 0.93 1.14 1.06 1.11 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.20 
INDIA  0.27 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 
INDONESIA  0.81 0.77 0.84 0.86 0.70 0.62 0.60 0.51 0.53 
ITALY  1.25 1.24 1.24 1.16 1.11 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.04 
JAPAN  2.02 1.55 1.48 1.37 1.26 1.20 1.14 1.07 1.12 
KOREA  0.87 0.65 0.75 0.64 0.63 0.86 0.93 0.91 0.78 
MALAYSIA  0.86 0.93 0.87 0.73 0.67 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.62 
MEXICO  2.58 2.84 2.73 2.10 1.96 1.94 2.02 1.88 1.81 
MOROCCO  1.03 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.92 
NETHERLANDS  1.19 1.17 1.18 1.14 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.09 1.04 
PHILIPPINES  1.94 1.85 1.67 1.30 1.13 1.15 1.28 1.30 1.32 
POLAND  0.58 0.64 0.66 0.61 0.58 0.63 0.67 0.68 0.74 
PORTUGAL  1.09 1.09 1.08 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.03 1.01 1.03 
PUERTO RICO  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SAUDI ARABIA  1.68 1.80 1.64 1.23 1.04 1.09 1.07 0.94 0.74 
SINGAPORE  1.17 1.03 1.00 0.83 0.68 0.72 0.77 0.74 0.74 
SOUTH AFRICA 1.48 1.20 0.87 1.01 0.94 0.85 0.77 0.66 0.53 
SPAIN  0.90 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.91 0.93 0.94 
SWEDEN  1.41 1.28 1.31 1.22 1.16 1.14 1.14 1.10 1.15 
SWITZERLAND  1.87 1.51 1.56 1.48 1.47 1.46 1.37 1.35 1.37 
TAIWAN  0.81 0.78 0.72 0.61 0.61 0.67 0.71 0.63 0.63 
THAILAND  0.43 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.45 0.55 0.54 
TUNISIA  0.80 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.69 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.72 
TURKEY  3.78 2.08 1.69 1.29 1.01 0.89 0.78 0.76 0.71 
UNITED KINGDOM  1.47 1.38 1.34 1.19 1.17 1.04 1.05 1.05 0.92 
WESTERN AFRICA  0.88 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.82 
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17. FB FR: PRICES RELATIVE TO FRANCE PRICES BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE 
PER STANDARD UNIT (FRANCE=1) 
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18. FB WA: PRICES RELATIVE TO WESTERN AFRICA BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED 
SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA    1.04 0.32 0.26 0.37 0.63 0.60 0.60 
AUSTRALIA  1.41 1.67 1.60 1.60 2.03 1.77 1.90 2.04 2.08 2.27 
AUSTRIA  1.42 1.39 1.36 1.53 1.64 1.53 1.62 1.69 1.90 2.00 
BELGIUM  1.78 1.86 1.78 1.81 1.98 1.91 1.70 1.74 1.80 1.90 
BRAZIL  2.02 2.31 1.73 1.22 1.07 0.97 1.21 1.47 1.55 1.79 
CANADA  2.49 2.67 2.64 2.37 2.75 2.45 2.82 3.19 2.90 3.07 
EGYPT  0.62 0.81 0.74 0.53 0.37 0.30 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.36 
FINLAND  1.43 1.60 1.76 1.88 1.99 1.85 2.00 1.97 1.97 2.24 
FRANCE   1.24 1.21 1.22 1.31 1.19 1.25 1.27 1.27 1.37 
GERMANY  1.59 1.65 1.64 1.67 1.74 1.62 1.69 1.78 1.75 1.85 
GREECE  1.86 1.17 1.34 2.29 2.03 2.15 2.13 2.05 1.98 2.31 
INDIA  0.28 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.35 
INDONESIA  0.86 1.01 0.92 1.09 1.04 0.89 0.84 0.93 0.76 0.77 
ITALY  1.42 1.57 1.57 1.53 1.50 1.45 1.53 1.61 1.62 1.70 
JAPAN  1.40 1.95 2.05 1.85 1.80 1.75 1.95 2.00 1.92 2.19 
KOREA  0.81 2.33 1.28 1.77 1.35 1.37 2.24 1.93 1.89 1.81 
MALAYSIA  0.98 1.19 1.40 1.37 1.15 1.14 1.17 1.28 1.06 1.12 
MEXICO  2.61 3.22 3.52 3.52 2.73 3.06 2.84 3.17 2.76 2.97 
MOROCCO  0.86 1.32 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.05 1.12 1.15 1.24 
NETHERLANDS  1.46 1.52 1.47 1.50 1.56 1.36 1.40 1.47 2.17 2.20 
PHILIPPINES  2.57 3.23 3.15 3.20 2.55 2.26 2.26 2.62 2.68 2.92 
POLAND  0.57 0.75 0.78 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.95 1.05 1.00 1.20 
PORTUGAL  1.34 1.35 1.32 1.38 1.45 1.48 1.55 1.53 1.53 1.68 
SAUDI ARABIA 1.81 2.25 2.64 2.59 1.63 1.40 1.47 1.48 1.25 1.08 
SINGAPORE  0.99 1.19 1.35 1.36 1.18 0.90 1.06 0.94 0.94 1.01 
SOUTH AFRICA  1.95 2.01 1.69 1.34 1.64 1.40 1.25 1.10 0.92 0.80 
SPAIN  1.32 1.37 1.40 1.56 1.64 1.57 1.24 1.22 1.20 1.27 
SWEDEN  2.42 2.58 2.51 2.79 2.74 2.56 2.57 2.62 2.29 2.58 
SWITZERLAND  1.69 1.78 1.83 2.09 2.21 2.12 2.08 2.10 1.93 2.14 
TAIWAN  0.62 0.84 0.80 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.88 0.95 0.85 0.91 
THAILAND  0.52 0.72 0.69 0.72 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.81 0.89 0.81 
TUNISIA  0.80 0.87 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.75 0.80 0.86 0.88 0.94 
TURKEY  7.18 6.53 3.98 3.60 2.86 2.00 1.78 1.53 1.41 1.43 
UNITED KINGDOM 1.68 1.95 1.83 1.80 1.80 1.71 1.57 1.68 1.61 1.46 
UNITED STATES 3.53 4.75 4.85 5.26 4.92 3.90 4.16 4.32 3.93 3.69 
   261 
 
19. FB WA: PRICES RELATIVE TO WESTERN AFRICA BASED ON BILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE, FISHER PRICE INDICES, 
PRICE PER STANDARD UNIT (WESTERN AFRICA=1) 
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20. PROPORTION OF TOTAL COUNTRY MARKET (BY SU VOLUME) CAPTURED IN SAMPLES 
BILATERALLY-MATCHED WITH UNITED STATES 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
ALGERIA     80 80 76 85 87 87 86 
AUSTRALIA  99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
AUSTRIA  71 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 74 74 
BELGIUM  80 80 80 80 81 81 81 80 82 82 
BRAZIL  71 68 71 69 68 69 69 68 70 71 
CANADA  97 97 97 97 97 98 98 95 95 95 
EGYPT  83 81 82 81 75 74 76 72 73 73 
FINLAND  85 85 85 85 84 85 85 86 86 87 
FRANCE   62 63 63 62 63 65 68 70 71 
GERMANY  79 80 80 79 79 80 80 76 79 80 
GREECE  98 98 98 98 98 98 97 97 98 98 
INDIA  97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
INDONESIA  94 94 92 93 93 93 93 92 92 93 
ITALY  67 68 69 70 70 72 72 73 75 77 
JAPAN  72 72 72 72 71 70 69 67 66 65 
KOREA  99 99 98 98 98 97 97 97 97 97 
MALAYSIA  89 88 88 89 87 86 87 87 89 89 
MEXICO  88 87 85 84 80 81 81 80 82 83 
MOROCCO  61 63 65 66 66 66 67 68 69 69 
NETHERLANDS  92 93 93 93 93 93 93 92 92 92 
PHILIPPINES  93 96 96 95 96 96 96 95 96 95 
POLAND  67 68 68 69 68 70 70 65 66 67 
PORTUGAL  88 88 89 90 90 91 92 92 93 94 
PUERTO RICO   100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SOUTH AFRICA 86 86 86 87 87 88 89 88 89 88 
SAUDI ARABIA  92 92 91 90 87 86 86 80 82 81 
SINGAPORE  81 81 85 85 82 82 81 83 83 84 
SPAIN  75 76 75 75 75 77 77 76 78 78 
SWEDEN  94 94 94 93 93 93 93 92 92 92 
SWITZERLAND 79 79 79 78 78 78 78 75 78 78 
TAIWAN 80 81 83 82 82 81 82 81 82 82 
THAILAND  67 62 65 64 58 59 62 67 64 62 
TUNISIA  68 69 70 71 70 71 72 71 71 71 
TURKEY  76 76 76 77 72 72 73 73 73 73 
UNITED KINGDOM  86 86 86 87 87 87 87 86 85 85 
WESTERN AFRICA 60 60 61 59 57 55 63 62 63 64 
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21. NUMBER OF MOLECULE PRESENTATIONS PER COUNTRY MARKET IN THE 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLE 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1858 1774 1853 1932 2012 1966 1896 2012 2019 1962 
AUSTRIA  1384 1340 1392 1547 1625 1594 1481 1545 1648 1672 
BELGIUM  1342 1338 1311 1429 1468 1437 1368 1446 1455 1469 
BRAZIL  3812 3873 3876 3927 4040 3953 3771 3880 3936 3852 
CANADA  2470 2406 2474 2510 2614 2529 2445 2534 2623 2568 
EGYPT  1343 1325 1386 1437 1470 1409 1354 1390 1419 1377 
FINLAND  1380 1345 1393 1629 1655 1602 1525 1604 1659 1673 
GERMANY  7439 7190 7667 8333 8618 8662 8065 8560 8970 8999 
GREECE  1477 1467 1481 1654 1693 1624 1525 1613 1652 1606 
INDIA  8505 8689 9460 8783 9431 9061 8394 8544 9138 8876 
INDONESIA 3179 3069 3140 3067 3152 3007 2907 2996 2980 2916 
ITALY  2308 2186 2256 2494 2606 2486 2310 2506 2502 2494 
JAPAN  3055 2982 2955 3013 3097 2896 2761 2793 2860 2720 
KOREA  2927 2849 3096 3359 3458 3186 3072 3297 3315 3229 
MALAYSIA 2196 2111 2178 2167 2220 2104 2018 2043 2060 2017 
MEXICO  2890 2892 3045 2962 3096 2872 2704 2800 2839 2715 
MOROCCO  1041 1034 1048 1063 1084 1042 976 987 1018 986 
NETHERLANDS  3594 3483 3578 4170 4242 4111 3830 4053 4185 4167 
PHILIPPINES  2989 2934 3007 2913 2983 2873 2802 2848 2870 2870 
POLAND  1622 1605 1671 1857 1942 1898 1815 1903 1977 2023 
PORTUGAL  1723 1739 1816 2010 2059 1952 1926 2082 2194 2163 
SOUTH AFRICA 1761 1712 1761 1837 1890 1830 1737 1784 1812 1766 
SAUDI ARABIA 1132 1119 1185 1217 1235 1184 1141 1167 1187 1165 
SINGAPORE 1606 1564 1577 1610 1633 1553 1488 1502 1536 1508 
SPAIN  2411 2497 2597 2818 2888 2744 2671 2832 2950 2888 
SWEDEN 1525 1501 1588 1818 1856 1805 1696 1825 1921 1950 
SWITZERLAND  1681 1675 1725 1845 1867 1863 1769 1833 1883 1882 
THAILAND  3491 3446 3629 3595 3616 3457 3362 3375 3431 3277 
TUNISIA  701 706 698 762 770 746 701 712 721 716 
TURKEY  1221 1192 1313 1374 1432 1301 1228 1286 1348 1302 
UK  2128 2034 2046 2230 2274 2255 2082 2186 2187 2218 
UNITED STATES 7032 6992 7088 7165 7287 7184 7080 7326 7358 7216 
WESTERN AFRICA 1858 1811 1904 1828 1888 1794 1750 1785 1794 1745 
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22. NUMBER OF MOLECULE PRESENTATIONS PER COUNTRY MARKET (INCLUDED IN 
DATABASE) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  7911 8046 8138 8251 8289 8315 8268 8293 8328 8288 
AUSTRIA  5726 5798 5815 5852 5870 5902 5898 5913 5904 5850 
BELGIUM  4685 4716 4787 4844 4845 4845 4782 4794 4761 4677 
BRAZIL  11262 11417 11493 11539 11544 11529 11630 11562 11544 11561 
CANADA  10370 10438 10622 10596 10589 10616 10746 10926 11010 10937 
EGYPT  4523 4601 4704 4812 4852 4918 4978 5002 5041 5056 
FINLAND  4185 4222 4245 4258 4292 4319 4340 4330 4330 4310 
GERMANY  33291 33634 33970 34105 34196 34146 34139 34128 34027 33936 
GREECE  5585 5611 5715 5816 5818 5829 5864 5897 5876 5892 
INDIA  24120 25136 26192 27394 27935 29117 29494 29850 29971 29836 
INDONESIA 8912 8987 9012 9017 9078 9063 9062 9158 9130 9146 
ITALY  9061 9165 9203 9396 9379 9358 9322 9272 9254 9231 
JAPAN  17371 17390 17478 17490 17504 17503 17482 17510 17510 17483 
KOREA  11168 12506 12647 12882 12914 12994 12931 12996 13022 12929 
MALAYSIA 6241 6280 6278 6273 6325 6401 6421 6426 6418 6383 
MEXICO  8199 8264 8401 8543 8587 8624 8709 8875 8833 8829 
MOROCCO  2858 2862 2905 2928 2943 2949 2950 2950 2942 2842 
NETHERLANDS  11772 11973 12168 12202 12278 12350 12388 12373 12394 12377 
PHILIPPINES  7889 7907 7916 7909 7913 7925 7914 7902 7928 7919 
POLAND  6798 6915 6928 6988 6996 6961 6945 6922 6949 6881 
PORTUGAL  5287 5359 5404 5450 5498 5533 5454 5455 5455 5412 
SOUTH AFRICA 6026 6187 6234 6225 6255 6259 6255 6258 6292 6261 
SAUDI ARABIA 3387 3420 3464 3483 3492 3466 3407 3404 3411 3403 
SINGAPORE 4944 4963 4941 4917 4912 5016 5055 5070 5002 4947 
SPAIN  7773 7849 7885 7912 7916 7926 7950 7879 7874 7840 
SWEDEN 5553 5702 5791 5940 5971 6020 6029 6067 6084 6078 
SWITZERLAND  8320 8342 8356 8367 8311 8236 8202 8139 8106 8021 
THAILAND  10740 10901 10772 10861 10978 11122 11169 11197 11201 11126 
TUNISIA  2145 2144 2180 2196 2173 2186 2169 2150 2161 2152 
TURKEY  4781 4860 4901 4931 4993 5015 5354 5470 5551 5563 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
7504 7573 7627 7643 7666 7677 7655 7660 7655 7592 
UNITED STATES 37904 38057 38260 38602 38669 38764 38751 38220 38230 38195 
WESTERN AFRICA 4976 5046 5089 5127 5153 5118 5100 5140 5151 5127 
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23. ATTRIBUTES OF MOLECULE PRESENTATIONS UNDERPINNING MULTILATERALLY-
MATCHED SAMPLE (AVERAGE ACROSS YEARS) MK = FULL MARKET, MS = 
MULTILATERAL SAMPLE 
 % any 
brand 
MK 
% any 
brands MS 
% original 
brands MK 
% original 
brands MS 
% OTC 
MK 
% OTC MS 
AUSTRALIA  53 13 15 61 28 48 
AUSTRIA  71 25 19 69 7 15 
BELGIUM  72 27 23 74 14 22 
BRAZIL  73 9 6 83 14 26 
CANADA  53 11 11 54 5 12 
EGYPT  76 10 10 85   
FINLAND  73 29 21 71 12 11 
GERMANY  59 19 15 64 12 29 
GREECE  87 20 15 92   
INDIA        
INDONESIA 79 10 8 89 10 13 
ITALY  66 14 11 63 8 15 
JAPAN  66 8 8 77 3 7 
KOREA  68 5 4 73 22 29 
MALAYSIA 71 14 11 79 19 25 
MEXICO  76 13 9 80 7 14 
MOROCCO  82 17 16 94   
NETHERLANDS  55 33 26 46 10 9 
PHILIPPINES  69 11 8 73 8 12 
POLAND  68 15 11 76 15 24 
PORTUGAL  58 18 12 51 3 6 
SOUTH AFRICA 68 17 14 76 22 38 
SAUDI ARABIA 86 23 19 94   
SINGAPORE 71 19 15 78 18 24 
SPAIN  57 15 9 50 6 12 
SWEDEN 72 37 31 67 10 9 
SWITZERLAND  61 18 19 73 13 40 
THAILAND  75 6 6 88   
TUNISIA  77 22 20 89   
TURKEY  82 14 11 92   
UNITED KINGDOM 57 19 17 57 19 25 
UNITED STATES 47 10 12 54 24 34 
WESTERN AFRICA 63 14 13 75   
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24. NUMBER OF UNIQUE ATCMOLS IN MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED (33-COUNTRY) 
SAMPLE 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
101 100 101 111 114 110 100 106 112 108 
25. PROPORTION OF TOTAL COUNTRY MARKET (BY SU VOLUME) CAPTURED IN 
MULTILATERALLY-MATCHED SAMPLES 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  46 42 43 45 43 41 41 40 38 38 
AUSTRIA  25 24 25 27 28 27 27 29 32 32 
BELGIUM  30 29 28 31 31 31 32 35 35 36 
BRAZIL  33 32 31 32 33 32 31 31 31 31 
CANADA  33 35 34 35 35 34 36 39 36 34 
EGYPT  34 30 32 32 31 31 30 29 30 30 
FINLAND  39 37 38 42 41 39 39 43 42 43 
GERMANY  27 26 27 30 31 31 31 32 35 36 
GREECE  34 30 29 32 30 29 28 29 31 33 
INDIA  40 41 40 41 40 38 36 36 37 35 
INDONESIA 34 34 35 34 37 36 36 40 40 39 
ITALY  32 30 28 31 30 30 30 32 34 35 
JAPAN  17 16 15 16 16 16 15 16 17 16 
KOREA  15 17 20 20 20 19 18 19 19 19 
MALAYSIA 45 43 42 43 43 41 40 42 43 39 
MEXICO  29 27 29 27 27 26 26 27 26 25 
MOROCCO  31 31 32 34 33 32 32 34 35 35 
NETHERLANDS  38 35 37 44 43 42 41 44 44 43 
PHILIPPINES  34 39 42 42 47 47 49 46 48 48 
POLAND  32 29 29 30 30 29 30 32 30 31 
PORTUGAL  32 31 30 33 34 33 33 35 37 37 
SOUTH AFRICA 30 28 29 33 34 35 36 37 38 37 
SAUDI ARABIA 37 36 38 43 42 38 39 42 45 43 
SINGAPORE 41 37 36 38 39 38 36 39 38 39 
SPAIN  34 33 32 36 35 34 34 38 39 39 
SWEDEN 41 39 36 37 37 34 34 37 36 37 
SWITZERLAND  22 22 23 25 25 24 25 27 30 30 
THAILAND  30 27 30 29 26 24 26 27 26 23 
TUNISIA  33 33 33 34 34 35 34 35 34 32 
TURKEY  30 28 29 31 29 27 27 30 29 29 
UNITED KINGDOM 47 41 42 50 48 47 43 45 45 46 
UNITED STATES 29 28 30 31 31 30 34 39 36 36 
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WESTERN AFRICA 26 27 27 26 26 26 30 32 33 33 
26. NUMBER OF UNIQUE ATCMOLS ON MARKET BY COUNTRY BY YEAR 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AUSTRALIA  1430 1465 1494 1547 1569 1575 1536 1544 1564 1558 
AUSTRIA  1205 1225 1216 1231 1244 1248 1242 1252 1252 1224 
BELGIUM  1147 1156 1172 1182 1176 1173 1120 1129 1109 1067 
BRAZIL  1306 1370 1388 1410 1402 1386 1430 1399 1408 1417 
CANADA  1447 1436 1495 1458 1461 1457 1509 1608 1640 1618 
EGYPT  894 909 925 950 970 1006 1038 1049 1082 1097 
FINLAND  784 784 784 790 795 795 800 803 799 792 
GERMANY  2471 2516 2629 2630 2616 2509 2497 2481 2493 2486 
GREECE  996 1002 1035 1088 1080 1087 1103 1120 1111 1118 
INDIA  1136 1205 1291 1390 1265 1547 1622 1686 1728 1751 
INDONESIA 1042 1069 1083 1075 1099 1098 1110 1175 1165 1178 
ITALY  1348 1375 1367 1392 1369 1345 1330 1312 1304 1305 
JAPAN  1735 1733 1742 1749 1738 1732 1720 1737 1735 1731 
KOREA  1016 1333 1334 1492 1462 1501 1479 1496 1514 1482 
MALAYSIA 1022 1025 1017 1014 1022 1067 1084 1099 1110 1096 
MEXICO  1154 1193 1238 1286 1315 1331 1369 1479 1457 1461 
MOROCCO  813 808 835 834 842 845 844 840 835 771 
NETHERLANDS  994 1006 1013 996 974 978 990 982 982 974 
PHILIPPINES  949 943 941 931 925 914 918 916 943 941 
POLAND  1387 1411 1393 1416 1409 1371 1360 1350 1368 1342 
PORTUGAL  924 943 953 960 973 990 937 935 929 918 
SOUTH AFRICA 1234 1320 1355 1330 1335 1326 1329 1324 1357 1338 
SAUDI ARABIA 813 814 839 835 826 810 768 771 776 774 
SINGAPORE 1132 1135 1106 1091 1075 1123 1138 1158 1115 1083 
SPAIN  1193 1219 1221 1220 1215 1208 1211 1181 1174 1171 
SWEDEN 799 824 856 897 892 900 906 919 931 934 
SWITZERLAND  1994 1990 1976 1966 1926 1858 1834 1794 1780 1739 
THAILAND  1033 1041 1030 1052 1062 1063 1093 1105 1114 1094 
TUNISIA  691 685 698 696 681 686 675 665 678 667 
TURKEY  898 914 923 936 952 974 1092 1172 1228 1249 
UNITED KINGDOM 1354 1369 1388 1381 1391 1390 1387 1389 1382 1348 
UNITED STATES 2172 2152 2150 2203 2200 2214 2196 2127 2160 2192 
WESTERN AFRICA 1082 1109 1128 1146 1161 1124 1107 1140 1145 1136 
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BRIEF SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
Findings of the US-based comparison largely echo the main findings of all papers: Most high-
income countries had prices higher than most middle- and low-income countries, with the important 
exception of Mexico (a country categorized as middle-income countries) which had prices higher 
than all high-income countries, including the US in some years. A few other middle-income 
countries —such as Philippines and Brazil--had prices close to the average high-income country 
level. Prices in low-income countries were below high-income countries (except Singapore) and 
above many middle-income countries. Expanding the sample (through bilaterally-matching with the 
US) increased the representation of the sample to 65-99% (averaging over 10-year period) of the 
market by volume. Results altered the magnitude of the price relatives, namely estimating that low-
income countries prices were closer to 20% of US prices rather than 40% estimated in the smaller, 
multilaterally-match sample.  Sample size also affected UK prices relative to western Africa. When 
compared to this low-income aggregate using the smaller, multilaterally-match sample UK prices 
were actually found to be relatively smaller (a rather startling finding) but were found to be relatively 
larger when compared bilaterally. Using the UK as a base country further suggests that UK prices 
fell somewhere between the cheaper of the high-income countries and the more expensive of the 
middle-income countries.  Of perhaps most interest, however, is the echoing of the trend for other 
countries to experience an increase in prices relative to the UK from approximately 2004 to the end 
of the study period, especially amongst high-income countries. Using a larger sample size bilaterally-
match sampling gives a slightly different picture. Here prices in other high-income countries relative 
to the UK start mainly below the UK in 1999 but surpass it by 2008. So whilst the overall price 
trend is similar, the shape of the curve differs depending on the sample. The picture of middle-
income country price relatives is largely consistent across the two samples. 
This Appendix also includes additional calculations were also made using alternative base countries 
(Philippines and India) in order examine more directly price differentials to these countries.  Results 
suggest that prices in the Philippines were in general on the higher end of those found across all 
middle-income countries (Mexico having consistently the highest prices amongst the group) and 
prices in India were consistently the lowest.  This variation in prices across middle-income countries 
should be taken into account in formulating fairer pricing policies. Indeed the fact that per capita 
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GDP in 2012 was twice as much in India as in the Philippines should put some stress on the 
unfairness of relative drug pricing. 
Technical notes: Countries are excluded from the indices based on multilaterally-matched samples if 
they lacked data in at least one year (e.g. France, Algeria) in order to capture price relatives across the 
full decade. 
 
                                                 
